Customers who boycott an organization after some scandal may actually exacerbate the fraud problem they would like to prevent. This conclusion is derived from a game-theoretic model that introduces a third player into the standard inspection game. Focusing on the example of doping in professional sports, we observe that doping is prevalent in equilibrium because customers undermine an organizer’s incentives to inspect the athletes. Establishing transparency about doping tests is necessary but not sufficient to overcome this dilemma. Our analysis has practical implications for the design of anti-doping policies as well as for other situations of fraudulent activities.
AndreozziL. (2004). Rewarding policemen increases crime. Another surprising result from the inspection game. Public Choice, 121, 69–82.
2.
AumannR. J.MaschlerM. (1972). Some thoughts on the minimax principle. Management Science, 18, 54–63.
3.
AvenhausR.Von StengelB.ZamirS. (2002). Inspection games. In AumannR.HartS. (Eds.), Handbook of game theory with economic applications (Vol. 3, pp. 1947–1987). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.
4.
BerentsenA. (2002). The economics of doping. European Journal of Political Economy, 18, 109–127.
5.
BerentsenA.BrueggerE.LoertscherS. (2008). On cheating, doping and whistle-blowing. European Journal of Political Economy, 24, 415–436.
6.
BerentsenA.LengwilerY. (2004). Fraudulent accounting and other doping games. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160, 402–415.
7.
BirdE.WagnerG. (1997). Sport as a common property resource. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, 749–766.
8.
BreivikG. (1992). Doping games: A game theoretical exploration of doping. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 27, 235–253.
9.
DilgerA.TolsdorfF. (2004). Doping als Wettkampfphänomen. In HorchH.-D.HeydelJ.SierauA. (Hrsg.), Events im Sport: Marketing, Management, Finanzierung. Köln, Germany: Institut für Sportökonomie und Sportmanagement.
10.
DresherM. (1962). A sampling inspection problem in arms control agreements. Rand Corporation Research Memorandum, Santa Monica, CA. No. RM-2972-ARPA.
11.
EberN. (2002). Credibility and independence of the world anti-doping agency. Journal of Sports Economics, 3, 90–96.
12.
EberN. (2006). Doping. In AndreffW.SzymanskiS. (Eds.), Handbook on the economics of sport (pp. 773–783). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
13.
EberN. (2008). The performance-enhancing drug game reconsidered—A fair play approach. Journal of Sports Economics, 9, 318–327.
14.
EberN.ThépotJ. (1999). Doping in sport and competition design. Louvain Economic Review, 65, 435–446.
15.
EmrichE.PierdziochC. (2013). A note on the international coordination of antidoping policies. Journal of Sports Economics. (Published on February 28, 2013). Doi: 10.1177/1527002513479802.
FrieheT. (2008). Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: Some theory and an application to corruption. Public Choice, 137, 127–143.
18.
HaugenK. (2004). The performance-enhancing drug game. Journal of Sports Economics, 5, 67–86.
19.
HollerM. J. (1990). The unprofitability of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games: A second folk-theorem. Economics Letters, 32, 319–323.
20.
HollerM. J. (1993). Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic. Public Choice, 76, 347–356.
21.
KirsteinR. (2014). Doping, the inspection game, and Bayesian enforcement. Journal of Sports Economics, 15, 385–409.
22.
KräkelM. (2007). Doping and cheating in contest-like situations. European Journal of Political Economy, 23, 988–1006.
23.
MaennigW. (2002). On the economics of doping and corruption in international sports. Journal of Sports Economics, 3, 61–89.
24.
MaschlerM. (1967). The inspector’s non-constant-sum game: Its dependence on a system of detectors. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 14, 275–290.
25.
MessingM.MüllerN. (1996). Veranstaltungsbesuch und sportpolitische Polarisation deutscher Olympia-Touristen in Barcelona 1992. Auf der Suche nach der Olympischen Idee. Facetten der Forschung von Athen bis Atlanta. Kassel, Germany: AGON-Sportverlag.
26.
MessingM.MüllerN.SchormanK. (2004). Local visitors and tourists at the modern pentathlon in Sydney 2000—A contribution on the internal differentiation of an Olympic spectator. In MessingM.MüllerN.PreussH. (Hg.). Olympischer Dreiklang. Werte–Geschichte–Zeitgeist (pp. 365–406). Kassel, Germany: Agon Sportverlag.
27.
MessingM.MuellerN.SchormannK. (2008). Zuschauer beim antiken Agon und bei den Olympischen Spielen in Athen 2004—anthropologische Grundmuster und geschichtliche Figurationen. In MauritschP.PetermandlW.RollingerW. R.UlfC.unter Mitarbeit vonI. Huber (Hrsg.). Antike Lebenswelten, Konstanz, Wandel, Wirkungsmacht. Festschrift für Ingomar Weiler zum 70. Geburtstag (S. 211–237). Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
28.
PitschW.EmrichE. (2012). The frequency of doping in elite sport: Results of a replication study. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 47, 559–580.
29.
PitschW.EmrichE.KleinM. (2007). Doping in elite sports in Germany: Results of a www survey. European Journal for Sport and Society, 4, 89–102.
30.
PitschW.FrengerM.EmrichE. (2010). The impact of anti-doping legislation in Europe—Outlines for the development of model-based hypotheses. In EmrichE.PitschW. (Eds.), Sport and doping. The analysis of an antagonistic symbiosis. Frankfurt/M, Germany: Peter Lang.
31.
PrestonI.SzymanskiS. (2003). Cheating in contests. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19, 612–624.
32.
SavulescuJ.FoddyB.ClaytonM. (2004). Why we should allow performance enhancing drugs in sport. British Journal of Sports Medicine, 38, 666–670.
33.
SolbergH. A.HanstadD. V.ThoringT. A. (2010). Doping in elite sport—Do the fans care? Public opinion on the consequences of doping scandals. International Journal of Sports Marketing & Sponsorship, 11, 185–199.
34.
StriegelH.UlrichR.SimonP. (2010). Randomized response estimates for doping and illicit drug use in elite athletes. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 106, 230–232.
35.
TrögerC. (2006). Olympia—Im Spannungsfeld von Mythos und Marke (Dissertation). Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany.
36.
TsebelisG. (1989). The abuse of probability in political analysis: The Robinson Crusoe fallacy. The American Political Science Review, 83, 77–91.
37.
Van ReethD. (2013). Television demand for the Tour de France: The importance of outcome uncertainty, patriotism and doping. International Journal of Sport Finance, 8, 39–60.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
