Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Although scholars have put enormous effort into developing models of legislative choice behavior, they may not have sufficiently considered the underlying choice process and its relationship to the institutional environment. Our analysis does so by jointly integrating more realistic models of legislator decision making with a historical perspective on institutional evolution. We apply a unified model, incorporating participation and vote choice in a theoretically and econometrically sensible manner, to roll call voting and participation choices in the 73rd (1933-1934), 89th (1965-1966), and 104th (1995-1996) United States Congresses. We consider whether the same factors affect behavior over time, whether abstention choices affect outcomes, and whether integrating voting and participation is advantageous. Our models fit the data well and reveal significant, intuitive, differences in decision making over time that are related to Congress’s development and that are relevant for policy. Realistic models and an appreciation for institutional evolution are related and important for considering legislative choice behavior.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Aldrich, J. H. (1995). Why parties? The origin and transformation of party politics in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Aldrich, J. H. , & Rohde, D. W. (1997). The transition to Republican rule in the House: Implications for theories of congressional politics. Political Science Quarterly, 112, 541-567.

Bender, B. , & Lott, J. R., Jr. (1996). Legislator voting and shirking—A critical review of the literature. Public Choice, 87, 67-100.

Brady, D. W. (1988). Critical elections and congressional policy making. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Cohen, L. R. , & Noll, R. G. (1991). How to vote, whether to vote: Strategies for voting and abstaining on congressional roll calls. Political Behavior, 13, 97-127.

Collie, M. P. (1988a). The rise of coalition politics: Voting in the U.S. House, 1933-1980. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13, 321-342.

Collie, M. P. (1988b). Universalism and parties in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1921-1980. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 865-883.

Cox, G. W. , & McCubbins, M. D. (1993). Legislative leviathan: Party government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Enelow, J. , & Hinich, M. J. (1984). The spatial theory of voting. New York: Cambridge University Press.

10.

Evans, M. , Hastings, N. , & Peacock, B. (1993). Statistical distributions. New York: John Wiley.

11.

Forgette, R. , & Sala, B. R. (1999). Conditional party government and member turnout on Senate recorded votes, 1873-1935. Journal of Politics, 61, 467-484.

12.

Gillespie, E. , & Schellhas, B. (1994). Contract with America: The bold plan by Rep. Newt Gingich, Rep. Dick Armey, and the House Republicans to change the nation. New York: Times Books.

13.

Hart, D. B. , & Munger, M. C. (1989). Declining electoral competitiveness in the House of Representatives—The differential impact of improved transportation technology. Public Choice, 61, 217-228.

14.

Krehbiel, K. (1998). Pivotal politics: A theory of U.S. lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

15.

Loomis, B. A. (2000). The contemporary Congress (3rd ed.). New York: St. Martin’s.

16.

Mayer, K. H. , & Canon, D. T. (1999). The dysfunctional Congress?: The individual roots of an institutional dilemma. Boulder, CO: Westview.

17.

McCloskey, D. N. , & Ziliak, S.T. (1996). The standard error of regressions. Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 97-114.

18.

Poole, K. T. , & Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

19.

Rohde, D. W. (1991). Parties and leaders in the postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

20.

Rothenberg, L. S. , & Sanders, M. (1999). Rational abstention and the congressional vote choice. Economics & Politics, 11, 311-340.

21.

Rothenberg, L.S. , & Sanders, M. (2000). Legislator turnout and the calculus of voting: The determinants of abstention in the U.S. Congress. Public Choice, 103, 249-270.

22.

Sachs, R. C. , Hardy-Vincent, C. , Rundquist, P. S. , & Bullock, F. M. (1997). Party leaders in Congress, 1789-1997: Vital statistics. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

23.

Schickler, E. (2001). Disjointed pluralism: Institutional innovation and the evolution of the U.S. Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

24.

Sundquist, J. L. (1968). Politics and policy; the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Modeling Legislator Decision Making

Abstract

Get full access to this article

References