What happens after longstanding policies are overthrown in fierce political battles, events scholars refer to as punctuated equilibrium? Do these new policies remain static and unchanging until the next big punctuation, or do they continue to change in explainable and predictable ways? In this article, we develop a model of postpunctuation policy change grounded in theories of boundedly rational decision-making by policymakers. Uncertain about how well the new policy will perform, policymakers learn to rely on competing interest groups for information or, under certain circumstances, look to other political jurisdictions for cues on how their policies ought to be further refined. We test our predictions by studying changes in state charter school laws from 1996 to 2014. We find evidence of policy change, and even convergence, across states suggesting that policies after punctuation do change in ways explained as reactions to political pressures in an environment fraught with uncertainty.
AhnSeung C.SchmidtPeter. 1995. “Efficient Estimation of Models for Dynamic Panel Data.” Journal of Econometrics68 (1): 5–27.
2.
BallaSteven J.2001. “Interstate Professional Associations and the Diffusion of Policy Innovations.” American Politics Research29 (3): 221–45.
3.
BaumgartnerFrank R.BerryJeffrey M.HojnackiMarieKimballDavid C.LeechBeth L.2009. Lobbying and Policy Change. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
4.
BaumgartnerFrank R.JonesBryan D.1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
5.
BerryWilliam D.RingquistEvan J.FordingRichard C.HansonRussell L.1998. “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States.” American Journal of Political Science42 (1): 327–48.
6.
BousheyGraeme. 2010. Policy Diffusion Dynamics in America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
BrehmJohnGatesScott. 1997. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
9.
BulkleyKatrina. 2005. “Understanding the Charter School Concept in Legislation.” International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education18 (4): 527–54.
10.
BulmanRobert C.KirpDavid L.1999. “The Shifting Politics of School Choice.” In School Choice and Social Controversy: Politics, Policy, and Law, eds. SugarmanStephen D.KemererFrank R.Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 36–67.
11.
ChiWendy C.WelnerKevin G.2008. “Charter Ranking Roulette: An Analysis of Reports that Grade States’ Charter School Laws.” American Journal of Education114 (1): 273–98.
12.
ClarkTom S.LinzerDrew A.2015. “Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?” Political Science Research and Methods3 (2): 399–408.
DoddLawrence C.1977. “Congress and the Quest for Power.” In Congress Reconsidered, eds. DoddLawrence C.OppenheimerBruce I.New York: Praeger, 269-307.
16.
FennoRichard F.Jr.1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.
17.
GigerenzerGerdSeltenReinhard. 2001. “Rethinking Rationality.” In Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, eds. GigernezerGerdSeltenReinhard. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1–12.
18.
GilardiFabrizioFüglisterKatharinaLuyetStéphane. 2009. “Learning from Others: The Diffusion of Hospital Financing Reforms in OECD Countries.” Comparative Political Studies42 (4): 549–73.
19.
GormleyWilliam T.Jr.BallaSteven J.2004. Bureaucracy and Democracy: Accountability and Performance. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
20.
GrayVirginia. 1973. “Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study.” American Political Science Review67 (4): 1174–85.
21.
GrayVirginiaLoweryDavid. 1993. “The Diversity of State Interest Group Systems.” Political Research Quarterly46 (1): 81–97.
22.
GrossbackLawrence J.SeanNicholson-CrottyPetersonDavid A. M.2004. “Ideology and Learning in Policy Diffusion.” American Politics Research32 (3): 521–45.
23.
HallRichard L.DeardorffAlan V.2006. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” American Political Science Review100 (1): 69–84.
24.
HansenJohn Mark. 1991. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
25.
HartneyMichaelFlavinPatrick. 2011. “From the Schoolhouse to the Statehouse: Teacher Union Political Activism and U.S. State Education Reform.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly11 (3): 251–68.
26.
HenigJeffrey R.1994. Rethinking School Choice: Limits of the Market Metaphor. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
27.
HenigJeffrey R.2008. Spin Cycle: How Research Is Used in Policy Debates, the Case of Charter Schools. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
28.
HenigJeffrey R.SugarmanSteven D.1999. “The Nature and Extent of School Choice.” In School Choice and Social Controversy: Politics, Policy, and Law, eds. SugarmanS. D.KemererF. R.Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 13–35.
29.
Hertel-FernandezAlexander. 2014. “Who Passes Business’s ‘Model Bills’? Policy Capacity and Corporate Influence in U.S. State Politics.” Perspectives on Politics12 (3): 582–602.
30.
HirschBarry T.MacPhersonDavid A.2003. “Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey: Note.” Industrial & Labor Relations Review56 (2): 349–54.
31.
HolyokeThomas T.HenigJeffrey R.BrownHeathLacireno-PaquetNatalie. 2009. “Policy Dynamics and the Evolution of State Charter School Laws.” Policy Sciences42 (1): 33–55.
JonesBryan D.2001. Politics and the Architecture of Choice. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
34.
JonesBryan D.BaumgartnerFrank R.BreunigChristianWlezienChristopherSorokaStuartFoucaultMartialFrançoisAbelGreen-PedersenChristofferKoskiChrisJohnPeterMortensenPeter B.VaroneFrédéricWalgraveStefaan. 2009. “A General Empirical Law of Public Budgets: A Comparative Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science53 (4): 855–73.
35.
KahnemanDanielTverskyAmos. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica47 (1): 263–92.
36.
KarchAndrew. 2007. “Emerging Issues and Future Directions in State Policy Diffusion Research.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly7 (1): 54–80.
37.
KingdonJohn W.1973. Congressmen’s Voting Decisions. Ann Abor: University of Michigan Press.
38.
KingdonJohn W.1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown.
39.
KirstMichael W.2007. “Politics of Charter Schools: Competing National Advocacy Coalitions Meet Local Politics.” Peabody Journal of Education82 (2/3): 184–203.
40.
LeeMei-HsienMooneyChristopher Z.1999. “The Temporal Diffusion of Morality Policy: The Case of Death Penalty Legislation in the American States.” Policy Studies Journal27 (4): 766–80.
41.
LindblomCharles E.1959. “The Science of Muddling through.” Public Administration Review19 (1): 79–88.
42.
LottJohnathanKennyLawrence W.2013. “State Teacher Union Strength and Student Achievement.” Economics of Education Review35 (2): 93–103.
43.
MayhewDavid A.1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
44.
McKayAmy. 2012. “Negative Lobbying and Policy Outcomes.” American Politics Research40 (1): 116–46.
45.
MeseguerCovadonga. 2006. “Rational Learning and Bounded Learning in the Diffusion of Policy Innovations.” Rationality and Society18 (1): 35–66.
46.
MintromMichael. 1997. “Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation.” American Journal of Political Science41 (3): 738–70.
47.
MoeTerry M.2015. “Vested Interests and Political Institutions.” Political Science Quarterly130 (2): 277–318.
48.
NathanJoseph. 1996. Charter Schools: Creating Hope and Opportunity for American Education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
49.
Nicholson-CrottySeanCarleySanya. 2016. “Effectiveness, Implementation, and Policy Diffusion: Or ‘Can We Make That Work For Us?’” State Politics & Policy Quarterly16 (1): 78–97.
50.
PatashnikEric M.2008. Reforms at Risk. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
51.
PatashnikEric M.ZelizerJulian E.2013. “The Struggle to Remake Politics: Liberal Reform and the Limits of Policy Feedback in the Contemporary American State.” Perspectives on Politics11 (4): 1071–87.
52.
PayneJohn W.BettmanJames R.2001. “Preferential Choice and Adaptive Strategy Use.” In Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, eds. GigerenzerGerdSeltenReinhard. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 123–46.
53.
PressmanJeffrey L.WildavskyAaron. 1973. Implementation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
54.
QuattroneGeorge A.TverskyAmos. 1988. “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice.” American Political Science Review82 (3): 719–36.
55.
SavageRobert L.1985. “When a Policy’s Time Has Come: Cases of Rapid Policy Diffusion 1983 – 1984.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism15 (1): 111–26.
56.
ScottJanelle. T.BarberMargaret. E.2002. “Charter Schools in California, Michigan, and Arizona: An Alternative Framework for Policy Analysis.” Occasional Paper #40. National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York.
57.
ShoberArnold F.MannaPaulWitteJohn F.2006. “Flexibility Meets Accountability: State Charter School Laws and Their Influence on the Formation of Charter Schools in the United States.” Policy Studies Journal34 (4): 563–87.
58.
SimonHerbert A.1955. “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (February): 99–118.
59.
StoddardChristinaCorcoranSean P.2007. “The Political Economy of School Choice: Support for Charter Schools across States and School Districts.” Journal of Urban Economics62 (1): 27–54.
60.
ToddPeter M.2001. “Fast and Frugal Heuristics for Environmentally Bounded Minds.” In Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, eds. GigerenzerGerdSeltenReinhard. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 51–70.
61.
TverskyAmosFoxCraig R.1995. “Weighing Risk and Uncertainty.” Psychological Review102 (2): 269–83.
62.
WeylandKurt. 2007. Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
63.
WongKenneth K.ShenFrancis X.2002. “Politics of State-Led Reform in Education: Market Competition and Electoral Dynamics.” Educational Policy16 (1): 161–92.
64.
WrightJohn R.1996. Interest Groups and Congress. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
