Why do powerful elites in authoritarian regimes so often fail to resist autocratic power grabs? Existing scholarship suggests that strong elites can deter ambitious dictators and thereby prevent personalization. This paper qualifies that view. It argues that a strong but numerous ruling coalition can facilitate power grabs. When many actors have the capacity to constrain the leader, each has an incentive to free ride on the resistance of others. While all regime members benefit from a constrained executive, the costs of resistance are borne individually. As a result, regime members are often tempted to stand by and let others bear those costs. Thus, although power sharing is on average a constraining force on dictators, it can also demobilize elites and open the door to personalization. We must therefore ask not only how much power dictators share, but also how they share it.
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