The Order of Games in a Best-of-Three Contest

Abstract

We study a best-of-three all-pay contest with two players in which the first player to win two games wins the contest. Each player has a value of winning the contest as well as a value of winning a single game. It is assumed that a player’s value of winning a game in his home field is higher than his value of winning a game away from home. The stronger player (the player with the higher value of winning the contest) plays twice at his home field and once away from it. We analyze the order of games that both players agree to, according to which no one has an incentive to switch to a different order, since switching would not yield a higher expected payoff. In this order, the weaker player plays at his home field in the first stage and then plays two games at the stronger player’s field.

Keywords

winner-take-all contests all-pay auctions best-of-three contests

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