The general firm/trade union bargaining literature is brought to bear on a specific North American sports league model, where talent supply is perfectly inelastic and profit-maximizing clubs receive local (gate) revenue plus an equal share of league broadcasting revenue. Club and player representatives negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on the levels of local revenue sharing, salary cap, and salary floor. Results characterize the set of efficient bargains and the Nash bargaining solution and show how they are affected by increases in broadcasting market size, focusing on player salaries, competitive balance, the content of CBA documents, and comparisons with laissez-faire.
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