In this article, the authors propose an extension to Fiorina's balancing model based on voters' electoral expectations and test this extension and several implications of the theory. The authors examine the observed pattern of ticket-splitting and find it less consistent with a balancing perspective than with an alternative approach stressing separation between presidential and congressional voting. They also address the relationship between party polarization and ticket-splitting; their results indicate that the occurrence of split ballots does not increase with polarization. A further test identifies respondents with both the sophistication and the motive to engage in balancing behavior. According to this analysis, balancing considerations influence, at most, the very small group of voters whose sophistication and electoral expectations give them the tools and the incentive to pursue balance with a split ballot. Ticket-splitting appears to result far more from incumbency and cross-pressured voters holding candidate evaluations at odds with their partisan learnings.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Alesina, A.
, & Rosenthal, H. (1995). Partisan politics, divided government, and the economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
2.
Alford, J. R.
, and Brady, D. W. (1993). Personal and partisan advantage in U.S. Congressional elections, 1846-1990. In L. C. Dodd & B. I. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Congress reconsidered (pp. 141-157). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly
3.
Alvarez, R. M.
, & Schousen, M. M. (1993). Policy moderation or conflicting expectations? Testing the intentional models of split-ticket voting. American Politics Quarterly, 21, 410-438.
4.
Born, R.
(1994). Split-ticket voters, divided government, and Fiorina's policy-balancing model. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19, 95-115.
5.
Burden, B. C.
, & Kimball, D. C. (1997, April). Breaking up isn't so hard to do: Ecological inference and split-ticket voting in the 1988 presidential election. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
6.
Burns, J. M.
(1984). The power to lead: The crisis of the American presidency. New York: Simon and Schuster.
7.
Campbell, A.
, & Miller, W. E. (1957). The motivational basis of straight and split ticket voting. American Political Science Review, 51, 293-312.
8.
Cover, A. D.
, & Mayhew, D. R. (1981). Congressional dynamics and the decline of competitive congressional elections. In L. C. Dodd & B. I. Oppenheimer (Eds.), Congress reconsidered (pp. 62-82). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
9.
Fiorina, M. P.
(1988). The Reagan years: Turning to the right or groping toward the middle? In B. Cooper, A. Kornberg, & W. Mishler (Eds.), The resurgence of conservatism in Anglo-American democracies (pp. 430-459). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
10.
Fiorina, M. P.
(1992). An era of divided government. Political Science Quarterly, 107, 387-410.
11.
Fiorina, M. P.
(1994a). Response to Born. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19, 117-125.
12.
Fiorina, M. P.
(1994b). The electorate at the polls in the 1990s. In L. S. Maisel (Ed.), The parties respond: Changes in American parties and campaigns (pp. 123-142). Boulder, CO: Westview.
13.
Fiorina, M. P.
(1996). Divided government (2nd ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
14.
Frymer, P.
, Kim, T. P., & Bimes, T. L. (1997). Party elites, ideological voters, and divided party government. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22, 195-216.
15.
Jacobson, G.
(1990). The electoral origins of divided government: competition in U.S. House elections, 1946-1988. Boulder, CO: Westview.
16.
Jacobson, G.
(1991). The persistence of Democratic House majorities. In G. W. Cox & S. Kernell (Eds.), The politics of divided government (pp. 57-84). Boulder, CO: Westview.
17.
Jacobson, G.
(1996). Divided government and the 1994 elections. In P. F. Galderisi, with R. Q. Herzberg & P. McNamara (Eds.), Divided government: Change, uncertainty, and the constitutional order (pp. 61-83). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
18.
Key, V. O., Jr.
(1966). The responsible electorate: Rationality in presidential voting, 1936-1960. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
19.
Lichtl, M. G.
, & Garand, J. C. (1997, September). Testing a model of split-ticket voting: Respectifying Fiorina's policy-balancing model. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
20.
Macdonald, S. E.
, & Rabinowitz, G. (1987). The dynamics of structural realignment. American Political Science Review, 81, 775-796.
21.
Neustadt, R. E.
(1990). Presidential power and the modern presidents. New York: The Free Press.
22.
Petrocik, J. R.
(1991). Divided government: Is it all in the campaigns? In G. W. Cox & S. Kernell (Eds.), The politics of divided government (pp. 13-38). Boulder, CO: Westview.
23.
Petrocik, J. R.
, & Doherty, J. (1996). The road to divided government: Paved without intention. In P. F. Galderisi, with R. Q. Herzberg & P. McNamara (Eds.), Divided government: Change, uncertainty, and the constitutional order (pp. 85-107). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
24.
Sigelman, L.
, Wahlbeck, P. J., & Buell, E. H., Jr. (1997). Vote choice and the preference for divided government: Lessons of 1992. American Journal of Political Science, 41, 879-894.
25.
Soss, J.
, & Canon, D. T. (1995). Partisan divisions and voting decisions: U.S. senators, governors, and the rise of a divided federal government. Political Research Quarterly, 48, 253-274.
26.
Sundquist, James L.
(1992). Constitutional reform and effective government. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
27.
Zaller, J. R.
(1985). Pre-testing information items on the 1986 NES Pilot Survey: Report to the National Election Study Board of Overseers.
