This article argues that a rigorous application of simple game theory tools may provide unambiguous predictions about the behavior of teams in sports. As an illustration, the authors analyze the merits of two controversial changes in soccer rules, namely, the “three-point victory” and the “golden goal.” Building on well-accepted premises, the authors show that contrary to the common belief, the incentives of teams to play offensively may be lower under the three-point victory than under the traditional two-point victory. They also provide clear and simple recommendations for the improvement of these rules.
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