In the sports economics literature, little attention has been paid to the impact of revenue sharing on club owners' profits. In particular, it is unclear how the profits of the large-budget clubs are affected. In this article, the relationship between one specific revenue-sharing arrangement and owner profits is investigated for clubs in a profit-maximization league using two different models. In a Walrasian equilibrium model, revenue sharing will lower profits, whatever the value of the share parameter, if the profits of a large-budget club are higher than the average club budget in the league. In a noncooperative Nash equilibrium model, the impact turns out to be theoretically indeterminate.
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