Address Confidentiality Policies: Ensuring Safe Voting Accessibility for Survivors of Violence

Abstract

In the United States, the voting system gives people the ability to voice their opinions about the policies and practices that affect their lives, health, and well-being, but those affected by intimate partner and sexual violence face substantial barriers to participating in this system. Many of the power and control tactics used by those who perpetrate relationship violence actively work against survivors’ ability to vote and otherwise express their thoughts and views, not only during the relationship, but even after it ends. Address Confidentiality Policies (ACP) are one way that states and territories have attempted to lessen safety concerns associated with voting among survivors of violence by allowing them to use alternate addresses for public records requirements. However, low public awareness of policies, inconsistencies in approach, and barriers to participation have kept ACPs from being as successful as they could be. This perspectives article summarizes ACPs across the United States and advocates for more consistent, empowering, and universal application of ACPs to guarantee that survivors of violence and others that fear making their address known can participate equally in the voting system and ensure that their concerns are represented.

Introduction

Physical violence, psychological aggression (intimate partner violence or IPV), stalking, and sexual assault (SA) are unfortunately common in the United States (CDC, 2024), and experiencing these traumas impacts lifelong health and well-being as well as civic engagement. Well-documented co-morbidities of IPV include substance misuse (Smith et al., 2012) and mental health concerns (Mason & Du Mont, 2015). Such co-occurring challenges can be exploited as part of the power, manipulation, and fear tactics perpetrators of violence employ to control people’s behavior (Pence & Paymer, 1993) which can extend into civic engagement.

Perpetrators of violence may try to control how a person participates in civic processes, including voting. Someone may “threaten to restrict access to children, cut off financial support, or intimidate another person with physical or sexual violence if they vote or do not vote a specific way” (Root, 2024, p. 22). Isolating individuals from their support systems is a tactic often used by perpetrators of violence and, in the context of voting, may affect the isolated person’s ability to access information about voting. Even if the perpetrator does not actively try to control another person’s voting behavior, without knowing how or where to vote or what is being voted on, a person experiencing IPV loses autonomy over voting (Root, 2024).

People who have experienced IPV, stalking, and/or SA may also encounter barriers associated with voting if their behavior is being manipulated or because registering to vote requires sharing information. Usually, individuals must supply their addresses and other identifying information when registering to vote which then becomes public information that can be used to compromise a person’s safety (Klein, 2024). When survivors refrain from voting due to the fear, “the issue of IPV and civic disengagement perpetuates itself” since they become unable to vote for policies that would protect and support them (Strelow, 2023; Xie et al., 2012).

As of writing this article, 46 states have implemented Address Confidentiality Programs (ACPs) that allow survivors of violence to keep their address confidential. These programs provide substitute addresses to victims of specific crimes to use for public services, including voter registration. The ACP then forwards participants’ mail to their confidential address. Although ACPs potentially allow survivors to be civically engaged (Strelow, 2023), there is wide variability in how to obtain information about ACPs, who is eligible, and the process for applying that affects awareness, accessibility, and rates of participation (Klein, 2024). While Klein summarized the administrative burden of ACPs relative to the number of participants and assumed need in 2024, few have described ACPs. Here, I have further summarized programs in terms of eligibility, the application process, exceptions to confidentiality, and the governing office to describe a set of common and best practices for ensuring safety during civic engagement and suggest ways that practitioners and policymakers can encourage ACP participation.

Method

Starting with the 2022 National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) summary of ACP programs (NASS, 2022), I confirmed/ updated information using Google to search for the name of each state/territory and the phrase “address confidentiality program.” The ACP office’s website was the first source consulted to obtain program (1) name, (2) governing office, (3), application process, (4) documentation required, (5) service components, (6) program exceptions, (7) eligibility, and (8) other relevant information and is listed on the website in each case (9). I reviewed the exact text of these nine pieces of information for similarities and used the same phrasing when possible. When any of these nine pieces of information were missing, I searched the state’s official statutes to obtain the missing information.

Results

The supplemental material table describes the ACP in each of the U.S. states and territories as of December 2025. The following states and territories do not currently have an ACP: Alaska, ¹ American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, ² Virgin Islands, and Wyoming. In general, eligible ACP participants are adult residents of the state who are survivors of IPV, SA, human trafficking, stalking, or otherwise afraid for their safety who provide a sworn statement of their need for the ACP. Some states also include employees or patients of reproductive and/or gender affirming health care services or those working for the courts. In these cases, some ACPs have different requirements or application procedures for these individuals.

Commonly, applicants may include minors whose address will also be protected and may apply for someone incapable of applying for themselves. In states where there are sex offender or other criminal registries, it is often the case that people convicted of these crimes are ineligible for the ACP. Many states require that applicants work with a certified application assistant to complete the ACP filing process. Often, the application assistant works for a recognized community-based support program and can help survivors to submit the application as well as connect them to services. Once approved for the ACP, participants usually receive an authorizing document to provide proof of participation when agencies request their address. In many cases, this documentation allows participants to use alternate addresses to vote, on police records, as their residence, work, and school address, and to obtain driver’s licenses, marriage certificates, and social and other government services. Participation in most ACPs lasts between 3 and 5 years, after which participants may usually re-apply. Participants may stop participating at any time by notifying the ACP office in writing.

All ACPs listed in the Supplemental Material provide a substitute address, forwarding service for all first-class mail, and service of process for legal documentation. ACP programs, like those in KY, IA, IL, FL, CA, MI, MN, MT, OH, and NH, simultaneously change participants voter registration to allow absentee voting so that they do not have to be physically present at polling locations and their address is not publicly listed. Other ACP programs may include information on how to change voter registration, but it remains a separate process. ACPs do not usually forward magazines, junk mail, or packages and participants may expect a delay in receiving mail that can range from 2 to 7 days. Importantly, participating in the ACP does not remove participant information from existing documents or public records, but only keeps new ones from being made. This may be why most ACPs require that applicants have recently changed address or be moving soon and some stipulate that the person an applicant fears not know their address.

With some exceptions, government agencies are required to accept an ACP participant’s substitute address. Even law enforcement agencies must accept the substitute address and request an official exemption or have a court order to receive the participant’s physical address. Washington state law acknowledges that victims of perpetrators within the law enforcement system may need further protection and requires a court order to release participant information in these cases. Some states require interaction with or direct reporting to law enforcement or the court system to be eligible for the ACP. In a few cases, documentation required to participate in an ACP was unclear, which is denoted in the table in the supplementary material.

In most states, real estate holdings are exempt from the program as property ownership is public record. Vermont’s ACP suggests participants purchase real estate through alternative means to protect themselves. Most ACPs require that participants notify the office of a change to their information within a specific time frame ranging from 48 hr to 30 days, and failure to do so results in removal from the program. Some states require physical addresses for determining school placement while others require that schools accept the substitute address.

Implications for Practice

Nationally, there is relatively low participation in ACPs and a clear need to raise awareness of program availability (Root, 2024). ACP awareness among medical and social services practitioners is especially important in states where employees or patients of reproductive and/or gender affirming health care services are eligible. Rather than promoting participation for individuals, providers can promote program availability generally to help normalize participation and raise awareness without the need to identify specific cases. Providers can also help connect survivors to resources in their local community that, in many cases, may be the same organizations where applicants can find application assistants.

Implications for Policy

Overall, ACP policies can be more accessible and effective. A trauma-informed lens that empowers survivors would suggest applications should be available in multiple ways (online, fax, mail, in-person), not involve law enforcement, not require relocation, reporting, or documentation, and allow maximum time for renewal and notifying ACP of changes to participant information (see, for example, references in Root, 2024). While many ACPs require that an applicant has recently moved, finding housing is often difficult for survivors of violence. Perhaps relatedly, in 2022, Ohio changed this requirement so that “an applicant who meets all other qualifications may participate in Safe at Home without moving” (see https://www.ohiosos.gov/public-integrity/safe-at-home). Removing requirements for protective orders or other documentation would also increase accessibility since many survivors of violent crimes do not wish to engage with police, and most applications already require a sworn statement of victimization. In 2023, Kentucky removed this requirement, and participation greatly increased (Hughes, 2024). Many survivors may find it difficult to notify ACPs of changes to their information within only a few days. Places with longer notification periods (e.g., 30 days) offer greater flexibility to participants before compromising their safety.

Some states extend ACP exclusion to those on parole or probation, but, often, in the case of IPV, both parties may be involved in the justice system due to self-protective actions taken by the survivor. Places where the ACP is limited to voter records or where there are many exceptions to confidentiality could increase the effectiveness of ACPs by requiring more agencies (i.e., schools, utilities, etc.) to use substitute addresses. While most states make voter registration a separate process, it seems potentially viable that registering to vote confidentially or via absentee ballot be incorporated into the ACP process so that participants’ voting rights are protected along with their safety.

Very few ACP websites had safety warnings for survivors, though technological monitoring is a common form of abuse (Root, 2024). ACPs should consider adding such warnings to their websites and ensure there is a safe exit option (see https://www.thehotline.org/ for example). While requiring applicants to work with an application assistant to participate in ACPs may ensure that participants are connected to service providers and complete applications effectively, this can also be a barrier to participation for individuals who would rather not discuss their experiences. Online applications and fax or mail submissions may be the most accessible options, however, this removes the connection to services and risks applicants submitting incomplete or incorrect information. Determining whether application assistance is required is a balance of these risks and benefits, but even in cases where assistance remains a requirement, making the application available and providing transparency by listing all program requirements online would make the process easier. Survivors trying to stay safe through ACPs should carefully review requirements for their state and, if possible, consult with victims’ advocates and the ACP organizing agency to be sure that they stay in compliance.

Conclusion

ACPs maintain crime survivors’ rights to vote while also keeping their physical locations safe, but awareness of these programs is low, and many requirements make participation difficult. Shifting ACPs to align better with empowerment-based frameworks would remove some of the need for assistance with the application process and with maintaining compliance while potentially also increasing participation. ACPs are one part of a comprehensive safety planning process that should, depending on the participant’s wishes, also involve advocacy and law enforcement or court systems.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-hpp-10.1177_15248399261448732 – Supplemental material for Address Confidentiality Policies: Ensuring Safe Voting Accessibility for Survivors of Violence

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-hpp-10.1177_15248399261448732 for Address Confidentiality Policies: Ensuring Safe Voting Accessibility for Survivors of Violence by April Schweinhart in Health Promotion Practice