Most studies of the effects of term limits on state legislators' careers have focused solely on their propensity to seek other offices. An expected-utility analysis of the decision to run for office indicates that term limits reduce the benefits of seeking reelection, even for state legislators who are eligible to run, and reduce the opportunity cost of running for other offices. From this analysis, I develop a series of hypotheses about the probability that state legislators—term-limited or not—will seek re-election or other offices under a term limits regime, the value of the offices they seek, and the probability with which they will win these contests. I test these hypotheses using data on the career choices of state legislators in states with and without term limits in 2000–02. My empirical analysis supports the rational entry model and indicates that term limits have had a much richer effect on state legislative careers than previously understood.
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