Due to the historical centrality of presidents in Latin America, we argue that presidential approval can be a source of group membership among citizens, creating a division between “ingroups” and “outgroups.” We test the effects of such division on tolerant attitudes toward the rights of system critics to participate in political life in four ways (from the least to the most threatening for the ingroup): voting, giving speeches on television, running for office, and demonstrating peacefully. We further argue that this effect is conditioned by the economic context, and that the ingroup/outgroup divide is activated when an economy performs poorly. Analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2018/2019 survey is consistent with our expectations. Specifically, our results suggest that the main predictor for tolerant attitudes is presidential approval, and that the individual-level effect dissipates in a context of good performance of the economy, which causes the presidential ingroup to not feel threatened by any outgroup.
AdmanPStrömbladP (2018) Time for Tolerance: Exploring the Influence of Learning Institutions on the Recognition of Political Rights among Immigrants. Comparative Migration Studies6 (1): 34.
2.
AndersenRFetnerT (2008) Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies. American Journal of Political Science52: 942–958.
3.
AndersonCJBlaisABowlerS, et al. (2005) Losers’ Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BrewerMB (1999) The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?Journal of Social Issues55 (3): 429–444.
6.
BrubakerRCooperF (2000) Beyond “Identity.”Theory and Society29 (1): 1–47.
7.
BurtonFFenechAMoskowitzC (2019) Education and Engagement Predict Tolerance for Anti-System Protest. LAPOP, Insights Series, No. 139. Vanderbilt University. LAPOP. AmericasBarometer. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO939es.pdf
8.
CampelloDZuccoC (2016) Presidential Success and the World Economy. The Journal of Politics78 (2): 589–602.
9.
CarlinRE (2006) The Socioeconomic Roots of Support for Democracy and the Quality of Democracy in Latin America. Revista de Ciencia Politica26 (1): 48–66.
10.
CarlinREHellwigT (2020) The World Economy, Political Control, and Presidential Success. The Journal of Politics82 (2): 786–799.
11.
CarlinRELoveGJ (2018) Political Competition, Partisanship and Interpersonal Trust in Electoral Democracies. British Journal of Political Science48 (1): 115–139.
12.
CarlinRESingerMM (2011) Support for Polyarchy in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies44 (11): 1500–1526.
13.
CarlinRESinghSP (2015) Executive Power and Economic Accountability. The Journal of Politics77 (4): 1031–1044.
14.
CarranzaT (2020) Dilemas De La Acción Colectiva En América Latina: Entre La Incidencia Institucional Y La Protesta Social. Revista Mexicana de Estudios de los Movimientos Sociales4 (1): 110–113.
15.
CartyEB (2020) “I’m with Her” or “we’re with Her”? Personal Versus Group Leader-Based Identities and Types of Political Participation. Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública9 (2): 49–79.
16.
Castro CornejoRBeltránULeyS, et al. (2022) From Election Day to Presidential Approval: Partisanship and the Honeymoon Period in Mexico. Electoral Studies75: 102438.
17.
CohenJE (2004) Economic Perceptions and Executive Approval in Comparative Perspective. Political Behavior26 (1): 27–43.
18.
CórdovaASeligsonMA (2010) Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin American Politics and Society52 (2): 1–35.
19.
ExpósitoAFernández-SerranoJVelascoF (2017) Crecimiento económico, pobreza y desigualdad: un análisis de eficiencia para América Latina en el siglo XXI. Revista de Economía Mundial47: 117–138.
20.
FriedmanBM (2017) The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. In: ImberJB (ed.) Markets, Morals, and Religion. New York: Routledge, pp.29–42.
21.
GélineauF (2007) Presidents, Political Context, and Economic Accountability: Evidence from Latin America. Political Research Quarterly60 (3): 415–428.
22.
GreeneS (2004) Social Identity Theory and Party Identification. Social Science Quarterly85 (1): 136–153.
23.
KajsiuB (2019) The Colombian Right: The Political Ideology and Mobilization of Uribismo. Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies44 (2): 204–224.
24.
KlandermansPG (2014) Identity Politics and Politicized Identities: Identity Processes and the Dynamics of Protest. Political Psychology35 (1): 1–22.
25.
KranendonkMVermeulenFvan HeelsumA (2018) “Unpacking” the Identity-to-Politics Link: The Effects of Social Identification on Voting among Muslim Immigrants in Western Europe. Political Psychology39 (1): 43–67.
26.
LoxtonJLevitskyS (2018) Personalistic Authoritarian Successor Parties in Latin America. In: LoxtonJMainwaringS (eds) Life after Dictatorship. Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 113–142.
27.
LupuN (2016) Party Brands in Crisis: Partisanship, Brand Dilution, and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
28.
MainwaringS (ed.) (2018) Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
29.
Marquart-PyattSPaxtonP (2007) In Principle and in Practice: Learning Political Tolerance in Eastern and Western Europe. Political Behavior29 (1): 89–113.
30.
MoehlerDC (2009) Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects: Election Losers and Winners in Africa. British Journal of Political Science39 (2): 345–366.
31.
MurilloMVViscontiG (2017) Economic Performance and Incumbents’ Support in Latin America. Electoral Studies45: 180–190.
32.
NaviaPPerellóL (2019) One-Night Stands and Long-Term Commitments: Presidential Approval for Sebastián Piñera in Chile, 2009-2014. Revista De Ciencia Política39 (1): 49–73.
33.
ÖsterholmPZettelmeyerJ (2008) The Effect of External Conditions on Growth in Latin America. IMF Economic Review55: 595–623.
34.
PaulD (2018) Explaining Tolerance for Anti-System Protest in the United States. LAPOP, Insights Series, No. 137. Vanderbilt University. LAPOP. AmericasBarometer. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO937es.pdf
35.
Pérez-LiñánA (2007) Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
RibeiroEFuksM (2019) Tolerância política no Brasil. Opinião Pública25: 531–555.
39.
SalinasEBoothJA (2011) Micro-Social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America. Journal of Politics in Latin America3 (1): 29–64.
40.
SimonBKlandermansB (2001) Politicized Collective Identity: A Social Psychological Analysis. American Psychologist56 (4): 319.
41.
SingerM (2018) Delegating Away Democracy: How Good Representation and Policy Successes Can Undermine Democratic Legitimacy. Comparative Political Studies51 (13): 1754–1788.
42.
SingerMM (2021) Fiddling While Democracy Burns: Partisan Reactions to Weak Democracy in Latin America. Perspectives on Politics. Epub ahead of print 20December. DOI: 10.1017/s1537592721002899.
43.
SullivanJLMarcusGEFeldmanS, et al. (1981) The Sources of Political Tolerance: A Multivariate Analysis. American Political Science Review75 (1): 92–106.
44.
SullivanJLPieresonJMarcusGE (1993) Political Tolerance and American Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
45.
Van DoornM (2014) The Nature of Tolerance and the Social Circumstances in Which It Emerges. Current Sociology Review62 (6): 905–927.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
