The present research extends prior empirical work by proposing that in local government, financial planning explains fiscal transparency. Civic participation is hypothesized to influence fiscal transparency as a mediating mechanism. A mixed methods design was employed to carry out the study. Data were collected from 28 districts and 322 other local governments, two ministries, and four donor agencies based in Uganda, East Africa. the results reveal that financial planning predicts changes in fiscal transparency. However, civic participation does not mediate the financial planning-fiscal transparency relationship. Implications for theory and practice are discussed and future research direction is provided.
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