Policy-balancing Models and the Split-ticket Voter,1972-1996

Abstract

Previous examinations of the policy-balancing explanation for presidential-House split-ticket voting have been unable to sustain two of its basic propositions—that splitting should be greater for respondents located between the parties' ideological positions and for those seeing more interparty distance—when each is tested separately. Work by Garand and Lichtl, however, suggests that the between-parties expectation can be supported when both propositions are tested in the same equation. Our study demonstrates the essentially artifactual nature of this result, produced by the strong relationship of the between-parties variable to relative party closeness, with interparty distance held constant. But 1996 stands out as the one year in which clear-cut balancing behavior was manifested by the electorate. Furthermore, some backing for a modified version of the policy-balancing idea emerges when we take into account respondent perceptions of individual candidates' ideological positions.