We empirically investigate whether tournaments between heterogeneous contestants are less intense. To test our hypotheses, we use professional sports data from the TOYOTA Handball-Bundesliga, the major handball league in Germany. Based on sports betting odds, we estimate the differences in winning probabilities of the competing teams and find evidence for a negative impact of the matchup’s heterogeneity on the intensity of the game. The decrease is significant not only at the beginning but also toward the end of the game. Further analysis shows that the overall intensity decrease is almost entirely driven by the reaction of the ex ante favorite team.
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