Monitoring and Employee Shirking: Evidence From MLB Umpires

Abstract

Neoclassical principal–agent theory predicts stricter monitoring should reduce employee shirking; however, recent analyses indicate social aspects of principal–agent relationships may result in “crowding out” of disciplinary effects. Asymmetric implementation of an automated pitch-tracking system in baseball allows for the comparison of monitored and unmonitored umpires to identify shirking in light of incentives. Estimates identify some reduced shirking with monitoring; however, overall, umpires appeared to be quite sensitive to league directives absent technological monitoring. Extreme sensitivity to MLB mandates when unmonitored by the new technology indicates that preexisting monitoring (which included human oversight and efficiency wages) was effective at limiting shirking.

Keywords

principal–agent problem moral hazard monitoring

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Alchian

A. A.

Demsetz

(1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777–795.

Ball

(2010). Workplace surveillance: An overview. Labor History, 51, 87–106.

Bhave

D. P.

(2014). The invisible eye? Electronic performance monitoring and employee job performance. Personnel Psychology, 67, 605–635.

Bradbury

J. C.

(2007). The baseball economist: The real game exposed. New York, NY: Dutton.

Bradbury

J. C.

Drinen

D. J.

(2008). Pigou at the plate: Externalities in major league baseball. Journal of Sports Economics, 9, 221–224.

Buraimo

Forrest

Simmons

(2010). The 12th man? Refereeing bias in English and German soccer. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 173, 431–449.

Buraimo

Simmons

Maciaszczyk

(2012). Favoritism and referee bias in European soccer: Evidence from the Spanish league and the UEFA champions league. Contemporary Economic Policy, 30, 329–343.

Cappelli

Chauvin

(1991). An interplant test of the efficiency wage hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 769–787.

Chass

(2001a, July 21). Pitchers regaining upper hand. New York Times. Retrieved February 17, 2017, from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/01/sports/baseball-pitchers-regaining-upper-hand.html

10.

Chass

(2001b, March 30). Calling pitches by the book won’t be easy. New York Times. Retrieved February 17, 2017, from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/30/sports/baseball-calling-pitches-by-the-book-won-t-be-easy.html

11.

Chass

(2003, May 29). Umpires say system has them alter calls. New York Times. Retrieved February 17, 2017, from http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/29/sports/baseball-umpires-say-system-has-them-alter-calls.html

12.

Corman

Mocan

(2005). Carrots, sticks, and broken windows. Journal of Law and Economics, 48, 235–266.

13.

Dawson

Dobson

(2010). The influence of social pressure and nationality on individual decisions: Evidence from the behaviour of referees. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31, 181–191.

14.

DiGiovanna

(2011, October 8). In baseball, balls and strikes still are in eye of the beholder. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved April 28, 2017, from http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/08/sports/la-sp-mlb-strike-zone-20111009

15.

Ellingsen

Johannesson

(2008). Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive theory. American Economic Review, 98, 990–1008.

16.

Falk

Kosfeld

(2006). The hidden costs of control. American Economic Review, 96, 1611–1630.

17.

Frey

B. S.

(1993). Does monitoring increase work effort? The rivalry with trust and loyalty. Economic Inquiry, 31, 663–670.

18.

Goff

B. L.

Tollison

R. D.

(1990). Sportometrics. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

19.

Holland

P. J.

Cooper

Heckler

(2015). Electronic monitoring and surveillance in the workplace: The effects on trust in management, and the moderating role of occupational type. Personnel Review, 44, 161–175.

20.

Hutchinson

K. P.

Yates

A. J.

(2007). Crime on the court: A correction. Journal of Political Economy, 115, 515–519.

21.

Jensen

M. C.

Meckling

W. H.

(1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.

22.

Jeske

Santuzzi

A. M.

(2015). Monitoring what and how: Psychological implications of electronic performance monitoring. New Technology, Work and Employment, 30, 62–78.

23.

Kim

J. W.

King

B. G.

(2014). Seeing stars: Matthew effects and status bias in major league baseball umpiring. Management Science, 60, 2619–2644.

24.

Lahman

(2016). The Lahman Baseball Database, 2015 version. Retrieved January 27, 2017, from http://www.seanlahman.com/baseball-archive/statistics/

25.

Mahaney

R. C.

Lederer

A. L.

(2010). The role of monitoring and shirking in information systems project management. International Journal of Project Management, 28, 14–25.

26.

McCormick

R. E.

Tollison

R. D.

(1984). Crime on the court. Journal of Political Economy, 92, 223–235.

27.

MiLB.com. (2017). Umpire salaries. Retrieved April 28, 2017, from http://www.milb.com/milb/info/umpires.jsp?mc=_ump_salaries

28.

Mills

B. M.

(2014). Social pressure at the plate: Inequality, aversion, status, and mere exposure. Managerial and Decision Economics, 35, 387–403.

29.

Mills

B. M.

(2017a). Technological innovations in monitoring and evaluation: Evidence of performance impacts among major league baseball umpires. Labour Economics, 46, 189–199.

30.

Mills

B. M.

(2017b). Policy changes in major league baseball: Improved behavior and ancillary productivity outcomes. Economic Inquiry, 55, 1104–1118.

31.

Moskowitz

T. J.

Wertheim

L. J.

(2011). Scorecasting: The hidden influences behind how sports are played and games are won. New York, NY: Crown Archetype.

32.

Nagin

D. S.

Rebitzer

J. B.

Sanders

Taylor

L. J.

(2002). Monitoring, motivation, and management: The determinants of opportunistic behavior in a field experiment. American Economic Review, 92, 850–873.

33.

O’Connell

(2007). Much required to become MLB umpire. MLB.com, August 28. Retrieved April 28, 2017, from http://m.mlb.com/news/article/2173765/

34.

Parsons

C. A.

Sulaeman

Yates

M. C.

Hamermesh

D. S.

(2011). Strike three: Discrimination, incentives, and evaluation. American Economic Review, 101, 1410–1435.

35.

Pettersson-Lidbom

Priks

(2010). Behavior under social pressure: Empty Italian stadiums and referee bias. Economics Letters, 108, 212–214.

36.

Retrosheet. (2016). Play-by-Play data files (event files). Retrieved January 27, 2017, from http://www.retrosheet.org/game.htm

37.

Sutter

Kocher

M. G.

(2004). Favoritism of agents—The case of referees’ home bias. Journal of Economic Psychology, 25, 461–469.

38.

Tainsky

Mills

B. M.

Winfree

J. A.

(2015). Further examination of potential discrimination among MLB umpires. Journal of Sports Economics, 16, 353–374.

39.

Weingast

B. R.

Moran

M. J.

(1983). Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission. Journal of Political Economy, 91, 765–800.