Ericson argued in this journal that the Bosman ruling, the abolition of transfer fees after the expiration of contracts, is inefficient. But, Ericson’s model is implausible because transfers in only one direction are assumed and the so-called transfer fees are indirect salary payments. His model is also inconsistent because of double counting of salaries in the case of free agency. Furthermore, even within his model the efficiency of the Bosman ruling can be shown by assuming lifetime contracts. The real danger to efficiency is new considerations of the European Commission to abolish transfer fees before the expiration of contracts.
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