The subjects of doping and corruption in the Olympic family and the fight against them have until now largely been matters of sporting politics and jurisprudence. This contribution emphasizes that (a) both problems have a high degree of economic determination and(b) economics can offer efficient solutions. The corruption problem could be damp ened by reducing the surpluses in the host cities, making the selection process more trans parent, and increasing the incentive for corruption-free behavior. With regard to the phenomenon of doping, an economic solution could increase the expected costs of doping by agreeing on financial penalties of a sufficiently high level.
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