The Importance and Limitation of Epistemic Norms in Political Theory

Abstract

One recent debate in political theory centers on the question of whether there is a distinctively political normativity. According to an influential view, there is a distinctive set of norms that applies specifically to political actions and decisions, which are not grounded in moral normativity. On one version of this non-moral view, political theory is grounded in epistemic normativity (and thus epistemic norms). Theorists identifying as “radical realists” insist that political theorists do not need any moral normativity (and thus moral norms), because epistemic normativity may provide action-guidance for political theory. In this article, we take our point of departure in a critical analysis of this epistemic version of the non-moral view, with the overall aim of analyzing the importance and limitation of epistemic norms in political theory. We argue that epistemic norms are necessary—since a political theory should not rely on empirical falsities—but not sufficient for a successful account in the political domain. Two claims are made: moral norms are essential in the process of political theorizing, both in the form of pre-epistemic norms and in the form of post-epistemic norms. More specifically, we contend, first, that we need moral norms to identify and justify which practices to study when conducting political theorizing, and second, that we need moral norms to tell us how to act in light of our investigation of warranted and unwarranted beliefs.

One recent debate in political philosophy centers on the question of whether there is a distinctively political normativity. Two main positions have emerged. The first conception argues that there is no distinctively political normativity in a strict sense, as political decisions and actions are ultimately evaluated on the basis of their conformity with more general moral norms, such as justice, fairness, equality, and democracy. The second conception, a non-moral stance, maintains that there is a distinctive set of norms that applies specifically to political actions and decisions, which are not grounded in moral normativity. Instead, these norms are shaped by the nature of political institutions, processes, and practices. ¹ Advocates of the non-moral view argue that political norms are necessary to ensure the legitimacy of political institutions and that these norms cannot be captured by moral principles. However, critics of this view contend that political norms are ultimately a subset of more general moral norms and that there is no need to posit a distinctively political normativity dichotomous to moral normativity. ²

Some supporters of the non-moral view have made the case that distinctively political normativity should be interpreted in instrumental or functional terms (Burelli, 2022; Burelli and Destri, 2022; Rossi, 2013). However, this proposal has already been critically scrutinized in the literature (Erman and Möller, 2022a, 2022b, 2023b). Another strand of critical thought comes from political theorists who instead wish to ground political theory in epistemic normativity (and thus epistemic norms). Theorists identifying as “radical realists” have insisted that political theorists do not need any moral normativity (and thus moral norms) to conduct ideology critique, because epistemic normativity may provide action-guidance for political theory (Aytac, 2022; Aytac and Rossi, 2023; Burelli, 2022; Burelli and Destri, 2022; Cross, 2022, 2024; Geuss, 2008; Prinz, 2016; Prinz and Rossi, 2017, 2021; Raekstad, 2024; Rossi, 2019, 2023). ³ As will be discussed below, ideology critique for radical realists is an epistemic method of unmasking illusions and unwarranted belief.

In this article, we take our point of departure in a critical analysis of this epistemic version of the non-moral view, with the overall aim of analyzing the importance and limitation of epistemic norms in political theory, which we believe is of broader interest. We argue that epistemic norms are necessary—since a political theory should not rely on empirical falsities—but not sufficient for a successful account in the political domain. Two claims are made: moral (or political, see next paragraph) norms are essential in the process of political theorizing, both in the form of pre-epistemic norms and in the form of post-epistemic norms. More specifically, we contend, first, that we need moral norms to identify and justify which practices to study when conducting ideology critique, and second, that we need moral norms to tell us how to act in light of this investigation of warranted and unwarranted beliefs. Since the second claim is most central to the debate in question, we begin our analysis of moral norms as post-epistemic norms, followed by an analysis of moral norms as pre-epistemic norms.

The article is structured as follows. First, we present the basic presumptions constituting our theoretical framework (I), followed by a defense of our second claim, that is, that moral normativity is needed in the form of post-epistemic norms (II). Third, we focus on our first claim, that is, that moral normativity is needed in the form of pre-epistemic norms (III). The fourth section concludes (IV).

Theoretical Framework

In this article, we are thus interested in the question of whether or not epistemic norms may provide sufficient guidance for action in the political sphere. So let us begin by saying a few words about the concept of “normativity” at play here. Normativity, in the most fundamental sense, refers to reasons to think or act in some sense or other, sometimes spelled out in terms of “oughtness.” ⁴ As such, norms are plentiful. For example, norms of grammar tell us how we ought or ought not construct sentences in some language; aesthetic norms tell us how we ought or ought not, say, combine the colors of our clothes or frame a photo view (e.g., according to the “golden rule”); and norms of etiquette tell us how we should act in order to respect a certain set of “politeness” codes of conduct.

In philosophy, a conventional division is typically made by distinguishing between norms for practical action, so-called practical norms (i.e., practical normativity), and norms for belief formation and knowledge, so-called theoretical norms (i.e., theoretical normativity). The former group regulates what we ought or have reason to do, whereas the latter group regulates what we ought or have reason to believe (Broome, 2013; Wallace, 2020). When we ask ourselves what to do, we assess and weigh different reasons for action, that is, considerations that speak in favor of particular actions being desirable in some way. When we ask ourselves what to believe, we assess and weigh considerations that recommend accepting a particular claim as to what is or is not the case, that is, speaking in favor of a proposition being true (worthy of acceptance) (Wallace, 2020).

In light of this distinction, moral norms are thus put on the practical side of the fence, whereas epistemic norms, having to do with proper belief formation and knowledge, are on the theoretical side. It would be too fast, however, to view this division in terms of a dichotomy, since it seems clear that given the right circumstances, many “non-practical” norms can be action-guiding too. Norms of grammar, for example, do guide us in our action of writing a book. And if we are thirsty, epistemic norms helping us to form a justified belief about the presence of water guide us. What about epistemic norms in the political domain? This is what we will investigate in the remaining sections.

Moreover, we will use the term “moral” as a general term for the practical, action-oriented values and norms typically addressed in political theory: values such as justice, legitimacy, fairness, freedom, autonomy, or equality, and their normative counterparts such as the notion that a society ought to treat their citizens as free and equal, and so on. However, while the non-moral view of normativity has received severe criticism in relation to the debate on political normativity, ⁵ in this article, we are not interested in questions such as whether political normativity is a moral or non-moral form of normativity. Rather, the chosen term is used for convenience and clarity: ⁶ the reader who prefers may thus exchange the use of “moral” here for “political” or any other practical, action-guiding category of values and norms she takes to be action-guiding in the political sphere. As long, of course, as she does not include epistemic values and norms in the category, since those are the target norms in our analysis.

The Importance of Moral Norms as Post-Epistemic Norms

In this section, we will investigate the idea that epistemic normativity is sufficient for guiding human behavior and decision-making in the political sphere. ⁷ A fundamental intuition guiding defenders of the radical realist view is the belief that many, if not most, of our normative ideas in the political sphere are distorted by illusions. Prior and existing power relations, wishful thinking, and various ideologies have made our normative values defunct and formed normative intuitions that are based on beliefs we take to be demonstrably factual but which are actually unwarranted (Geuss, 2008; Prinz and Rossi, 2017). However, through empirically-informed genealogical analyses and historical reconstructions of the origin and development of salient political concepts, we can reveal these intuitions as mistaken or illusory and thus guide our future-oriented actions toward legitimate narratives where our justifications are based on warranted beliefs (Prinz and Rossi, 2017; Argenton and Rossi, 2021). And since these analyses are epistemic rather than moral, that is, focused on dissolving false beliefs and revealing empirical facts, it is epistemic rather than moral norms which have guided our action.

A famous and often reiterated case of illusory justificatory narrative that epistemic norms can dissolve (e.g., through the method of ideology critique) is Geuss’ (2010: 183) example of Tony Blair justifying the 2003 Iraq invasion on the basis of Saddam Hussein being “evil” (c.f. Cross, 2022: 1118). Geuss cites at length Jonathan Steele’s (2008) account of a meeting with six academic experts invited to Downing Street, where it becomes clear that Blair was not interested in listening to any factual accounts which would imply that the invasion of Iraq would be unwise. When the invited experts tried to bring up the complications resulting from intercommunal resentments between factions of the country, Blair did not listen but focused on Saddam Hussein’s character only: “But the man’s uniquely evil, isn’t he?” (Steele, 2008: 18–19, cited in Geuss, 2010: 183). On Geuss’ (2010: 183) analysis,

appeal to the concept of evil is pretty clearly a defensive strategy aimed at preventing a cognitive engagement that would potentially upset a comfortable worldview, and interfere with a decision already taken on other grounds, while at the same time mobilizing and focusing self-righteous energy. Deploying the concept of “evil” in this kind of highly moralizing “criticism” does seem, in the wider scheme of things, to be more appropriately understood as a way of reinforcing the status quo than as any kind of contribution to radical change.

Hence, to the extent Blair’s support of the invasion was motivated by the “evilness” of Saddam Hussein rather than a factual analysis of the situation in Iraq, his action depended on an ideological account which “ideology critique would strongly counsel against” (Cross, 2022: 1118).

Now, in order for epistemic normativity to suffice to play the role typically given to moral normativity (in the broad sense specified in the previous section), it must be able to guide practical decision-making. In other words, it must be action-guiding in some sense. The notion of action-guidance is central in many debates in political theory, such as the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory and the debate surrounding political realism in its many forms. In the most general terms, a set of propositions—be it a theory, principle, norm, or simply a claim—is considered action-guiding if it helps us in deciding what to do in a certain situation or context. In the context of justice, Richard North has described action-guidance in terms of the capacity of a principle to work as a decision-making procedure. He takes this capacity to be in place when the principle gives the relevant set of agents (i.e., those for whom the principle is action-guiding) “coherent, consistent and determinate verdicts on the justness and unjustness of actions across a range of cases” (North, 2017: 81). In a similar vein, Naima Chahboun (2019: 553) suggests that “[a]ction-guidance constitutes a threshold on the scale of determinacy, and depending on where we locate this threshold, we will draw different conclusions regarding [the] theory’s action-guiding capacity.”

Action-guidance is thus typically thought of in two complementary senses, one direct and one indirect. In the direct sense, a set of propositions is action-guiding if it prescribes a certain action, for example, that agent S should do X in situation C. In the indirect sense, a set of propositions is action-guiding if it prescribes, suggests, or otherwise recommends an action by assigning a relevant normative property to an action or a state of affairs. For example, by assigning the property of justness or legitimacy to an action (“dividing the cake in equally large parts”) or state of affairs (“that this person become our leader”), we suggest that we have reasons to act in a corresponding way to bring this about.

In what follows, we will distinguish between two categories of action-guidance, strong and weak, which both come in direct as well as indirect versions. We will say that a set of propositions is action-guiding in a strong sense if it prescribes a unique action, either directly (“Arthur Pendragon should be crowned as the king of England”) or indirectly (“Arthur Pendragon is the legitimate ruler of England”). For a mundane example, when looking for a new computer, an advice such as “pick the computer under 2 kg which has the best CPU performance” would be classified as strongly action-guiding.

Far from all relevant action-guidance in the literature is this determinate, however. First, there might be more than one acceptable action. “Pick any computer with CPU performance above the current laptop average” does not determine a unique computer to purchase, but rather guides the agent’s action by providing a number of acceptable alternatives. Moreover, the evaluation may not be directly prescriptive. In order to provide both diagnosis and evaluation, Prinz and Rossi (2017: 349) write, “realist political theory needs to incorporate a wider understanding of what constitutes a normative approach besides making prescriptions.” To “take seriously the task of providing orientation,” they later clarify, “requires valuations and rankings of political states of affairs” (Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 360). Such a ranking may or may not include a “threshold” for acceptable action, and instead evaluate different alternatives. For example, an evaluation of different vice president candidates might provide a ranking of the applicants, but leave the question of whether any of them are good enough to actually hire to the company board. Let us therefore define a weak sense of action-guidance, in which a set of propositions does not give strong action-guidance but still either supplies a set of acceptable actions (direct version) or supplies an evaluative ranking of a set of different actions in terms of their acceptability (indirect version).

Do epistemic norms give us action-guidance in any of the two senses characterized above? To this we now turn.

Strong Action-Guidance

While theorists in the radical realist literature clearly aim for action-guidance—indeed, it would otherwise become very hard to grasp their transformative and critical project—pinpointing the strength of their claims is not always easy. Some claims in Rossi (2019: 642), for example, seem to argue for strong action-guidance, such as when he claims that “importantly, the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable legitimation stories is not moral but epistemic.” In most places, however, ⁸ he and other radical realists suggest an evaluative aim more in line with the weaker action-guiding claim (to be discussed in the next subsection).

A recent exception is Ben Cross, who claims that epistemic norms may guide us to unique actions. While Cross argues that a general demand for clear guidance “in the sense of telling people what they ought to do” conflates “what is desirable with what is possible” (Cross, 2022: 1118), he nonetheless goes on to claim that the method of ideology critique may “provide us with a way of evaluating the . . . normative ideas we have,” and “sometimes provide clear practical guidance” (Cross, 2022: 1120), by which he explicitly means “that P should do X” (Cross, 2022: 1118). ⁹ As an example of such guidance—referring to Rossi (2019) as well as Prinz and Rossi (2017)—Cross (2022: 1118) states that “[i]deology critique may also point in favour of a particular course of action by providing some kind of vindicatory analysis of its supporting legitimation narratives and/or by revealing greater epistemic deficiencies in the narratives supporting alternative courses of action.” Hence, if the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable legitimation (justification) is indeed purely epistemic (and not moral), it seems as if Cross is claiming that when a legitimation story is correct (“what it purports to be”) this means that it is legitimate.

The method that Cross is referring to here is ideology critique, which is an epistemic method of unmasking illusions (the specifics of which we will say more about in the next subsection). As stated previously, we do not object to the claim that ideology critique and other epistemic methods may demonstrate that a purported legitimation narrative is unwarranted. In fact, we here take that as a premise. However, it is one thing to claim that an epistemic method may direct us away from empirically unwarranted legitimation narratives, and quite another to claim that if the method has concluded that the legitimation story is not based on any empirically unwarranted beliefs, then this entails that the power in question is in fact legitimate. Indeed, on closer scrutiny, it seems clear that this conditional constitutes a fallacy.

In order to realize this, we should remember that the claim under scrutiny is that “not moral but epistemic” considerations decide whether a legitimation story is acceptable or not. Hence, if King Arthur’s claim to legitimacy is that he has been given a magical sword by the lady of the lake, ¹⁰ on this account his rule is legitimate if, in fact, this is what has happened, and not so if it is merely a fairytale to convince the masses. Now, let us for the sake of argument assume that the Matter of Britain (and Monty Python) got it right, and this legitimation story is historically correct. Then, ex hypothesi, any objection falls flat. Hence, not only would the objection that legitimate power must be mandated by all eligible members of the state have no grip; ¹¹ neither would any other normative objection, such that the rules should be selected by the prominent land-owners of the state (i.e., the aristocracy), or, as Mill held, by plural voting where the level of education was to decide one’s number of votes (Miller, 2015).

Hence, it seems clear that mere truth-telling cannot be sufficient for singling out an option as acceptable. Indeed, also Cross’ claim above that ideology critique may single out a particular course of action by “revealing greater epistemic deficiencies in the narratives supporting alternative courses of action” is an overstatement. If we have, say, three competing legitimation stories, two of which rely on some empirically unwarranted premises, it does not follow that the third one is acceptable (e.g., legitimate). Let us say that Arthur has traveled to Africa and claimed that he is the legitimate ruler there since he is a white male, whereas the two local tribe leaders also fighting for power are black. Even if his legitimation narrative is empirically true, and those of the other two tribe leaders are reaping with falsities, it does not reasonably follow that Artur is a legitimate ruler.

A potential objection to the above reasoning might be the thought, expressed by Cross, that there is plenty of (good old practical) normativity to go around. Noddingly citing Geuss’ statement that “[i]t is just not an option for us as human beings not to have some attitudes, preferences, and normative beliefs” (Geuss, 1981: 43, cited in Cross, 2022: 1111–1112), Cross argues that our main problem is that we have an excess of normativity:

If we think that human beings have a kind of normativity deficit, then we may understandably believe that the construction of positive normative ideas is an urgent task for political philosophy. In that case, ideology critique may seem a relatively low priority, albeit perhaps an occasionally useful tool. But if we instead think that human beings have an excess of normative ideas and suspect that many may be distorted by illusions, then we may understandably think that ideology critique is a good place for political philosophy to start (Cross, 2022: 1112).

The problem with this objection is that it is irrelevant. The whole point with epistemic norms as they are understood in the current debate is that they are orthogonal to moral considerations. Hence, even if ideology critique reveals which of the competing legitimation narratives are based on illusionary thinking and other kinds of falsities, it still does nothing to validate or invalidate the fundamental practical norms themselves.

Of course, if Arthur’s belief in the superiority of the white “race” is based on the unwarranted belief that white men have superior cognitive capacities, then his normative belief in white supremacy is indeed debunked by epistemic norms. However, if his belief is based on, say, the fact (which we might assume for the sake of argument since it was generally the case in the dark history of European colonialism) that white men have more powerful methods of war, and that legitimate power should be based solely on the capacity to defend the state from intruding powers, then epistemic norms cannot reject these white supremacy norms. ¹² While many of our (practical) normative beliefs are dependent on facts, they are then grounded in further practical norms that are ultimately fact-independent in the sense that their correctness is not grounded in any further empirical facts (Cohen, 2003, 2008; see Erman and Möller, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 for an extended analysis). ¹³ And when they are not dependent on any facts, purely epistemic methods are not sufficient to reject even the most repugnant practical norm.

Weak Action-Guidance

As mentioned above, the large bulk of radical realists’ action-guiding claims seem to be weak rather than strong: although they may not select a unique action as the normatively preferred (e.g., legitimate) one, they claim that epistemic norms provide action-guidance in the sense that they may point us in the direction of a set of endorsed or evaluatively preferable actions, and away from others (rejected or debunked). That is, rather than prescribing a specific action, epistemic norms provide, to use a term oft-used by realists, “orientation” (e.g., Cross, 2022: 1118; Geuss, 2008: 40–42, Prinz, 2016: 781, Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 357).

Indeed, even though both Rossi and Cross make strong action-guiding claims, as exemplified above, the vast majority of their claims are in fact weakly rather than strongly action-guiding. Most of Rossi’s claims sketch a more limited action-guidance as the result of ideology critique: it may give “action-orienting normative evaluation” and “diagnostic critique” (Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 349), an “evaluative desideratum” (Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 356), and has a “practical reach” (Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 357). Likewise, for the most part, Cross (2022: 1118) talks in terms of ideology critique being able to supply “at least some degree of practical guidance.” And when specifying the ways in which ideology critique may do so, most of his examples should arguably be classified as weak action-guidance (Cross, 2022: 1118): “showing that one course of action is supported exclusively by epistemically deficient narratives”; “redirect us towards a different question altogether, or direct our attention to a set of facts that we have previously tended to neglect” (referring to Geuss (2005, 2008) for support); or, with Finlayson’s words, “make us see the world very differently” (Finlayson, 2016: 131; Prinz, 2016: 786).

Broadly speaking, the radical realist suggestion is that the epistemic method of radical realism may provide weak action-guidance either negatively or positively. That is, after the ideology critique has been performed, the process has either debunked (or rejected) a number of legitimation narratives, by showing that they are defunct, or they have been validated, by demonstrating that they are not epistemically problematic. Since the process of revealing false or otherwise problematic legitimation narratives is at the heart of the method, let us start there.

A central idea in ideology critique is that the narrative which purportedly supports a power is problematic if that narrative is generated and upheld by that very power (Williams calls this the “Critical Theory Principle,” cf. 2002: 218–232, 2005: 6). By a reflective process in view of this realization—which Geuss (1981: 55–65) calls “reflective unacceptability”—the epistemic merits of the narrative are then judged. As Williams puts it:

if one comes to know that the sole reason one accepts some moral claim is that somebody’s power has brought it about that one accepts it, when, further, it is in their interest that one should accept it, one will have no reason to go on accepting it (Williams, 2002: 231).

In a recent article, Aytac and Rossi (2023) provide a rather detailed description of how the epistemic norms of ideology critique debunk legitimation narratives. Their analysis centers around the epistemic concept of self-justifying power, that is, cases of power where the justification narratives are provided and upheld by the people in power themselves. The argument from self-justifying power is summarized with the thought example of a patriarchal society where there is a belief that “father has everyone’s best interest in heart.” This belief

is ideologically flawed to the extent that its persistence is explained by paternal inculcation—but not because fathers are oppressive or patriarchy is unjust but because the belief is the product of self-justifying power and self-justifying power is epistemically suspect: judges in their own affairs are comparable to authors refereeing their own manuscripts. That is to say, the principle that people shouldn’t be judges in their own affairs—or determine the standards by which they are assessed—is widely accepted for reasons of fairness but also for epistemic reasons: all else equal, judges in their own affairs are less likely to reach the verdict that fits the evidence best (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 1).

Self-justifying power, ¹⁴ they argue, generates epistemically suspect concepts, beliefs, and dispositions, that legitimate social practices and structures (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 5). It is epistemically suspect for two (inter-related) reasons. First, it is epistemically circular: we should not simply take the authority on its word when it claims it ought to be the authority (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 5). Second, it leads to “politically motivating reasoning,” understood as the process in which new information is interpreted, selectively, as consistent with the respective groups’ held position (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 1, 5; cf. Kahan, 2016: 1–2). The dominant group’s position in the hierarchy, they further explain, “affords them the ability to spread their perspective more effectively than other groups—hierarchy tilts the epistemic playing field” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 6). Aytac and Rossi (2023: 6) conclude that in cases of self-justification of power, we have a conclusive reason to reject the justification narrative: it is “epistemically unwarranted” . . . “and so continued reliance on it is unjustified.” ¹⁵

From what we can tell, radical realists aiming for weak action-guidance utilize three (overlapping) strategies for drawing practical-normative conclusions from the ideology critique, what we here call epistemic risk, narratives debunked, and narratives validated. Below, we problematize them in turn.

Epistemic Risk

It seems clear that self-justification is an epistemic problem. Virtually any professional football player, when asked, thinks she should be in the starting line-up. Typically though, we are rightfully skeptical toward the epistemic soundness of such beliefs, since they are speaking in their own self-interest and are at risk (to put it mildly) of biased judgment. Still, we see a number of problems with the claim that it suffices to debunk legitimation narratives.

First, the sole fact that a legitimation narrative is “epistemically circular” does not entail that it is false. I may recommend myself to the coach as the best left-wing midfielder in the team, and it might be true. Similarly for the recurring example in several radical realist writings of the author refereeing her own article (e.g., Aytac and Rossi, 2023; Cross, 2022; Rossi, 2019). While that certainly would be a regrettable system of refereeing, in any particular instance, it might be true that the author in question is fully correct in her evaluation of the article, regardless. ¹⁶

Second, even if self-justification entails a higher risk of biased or selective reasoning, this is a merely a statistical notion. That there is an enhanced risk of selective reasoning and epistemic bias does not entail that, in any given case, the reasoning is in fact selective or biased. As such, it cannot itself debunk a narrative; at the very most, it puts a warning flag on it, telling us to carefully scrutinize its content. Indeed, it is typically taken as a virtue of the scientific process that regardless of who finances a research project—be it Philip Morris financing a project on the risks of smoking, or the oil industry financing a project on the greenhouse effect—that although we might have reason to be suspicious, demanding careful corroboration of every aspect of the research, it would be wrong to judge the result on other than substantial, scientific grounds.

This is arguably why Aytac and Rossi—despite some claims such that self-justification of power “leads to untrustworthiness” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 5)—often in their actual argumentation talk in probabilistic terms: “all else equal, judges in their own affairs are less likely to reach the verdict that fits the evidence best” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 1, our italics). Similarly, when discussing an example where one social group holds more power than another, they argue that due to “the pervasiveness of politically motivated reasoning, there is a high chance that [the legitimation story both groups accept] is the product of politically motivated reasoning” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 6; our italics). Rossi (2019: 642) makes a similar point when he talks about “epistemic caution” as an epistemic norm which prescribes us to disregard ideological legitimation stories.

What is crucial is that, while epistemic caution is indeed recommendable since it may be less likely that evaluators of their own affairs do reach the verdict that fits the evidence best, they may do so. Hence, Aytac and Rossi are correct when, in defending themselves against the charge that they mistake “a blemish in the causal history of a belief, concept, or practice with a lack of arguments in its support,” they admit that they do not “directly falsify the [legitimation narrative’s] propositional content” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 7). However, in order to move from epistemic suspicion to drawing a normative conclusion about the justificatory status of the legitimation narrative—whether directly or indirectly action-guiding—there is simply no way around the need to look at the propositional content itself, that is, analyze the actual arguments offered. Otherwise, radical realists would be guilty of the same faulty overgeneralization that Haslanger warns about in her ideology critique against ideological uses of generic statements (see below): an overrepresentation in criminal convictions of a certain ethic group, say, does not mean that we can conclude that a member of that group is guilty of a crime. It is thus not true, as Prinz and Rossi (2017: 356) argue, that we “do not need to spell out exactly why the perspective of the authors or rulers is flawed, but only why it carries an epistemic risk.” We do need to look at the actual reasons given in a case: the “propositional content,” as it were.

Narratives Debunked

The above considerations do not exclude that ideology critique may actually successfully debunk narratives, by looking and evaluating the narratives themselves. Prinz and Rossi, for example, point to how Haslanger’s ideology critique shows how generic statements, such as “blacks are criminals,” become a form of social “knowledge” as claims about the nature of entities when they are transferred from their social and historical context (Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 358; cf. Haslanger, 2012: 468–470). Let us therefore now assume that an instance of ideology critique has successfully shown that a legitimation narrative does indeed rely on unwarranted empirical statements, wishful thinking or is otherwise—substantively—epistemically problematic; in other words, that the “propositional content” of the legitimation narrative is proven to be unwarranted. This entails that the narrative does not legitimate the power, and it is thus debunked. However, does it entail that the power is not justified?

Unfortunately for a purely epistemic ideology critique, it does not. In itself, it merely means that one set of arguments for legitimate power is not justified. Going back to King Arthur, let us assume that our epistemic investigation has shown that his legitimation story with the lady of the lake is purely fictional. However, even if an epistemic investigation thus demonstrates that this very legitimation narrative is unwarranted, there still may be other reasons for why Arthur is the rightful ruler. Being the champion of the 12 battles for the British cause, for example. Or perhaps its causal consequence: that he has widespread popularity among the people of Britain, well surpassing any other contender for rule. For Arthur to be a legitimate ruler, what is central is that there are sufficient reasons to be had, not whether some legitimation narratives fail.

This means that even when a legitimation story is debunked, we cannot from this fact alone conclude that the power is illegitimate. For that, we need additional normative analysis. Narrative-debunking itself is not enough.

Narratives Validated

Virtually the same reasoning goes for the positive version of debunking, that is, narratives which are validated. In order to appreciate this, let us assume that a legitimation story, self-justificatory or not, after the epistemic investigation turns out not to rely on problematic inferences from dubious concepts and methods but rely on solid facts which are empirically corroborated. Then the justification narrative is validated by the ideology critique. The problem is that as long as the investigation in question is purely epistemic, thus containing no moral or other practical norms, this validation does not imply vindication.

The reason for this was brought forward already when we discussed strong action-guidance claims above: just because a legitimation narrative is free from factual deficiencies, it does not imply that it grants legitimation. Of course, that a legitimation story is epistemically validated means that one necessary bump in the road to legitimation is straightened out, since only epistemically warranted narratives may supply legitimation. If the story with the lady in the lake turns out to be fiction, we need not think about whether it can justify power. The probability for the story actually providing legitimacy is zero: it was simply a fantasy, told for whatever reason. If it turns out to be true, however, it merely means that we are ready for the next step: ponder whether or not “strange women lyin’ in ponds distributin’ swords” is a sufficient “basis for a system of government.” If it is, then Arthur’s rule is legitimate. However, that is no longer a matter of epistemic norms.

Two Objections

Let us end this section with two potential objections that, it seems to us, play more or less implicit roles when radical realists argue for the practical role of epistemic rather than moral norms. The first objection is the idea that radical realism represents an “anti-elitist” version of moral epistemology, whereas the second is the idea that what carries the heavy load in our arguments in this article is a very specific notion of political legitimacy, one which is contested by radical realists. On both objections, then, it is arguably just a matter of “reasonable disagreement” between the radical realist and the mainstream (in realist terms “moralist”) political theorist; nothing more.

The idea of an anti-elitist moral epistemology is perhaps an underlying premise already in Cross’ (2022) argument (treated in the previous section) that humans have an excess of moral ideas already, but it is more explicitly stated by Aytac and Rossi (2023). Objecting to what they take to be Haslanger’s “morality-driven ideology critique,” Aytac and Rossi (2023: 4) claim that there is no need for the theorist to provide moral argumentation beyond eliminating epistemic deficiencies:

[I]f we want people to correctly perceive the links between general moral truths and particular social practices, it seems sufficient to eliminate epistemic barriers . . . Once the epistemic obstacles are removed, subjects should be able to call the legitimacy of dominant practices into question using their general moral commitments. There is no need for the critic to make additional claims about what morality requires.

Presuming that the role of the political theorist also includes moral argumentation, they argue, “indicates distrust toward the reflective capacities of ordinary people” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 4).

As we understand it, the core argument here is that if we think that more is needed than eliminating epistemic barriers, we think that the political theorist (the “elite”) has an epistemic privilege in relation to the ordinary political subject (“ordinary people”). Radical realism, on the contrary (on this interpretation), favors an anti-elitist moral epistemology in which the moral evaluation of the ordinary political subject is on par with the theorist.

The main problem with this line of argument is that it misunderstands what we could call the “justificatory source” of moral epistemology in a way structurally similar to how radical realists above focused on the subject putting forward an argument rather than on the propositional content of the argument itself. The justificatory source, that is, what gives a moral claim its justification, is not the particular agent who happens to put forward the argument, but the content of the argument. Hence, it is not that a moral claim is made by a political theorist that makes it justified (if it is), but the normative arguments given in its favor. While it has been shown time and again in history that moral claims of “the elite” may be deeply unjust, this is naturally true of “ordinary people” as well. In order to justify one set of actions rather than another, removing epistemic barriers needs to be complemented by well-argued moral values and principles. In other words, other than presuming that the radical realist thinks that the “ordinary political subject,” qua ordinary political subject, is epistemically privileged in relation to the theorist, there is simply no disagreement in this respect, reasonable or otherwise. ¹⁷

A second potential objection comes from the idea that radical realists operate with a non-moral notion of legitimacy, whereas mainstream political theorists use a moral notion. Legitimacy for the realist is, the thought goes, a matter of whether the political subjects genuinely have accepted the rule, as opposed to a moralized notion in which the rule must be morally just in some stronger sense.

There are at least two problems with this line of reasoning, one more specific and one more general. The first relates to the concept of legitimacy itself, namely, the fact that the concept is moral (in the broad sense used in this article) also on the realist conceptualization. Generally in political theory, the concept of legitimacy refers to the justification of coercive power or the justification and sanctioning of political authority. While there may be disagreements between individual theorists in this debate concerning how best to characterize this concept in detail, there is wide agreement on this general understanding of the term. Realists may disagree about what legitimacy requires, that is, the proper criteria of legitimacy, but as has been pointed out in the literature (e.g., Erman and Möller, 2015), the potential disagreement relates to the normative criteria for what legitimacy requires. Even on the thinnest realist conceptualization, pure domination is not legitimate (“might is not right” as the slogan goes; see Williams, 2005: 6). Hence, it is not sufficient that political subjects have in fact accepted the rule. Rather, for legitimate rule, the acceptance is conditioned on a number of normative criteria, such as, for example, that it is not too tyrannical or deceptive (Horton, 2010), that it is not coerced (Williams, 2005), and that the subject must perceive of themselves as free (Newey, 2010). In sum, even if it is sometimes conflated, legitimacy also for political realists is a matter not only of whether the rule is accepted but whether it is acceptable. Consequently, the notion of legitimacy is normative for political realists as well as for other theorists.

The more general point is that the target of this article is practical normativity as such and that whichever normative notion we choose is a secondary matter. The reason that we often have utilized the concept of legitimacy in this article is for the simple reason that it is the favorite normative concept of political realists, who sometimes are skeptical toward (what is typically perceived as) stronger normative concepts such as justice and equality. The fundamental question we address is what is required to give action-guidance in the political sphere, regardless of under which concept such action-guidance is discussed.

Action-Guidance and the Need for Post-Epistemic Moral Norms

The epistemic project of radical realism rests on two very plausible premises: that an epistemic investigation of the legitimation narratives is central for political theory, and that we have good reason for pinpointing (and being skeptical toward) self-justificatory legitimation narratives. We agree with both points. In other words, we agree that epistemic norms are vital for any plausible political theory of, say, justice, equality, political legitimacy, democracy, or equality. What we do not agree with, and what the discussion above has aimed to demonstrate, is that epistemic norms suffice: “ideology critique without morality” simply cannot deliver on its promise.

The fundamental reason for this is that epistemic norms, while central, just do not give us sufficient reasons for any legitimation narrative. They are thus neither action-guiding in the strong nor the weak sense defined above: they do not justify a unique action or power: they do not manage to limit the set of available actions/powers (either by excluding them from or by including them in the set of normatively justified set), and the evaluative ordering it may provide is insufficient. This does not mean, of course, that they are not action-guiding in any sense. By pinpointing certain legitimation stories (through “probabilistic” norms such as the norm of epistemic caution), or by debunking or validating them, it seems plausible to claim that they guide our further investigations. However, that is a “theory-internal” action-guidance if you will: it may tell political theorists where to look, and when to search for alternative arguments. But it does not give us reasons to accept—or reject—an action or power as legitimate.

This brings us back to our initial discussions of practical and theoretical norms. There we granted the basic plausibility of the idea that theoretical norms such as epistemic norms may be action-guiding. Learning when and from where the next train into town leaves is indeed action-guiding if you are heading there. In the context of political theory, however, we have seen the shortcomings of mere theoretical norms: while they may manage to reveal descriptive beliefs as unwarranted, they cannot tell us what to do without a value premise. While you can expose Arthur’s legitimation story of the lady of the lake as unwarranted through epistemic considerations, you cannot conclude that it is politically justified unless you also endorse a value premise (in this case, something along the lines that power is justified when it is granted by the gods, and that the gift of a magic sword entails that so has been the case).

The basic lesson here is thus one version of Hume’s law: in order to make a valid practical-normative conclusion, you need (explicit or implicit) normative premises in addition to non-normative ones. Ideology critique, or any other purely epistemic investigation, cannot give us that answer. Only practical-normative argumentation does. Consequently, there is a possible interpretation of the famous Blair-story rehearsed in the introduction to this section in which Blair is not guilty of any epistemic shortcomings. On Geuss’ (2010: 183) analysis, when Blair insisted on focusing on the evilness of Saddam Hussein—although the experts called upon informed the prime minister of the practical complications with an invasion—it was “pretty clearly a defensive strategy aimed at preventing a cognitive engagement that would potentially upset a comfortable worldview.” This may of course be correct, but looking at the evidence at hand, that is, the passage (Steele, 2008: 18–19) that Geuss cites, the two actual quotes by Blair are “But the man’s uniquely evil, isn’t he?” and “He [Saddam Hussein] can make choices, can’t he?” Let us now assume that Blair is committed to the normative view that people are morally very bad (“evil”) when they are responsible for atrocities such as gassing their own population, murdering people without trial, etc.; and that morally very bad people should be stopped, even if that means a lot of practical complications. In that light, Blair’s comment on Saddam Hussein’s evilness as well as his ability to make autonomous choices is not a denial of any of the empirical claims made by the experts. Rather, it is a reiteration of his central point: Saddam Hussein is evil, and evil men should be stopped, even at very high costs. On this analysis, when one of the experts (Joffe) reacts to Blair’s rhetorical question of evilness with becoming “a bit nonplussed. It didn’t seem to be very relevant” (Steele, 2008: 18–19, cited in Geuss, 2010: 183), he is simply not appreciating Blair’s value premises.

Of course, we are not here saying that Geuss is wrong in his analysis. Given all possible evidence there is about the case, his conclusion about Blair might be correct. However, it demonstrates our central point, namely, that whether—and which—factual evidence is relevant or not depends on one’s value premises. Ideology critique, as an epistemic enterprise, may reveal factually problematic legitimation narratives. However, it may not solve the larger question of which power is legitimate and which is not. For that, we need practical normativity.

The Importance of Moral Norms as Pre-Epistemic Norms

As we have seen, epistemic normativity is concerned with norms of knowledge and belief. It refers to the standards that govern how we acquire and evaluate beliefs, and how we justify them to ourselves and others. Epistemic norms may require us to seek out evidence, avoid fallacies, and be willing to revise our beliefs in light of new evidence or arguments. What we have argued so far, however, is that the exposure of epistemically suspicious belief—be it through the method of ideology critique or through traditional empirical social science—in itself does not take us anywhere with regard to how we should act, neither in the strict sense of strong action-guidance (directing us toward a unique action/legitimate power) nor in the weak sense (offering some orientation for future action). Indeed, even if agreed on the epistemic standards for evaluating politics, there would still be reasonable disagreement about how to apply these standards to concrete political issues. Different people may have different beliefs, values, and interests and may interpret and weigh the available evidence and arguments differently. Moreover, political decisions and actions often involve trade-offs between different values and interests, such as liberty and equality, individual rights and social welfare, and so on. These value conflicts cannot be resolved by epistemic norms alone, but require substantive moral and political principles. ¹⁸

Recently, some theorists have retracted from their previously significantly stronger position that epistemic norms can offer action-guidance in the sense under scrutiny in the last section. However, they insist that a non-moral view could still be upheld as an evaluative (non-prescriptive) approach, conducting ideology critique “grounded in epistemic rather than moral commitments” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 1). ¹⁹ The method of ideology critique relies on “social-scientific evidence to identify instances of power self-justification,” which “yields social critique without the need for additional judgments about justice or moral progress” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 2). As we saw in the last section, the problem with self-justifying power, such as when hierarchical power legitimizes itself, is that it generates epistemically suspect belief and therefore deserves our evaluative attention (Aytac and Rossi, 2023; Prinz, 2016). As illustrated by Aytac and Rossi, if an editor of a scholarly journal lets an author be the reviewer of her own article, we would be epistemically suspicious of her evaluation. The problem is one of epistemic circularity: “we shouldn’t take an authority at their word when they claim that they ought to be the authority” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 5). By identifying such self-justifications, we may expose ideological distortions and “flawed ideologies” that reproduce power structures and hierarchical social and political orders and thereby generate social critique. Since the critique offers evaluations of states of affairs, it is indeed normative, even if it is not prescriptive. However, it may inform prescriptions and be useful for mainstream political theory (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 11).

The authors demonstrate the usefulness of their approach by evaluating a particular social order, namely, the neopatriarchy prevalent in the Middle-East and North-Africa region. The aim of this case study is not to say anything new about the social orders of this region, but rather to demonstrate that we can reach similar “normative conclusions” to other approaches “without relying on moral commitments” but only epistemic ones (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 9). Neopatriarchal social orders in this region are intertwined among social, political, and economic institutions, through which existing patriarchal norms are reproduced and reinforced. Drawing on an analogy between the father and ruler, political elites uphold power structures by using state power to reinforce existing gender roles and relations of authority within the patriarchal family. At the same time, the reproduction of patriarchal norms within the family is essential for the legitimation and stability of the social order (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 9–10). Hence, it is an example of epistemic circularity. The ideology critique reveals epistemically suspicious belief, where the political elite tries to self-justify its own power. For this reason, the narratives are “not warranted to function as genuine legitimation” since a genuine legitimation would require some “noncircular argument” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 11).

Unfortunately, we do not find this evaluative (non-prescriptive) version of the non-moral view convincing either. In line with our second claim, we argue that we do not only need moral norms in the form of post-epistemic norms, as it were—that is, in order to analyze what we ought to do, given the best empirical evidence at hand—but also in the form of pre-epistemic norms. Indeed, they are already at work before we get introduced to the case study. We already know of the neopatriarchal structures in this region, through the careful empirical work that has been done by social scientists, most probably for a long time, which is partly cited by Aytac and Rossi. These structures have been studied precisely because they are considered deeply problematic; however, not because they are upheld by epistemically suspicious beliefs—indeed, it strikes us as provocative that this would be the primary reason they are problematic, especially in the eyes of those oppressed—but because empirical scholars have found them problematic and/or undesirable on moral grounds.

From an epistemic standpoint, there are countless practices out there, and the compass of epistemic circularity does not seem to be very helpful, since it is both too limited and too broad in scope. It is too limited in scope since it mainly focuses on hierarchical structures where one group dominates, or at least has significantly more power than another. However, there are many cases of interest in political theory where there is no clear dominant part, as illustrated by the many surprisingly even elections in recent democratic systems of government (as compared, e.g., with Russia and other pseudo-democratic states where the “elections” often show almost total support for one dominant party), or when the normative political question concerns only groups with very little power. And it is too broad in scope since there are an infinite number of insignificant practices upheld partly by epistemic circularity, which are wholly uninteresting to political theory.

Now, the radical realist may reply that, while it is true that all practices are equivalent from an epistemic standpoint, as political theorists one can offer a descriptive motivation for choosing only the politically relevant ones. This is true. However, even if we had an uncontroversial definition of politics and what counts as political at our disposal, numerous practices within the political domain would also be rather unexciting for political theorists. Say that many politicians lie about how much they exercise, just to give the impression that they are healthy in front of their voters, which in turn reinforces their self-image of in fact being fit. There is an epistemic circularity and thus a self-justification involved since they uphold epistemic beliefs that are suspicious. Compare this with politicians who uphold epistemically suspicious belief to continue engaging in corruption. Let us further assume that the epistemic circularity and self-justifying power are equally present in both cases. There is no way for the advocate of the epistemic view of normativity to say that it is more important to study the latter case. In light of the problems we find important to study in political theory, such as domination, oppression, injustices, and inequality, this conclusion is rather unsatisfactory.

More importantly, no one in fact has an uncontroversial definition of politics at their disposal. Rather, politics is to a large extent precisely a contestation over defining what should count as political and not. For example, feminists insist that the private sphere is political, environmentalists argue that nature is part of the political, and Marxists see the economic sphere as political.

Conclusion

In this article, we have discussed the importance and limitations of epistemic norms in political theory. Through a critical analysis of the epistemic version of the non-moral view, advocated by radical realists, we have argued that while epistemic norms are important for political theory, they are not sufficient for a successful account. Moral norms (in the broad sense used here) are also necessary to provide a complete and successful account in political theory. We have defended two claims: that moral norms are essential as pre-epistemic norms in the process of political theorizing and that moral norms are essential as post-epistemic norms. As pre-epistemic norms, they are needed to identify and justify which practices to study when conducting ideology critique. As post-epistemic norms, they are needed to tell us how to act in light of our investigation of warranted and unwarranted beliefs. In sum, while epistemic norms play an important role in political theory, they are not adequate on their own.

Let us end by suggesting that the upshot of our discussion has significant bearing not only for the radical realist theorists we here have brought forward as making strong or weak action-guiding claims but for radical realists generally. ²⁰ Of course, if our arguments in this article are sound, the claims made by Cross, Aytac, Rossi, and others that we have rehearsed about how epistemic norms may be sufficient for justifying a certain political course of action, or for concluding that they are acceptable or should be rejected, are false. While that is true, we suggest that the consequences of the radical realist project are greater than that.

One such consequence is a matter of clarity and coherence. As we have exemplified throughout the article, many radical realist claims about the significance of the epistemic norms are vague and unclear, such as that they provide “diagnostic critique” (Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 349), have “practical reach” (Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 357) or “make us see the world very differently” (Finlayson, 2016: 131). Other claims are simply misleading, such as that they provide an “evaluative desideratum” (Prinz and Rossi, 2017: 356). This is misleading since it is not true in the default sense of ‘evaluative desideratum’—that is, in relation to the content of a normative claim—but, as we have seen, only in relation to their circumstances of utterance. Even more problematic are of course instances of incoherence, as when radical realists argue in one place that in cases of self-justification of power, the justification narrative is “epistemically unwarranted” . . . “and so continued reliance on it is unjustified” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 6), and then later bring out the caveat that ideology critique does not “directly falsify the [legitimation narrative’s] propositional content” (Aytac and Rossi, 2023: 7). These unclarities and incoherencies are problematic since they give the reader the impression that epistemic norms can provide much more than they in fact can.

The discussion in this article thus demonstrates the need for radical realism overall to be much clearer and more upfront about the specific role and limitations of ideology critique. It is not sufficient to just simply admit, when pressed, that arguments such as those we have brought forward in this article are correct, and then go on with business as usual. This is especially problematic in light of the fact that radical realists have shown to be essentially dismissive of moral norms, endorsing the “ethics is dead politics” slogan. And when additional practical norms are mentioned as useful for political theory by radical realists, it is typically not moral norms but other kinds of norms, such as norms about language (Aytac, 2022) or contextualist practical values (Arlen and Rossi, 2021).

The upshot is that the central role of normative argumentation as such, the force of the better argument (to speak with Habermas), is hardly recognized as anything but an ideological affair where the powerful and privileged are exercising domination. However, as soon as we admit to ourselves that ideology critique and other purely epistemic projects have the limited role of flagging justification narratives for further examination, this will not do. Hence, while the radical realist accepting the arguments brought forward in this article may of course endorse a division of labor between ideology critique and other branches of political theory, as, for example, Aytac and Rossi (2023: 11) have suggested, she should also retain a more respectful attitude toward those “other branches.” After all, without normative political theory which assesses the normative content of justification narratives, we can neither validate nor invalidate a normative claim itself. And in the end, that is what the justification of power has to involve.