Casus Belli

Abstract

In departing from the traditional principles of a “just war” theory, which demands that military action be taken only in self-defense, the U.S. government’s policy in its war against Iraq was preemptive, the logic being that the perceived risk of Iraqi aggression toward the United States ought to be avoided by attacking first. Perhaps this decision does not define imperialism, but it certainly has raised the specter in the eyes of much of the rest of the world. Of course, the obvious question became what evidence was there of imminent danger that should justify an attack? From the start, the principal challenge never was a matter of whether the U.S. military had the capacity to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Rather, the challenge has been all along a matter of how to sell the war and U.S. military occupation to the community of nations, the United Nations Security Council, the American people, and the Iraqi people.