Abstract
Europarties – the groupings of national parties that compose politics at the European level – are somewhat under-studied by academics, mostly ignored by the media and largely unknown to the public.
This is particularly true of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), despite formerly being the third largest party group in the European Parliament (EP).
In The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR): Politics, Parties and Policies, Martin Steven addresses this previously neglected topic by producing the first in-depth scholarly account of the ECR – outlining the organisation’s formation, political and ideological make-up, as well as its activities and policy influence.
Given the overall lack of scholarship on Europarties, Steven’s work provides an insight into the inner workings of such organisations more broadly through exploration of the ECR in particular. Steven outlines the structures that make-up the ECR – which include the ECR group in the EP, ECR Party and New Directions think tank – and how these various organisations work together under the wider ECR umbrella.
The book also includes a thought-provoking chapter on the UK Conservative Party, arguably the driving force behind the ECR’s creation. Acting as almost a short history of the Conservatives approach to EU politics, Steven charts the somewhat uncomfortable experience of the Conservative Party in the EP to David Cameron’s 2005 leadership election promise to leave the EU’s main centre-right group – the European People’s Party (EPP) – and the eventual creation of the ECR in 2009. The author also, quite persuasively, suggests that the seeds of Brexit may have been sown in the Conservative Party’s decision to leave the EPP – a suggestion that may present an avenue for future research.
However, Steven’s main argument is that the ECR should not be studied merely as another Europarty but as the EP’s, and by extension EU’s, main voice of conservatism. Indeed, throughout the book, Steven presents an underlying ideological distinction between West European Christian democracy, which is largely associated with the EPP, and an Anglo-American conservatism, which is the ideological void in the EU political landscape that it is argued the ECR exists to fill.
According to Steven, ‘ECR is the main standard-bearer for an Anglo-Saxon or liberal political economic model’ (p. 49). Termed Euro-realism by the group, the ECR’s core ideology consists of ‘a centre-right, economically liberal world view’ that believes ‘the EU ought to be reformed, but not destroyed or abandoned’ (p. 61). Indeed, the ECR are presented as the strongest advocates of free-market capitalism and NATO in the EP (pp. 106–107). This type of conservatism is clearly represented by the founding ECR members of the UK Conservative Party and Czech Civic Democrats, and also espoused by member parties including the Liberal Conservative Reformers and New Flemish Alliance.
Nevertheless, Steven’s contention that the ECR be considered the EU’s voice of conservatism is not without its weaknesses. Indeed, following the departure of the British Conservatives and elevation of Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) as the ECR’s leading national delegation, the ideological leanings of the group have become less clear and less obviously conform to the Euro-realist conservatism that Steven argues the group exists to promote. These internal policy incongruities are also discussed in relation to the Danish People’s Party and True Finns and can be extended to the Brothers of Italy (FdL) delegation, as well as a number of the smaller national delegations that are not discussed in detail.
Undermining Steven’s argument further is the fact that a number of conservative parties – including the major conservative parties in Bulgaria, Latvia, Sweden, Finland and Denmark – prefer membership of the EPP over the ECR. With such mainstream conservative parties within the ranks of the EPP, it is difficult to argue that the ECR is the only group at the European level that can claim to represent conservative parties or conservative viewpoints.
As such, although Steven puts forward a very well-made case that the ECR and its Euro-realist ideology are rooted in conservatism rather than Euroscepticism or nationalism, the central idea that the ECR should be considered the voice of conservatism at the European level is less convincing. In fact, as Steven notes, ‘ultimately, ECR have served well the intellectual distinction between Anglo-American conservatism and West European Christian democracy’ (p. 133). But whether the ECR in its current form makes this distinction in actuality, or whether a future ECR group under the leadership of PiS and FdL is capable of doing so, is much more up for debate.
Regardless, it is undoubtedly the case that in The European Conservatives and Reformists, Steven addresses a neglected topic in EU politics, providing the ECR with the proper attention that an established Europarty deserves. Of interest to researchers of the EU and party politics more broadly, this work should not only be considered a starting point for further research on the ECR, but also a springboard for future studies on conservatism, Euroscepticism and the internal workings of Europarties.
