College men’s basketball players have alleged that the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) cap on athletic scholarships is illegal and leads to lower scholarships than would prevail in a free market. Recently, the NCAA increased the limit on athletic scholarships. The authors compare the marginal revenue product (MRP) of men’s basketball players to athletic scholarship caps. The authors estimate MRPs using players’ playing statistics; information on the distribution of pro salaries; and players’ future draft status. The authors find that players’ MRPs are greater than the athletic scholarship caps for about 60% of men’s basketball players, not just the star players.
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