This study explains why intra-executive relationship varies across semi-presidential countries. The literature shows that both institutional and non-institutional factors influence the intra-executive relationship. Nonetheless, the majority of research is conducted outside of a crisis framework. This study develops a new theoretical framework based on the role of the president in semi-presidential countries. A popularly elected president derives power from the vote of the people and, thus, claims to reflect upon interests of their citizens. However, presidential activism varies. Intra-executive conflicts signal that a popularly elected president can respond to the needs and values of their citizens by reminding their governments, when exercising policies, to reflect the interests of the public at large, which should be more prevalent in the context of crisis management. Nonetheless, the combination of causal conditions that explain intra-executive dynamics in times of crisis may be different from those in normal times. This study compares intra-executive dynamics in normal times and COVID-19 period in semi-presidential democracies in Asia and Europe between 1990 and 2022, and employing a mixed methods research design. This finding offers a number of implications for the study of presidential activism, democratic accountability and intra-executive dynamics in times of national and global crisis.
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