This paper attempts to resolve some of the confusion in the sports economics literature regarding conjectures, open and closed leagues, and the invariance principle in sports league modeling. Very few papers model talent level and talent investment by teams separately, which can create confusion regarding open and closed leagues. It is also important that researchers are able to differentiate between the level of talent investment a team makes and their actual talent level which depends on the type of league and the talent choices made by other teams.
ChangYSandersS. (2009). Pool revenue sharing, team investments, and competitive balance in professional sports: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Sports Economics, 10, 409–428.
2.
EastonS. T.RockerbieD. W. (2005). Revenue sharing, conjectures, and scarce talent in a sports league model. Journal of Sports Economics, 6, 359–378.
3.
EckardE.W. (2006). Comment: Professional team sports are only a game: The Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture model, contest-Nash equilibrium, and the invariance principle. Journal of Sports Economics, 7, 234–239.
4.
El HodiriM.QuirkJ. (1971). An economic model of a professional sports league. Journal of Political Economy, 70, 1302–1319.
5.
FortR. (2006). Talent market models in North American and World leagues. In RodriguezP.KesenneS.GarciaJ. (Eds.), Sports economics after fifty years: Essays in honour of Simon Rottenberg (pp. 83–106). Oviedo, Spain: Oviedo University Press.
6.
FortR.QuirkJ. (1995). Cross-subsidization, incentives and outcomes in professional team sports leagues. Journal of Economic Literature, 33, 1265–1299.
7.
FortR.QuirkJ. (2007). Rational expectations and pro sports leagues. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 54, 377–390.
8.
FortR.WinfreeJ. (2009). Sports really are different: The contest success function and the supply of talent. Review of Industrial Organization, 34, 69–80.
9.
KesenneS. (2005). Revenue sharing and competitive balance: Does the invariance proposition hold?. Journal of Sports Economics, 6, 98–106.
10.
QuirkJ.FortR. D. (1992). Pay dirt: The business of professional team sports. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
11.
RascherD. (1997). A model of a professional sports league. In HendricksW. (Ed.), Advances in the economics of sport (Vol. 2, pp. 27–76). Greenwich, CT: JAI.
12.
RottenbergS. (1956). The baseball players' labor market. Journal of Political Economy, 64, 242–258.
13.
SzymanskiS. (2003). The economic design of sporting contests. Journal of Economic Literature, 41, 1137–1187.
14.
SzymanskiS. (2004). Professional team sports are only a game: The Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture model, contest-Nash equilibrium, and the invariance principle. Journal of Sports Economics, 5, 111–126.
15.
SzymanskiS. (2006). Reply: Professional team sports are only a game: The Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture model, contest-Nash equilibrium, and the invariance principle. Journal of Sports Economics, 7, 240–243.
16.
SzymanskiS.KesenneS. (2004). Competitive balance and revenue sharing in team sports. Journal of Industrial Economics, 52, 165–177.
17.
VroomanJ. (1995). A general theory of professional sports leagues. Southern Economic Journal, 64, 971–990.
18.
VroomanJ. (2007). Theory of the beautiful game: The unification of European Football. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 54, 314–354.
19.
VroomanJ. (2009). Theory of the perfect game: Competitive balance in monopoly sports leagues. Review of Industrial Organization, 34, 5–44.
