The Priority Question and Its Solutions: Debates About Political Normativity

Abstract

Kreutz explicitly categorises the debates about political normativity into two questions: the distinctness question (Q1), which asks whether there is distinctively political normativity, and the priority question (Q2), which asks which form of normativity should have priority in complete justification. I refine these distinctions and argue that some moralists who reject instrumental interpretations of political normativity appear to be disputing realists on Q1, but their objections ultimately presuppose an answer to Q2. I reconstruct a Korsgaard-style argument – which moralists might employ to defend moral priority – and show that it is question-begging. By contrast, I develop a heart-based conception of normativity – understood as a state of reflective and psychological stability – drawing on insights from Chinese philosophy and situating this view within Williams’s internal reasons tradition. This heart-based conception of normativity enables realists to argue that, in some cases, non-moral political normativity may have priority over moral normativity. It also suggests modest implications for realist methodology and political practice, including how heart-based normativity can shed light on genealogical inquiry and help us think about political disagreement. My aim is modest: to clarify the terrain of Q2 and sketch a realist-friendly answer.