The phenomenon of midterm loss—the drop in the midterm congressional vote for the president's party from its level 2 years prior—is more than a century old and counting. Some see this as a predictable referendum on the president's performance to date. Others argue that the referendum model does not hold up over time; still others, using survey data, find scant evidence for “pocketbook” voting in congressional elections. The data in this article escape reliance on a tiny sample of postwar midterms by using state-level data to test variants of the referendum hypothesis. They indicate no significant connection between state-level income change and the state's midterm vote. However, consistent with the referendum hypothesis, national income change and presidential approval have a strong overall impact, though this impact has declined markedly since the mid-1970s. Short-term lagged vote variables and measures of congressional incumbency have grown stronger over time.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Abramowitz, A. I.
(1985). Economic conditions, presidential popularity, and voting behavior in midterm congressional elections. Journal of Politics, 47(1), 31-43.
2.
Alesina, A.
, & Rosenthal, H. (1995). Partisan politics, divided government, and the economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
3.
Atkeson, L. R.
, & Partin, R. W. (1995). Economic and referendum voting: A comparison of gubernatorial and senatorial elections. American Political Science Review, 89(1), 99-107.
4.
Beck, N.
, & Katz, J. N. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data in comparative politics. American Political Science Review, 89(3), 634-647.
5.
Beck, N.
, & Katz, J. N. (1996). Nuisance vs. substance: Specifying and estimating time-series-cross-section models. Political Analysis, 6, 1-36.
6.
Born, R.
(1986). Strategic politicians and unresponsive voters. American Political Science Review, 80(2), 599-612.
7.
Campbell, A.
(1960). Surge and decline: A study of electoral change. Public Opinion Quarterly, 24(3), 397-418.
8.
Campbell, J. E.
(1985). Explaining presidential losses in midterm elections. Journal of Politics, 47(4), 1140-1157.
9.
Campbell, J. E.
(1991). The presidential surge and its midterm decline in congressional elections, 1868-1988. Journal of Politics, 53(2), 477-487.
10.
Campbell, J. E.
(1993). The presidential pulse of congressional elections. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
11.
Carsey, T. M.
, & Wright, G. C. (1998). State and national factors in gubernatorial and senatorial elections. American Journal of Political Science, 42(3), 994-1002.
12.
Chubb, J. E.
(1988). Institutions, the economy, and the dynamics of state elections. American Political Science Review, 82(1), 133-154.
13.
Clinton, W. J.
(1996). Public papers of the presidents: 1996 (vol. 1). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Cook, R.
(1997, July 12). Cities: decidedly democratic, declining in population. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 55, 1645-1653.
18.
Cox, G. W.
, & Katz, J. N. (1996). Why did the incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections grow?American Journal of Political Science, 40(2), 478-497.
19.
DeBoef, S.
, & Stimson, J. A. (1995). The dynamic structure of congressional elections. Journal of Politics, 57(3), 630-648.
20.
Erikson, R. S.
(1988). The puzzle of midterm loss. Journal of Politics, 50(4), 1011-1029.
21.
Erikson, R. S.
(1990). Economic conditions and the congressional vote: A review of the macrolevel evidence. American Journal of Political Science, 34(2), 373-399.
22.
Fiorina, M. P.
(1981). Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
23.
Fiorina, M. P.
(1989). Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment (2nd ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
24.
Fiorina, M. P.
(1992). Divided government. New York: Macmillan.
25.
Grofman, B.
, Brunell, T. L., & Koetzle, W. (1998). Why gain in the senate but midterm loss in the house? Evidence from a natural experiment. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23(1), 79-89.
26.
Haller, H. B.
, & Norpoth, H. (1994). Let the good times roll: The economic expectations of U.S. voters. American Journal of Political Science, 38(3), 625-650.
27.
Hetherington, M. J.
(1996). The media's role in forming voters' national economic evaluations in 1992. American Journal of Political Science, 40(2), 372-395.
28.
Holbrook, T. M.
(1991). Presidential elections in space and time. American Journal of Political Science, 35(1), 91-109.
29.
Holbrook, T. M.
(1994). Campaigns, national conditions, and U.S. presidential elections. American Journal of Political Science, 38(4), 973-998.
30.
Jacobson, G. C.
(1990). Does the economy matter in midterm elections? A reply to Erikson. American Journal of Political Science, 34(2), 400-404.
31.
Jacobson, G. C.
, & Kernell, S. (1981). Strategy and choice in congressional elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
32.
Kernell, S.
(1977). Presidential popularity and negative voting: An alternative explanation of the midterm congressional decline of the president's party. American Political Science Review, 71(1), 44-66.
33.
Key, V. O., Jr.
(1964). Politics, parties, and pressure groups (5th ed.). New York: Crowell.
34.
Kiewiet, D. R.
(1983). Macroeconomics and micropolitics: The electoral effects of economic issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
35.
Kiewiet, D. R.
, & Rivers, D. (1985). The economic basis of Reagan's appeal. In J. E. Chubb & P. E. Peterson (Eds.), The new direction in American politics. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
36.
Kinder, D. R.
, & Kiewiet, D. R. (1979). Economic discontent and political behavior: The role of personal grievances and collective economic judgments in congressional voting. American Journal of Political Science, 23(3), 495-517.
37.
King, G.
(1995). U.S. congressional elections, 1896-1992 (Data Set 6311). Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
38.
King, G.
, & Gelman, A. (1991). Systematic consequences of incumbency advantages in U.S. House elections. American Journal of Political Science, 35(1), 110-138.
39.
Kramer, G. H.
(1971). Short-term fluctuations in U.S. voting behavior, 1896-1964. American Political Science Review, 65(1), 131-143.
40.
Kramer, G. H.
(1983). The ecological fallacy revisited: Aggregate- versus individual-level findings on economics and elections, and sociotropic voting. American Political Science Review, 77(1), 92-111.
41.
Krause, G. A.
(1997). Voters, information heterogeneity, and the dynamics of aggregate economic expectations. American Journal of Political Science, 41(4), 1170-1200.
42.
Levitt, S. D.
(1994). An empirical test of competing explanations for the midterm gap in the U.S. House. Economics and Politics, 6(1), 25-37.
43.
Lewis-Beck, M. S.
(1984). Forecasting U.S. House elections. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 9(3), 475-486.
44.
Lewis-Beck, M. S.
(1988). Economics and the American voter: Past, present, and future. Political Behavior, 10(1), 5-21.
45.
MacKuen, M.
, Erikson, R. S., & Stimson, J. A. (1992). Peasants or bankers? The American electorate and the U.S. economy. American Political Science Review, 86(3), 597-611.
46.
Marra, R.
, & Ostrom, C. O., Jr. (1989). Explaining seat change in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1950-86. American Journal of Political Science, 33(3), 541-569.
47.
McDonald, M. P.
(1998, September). Redistricting, dealignment, and the political homogenization of congressional districts. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.
48.
Nagler, J.
, & De Boef, S. (1999, April). Economic voting: Enlightened self-interest and economic reference groups. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
49.
Oppenheimer, B. I., Stimson, J. A., & Waterman, R. (1986). Interpreting U.S. congressional elections: The exposure thesis. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 11(2), 227-247.
50.
Partin, R. W.
(1995). Economic conditions and gubernatorial elections: Is the state executive held accountable?American Politics Quarterly, 23(1), 81-95.
51.
Peltzman, S.
(1987). Economic conditions and gubernatorial elections. American Economic Review, 77(2), 293-298.
52.
Peltzman, S.
(1990). How efficient is the voting market?Journal of Law and Economics, 33(1), 27-63.
53.
Radcliff, B.
(1988). Solving a puzzle: Aggregate analysis and economic voting revisited. Journal of Politics, 50(2), 440-455.
54.
Ragsdale, L.
(1980). The fiction of congressional elections as presidential events. American Politics Quarterly, 8(4), 375-398.
55.
Ragsdale, L.
(1996). Vital statistics on the presidency: Washington to Clinton. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
56.
Rosenstone, S.
(1983). Forecasting presidential elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
57.
Scheve, K.
, & Tomz, M. (1999). Electoral surprise and the midterm loss in U.S. congressional elections. British Journal of Political Science, 29(3), 507-521.
58.
Stein, R. M.
(1990). Economic voting for governor and U.S. senator: The electoral consequences of federalism. Journal of Politics, 52(1), 29-53.
59.
Stimson, J. A.
(1985). Regression in space and time: A statistical essay. American Journal of Political Science, 29(4), 914-947.
60.
Tufte, E. R.
(1975). Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections. American Political Science Review, 69(3), 812-826.
61.
Tufte, E. R.
(1978). Political control of the economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
62.
U.S. Council of Economic Advisers
. (1998). Economic report of the president, fiscal year 1999. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
63.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
. (1989). State personal income, 1929-87. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
64.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
. (various years). Survey of current business. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
65.
Waterman, R.
, Oppenheimer, B., & Stimson, J. A. (1992). Sequences and equilibria in congressional elections: An integrated approach. Journal of Politics, 53(2), 372-393.
