Abstract
In search for answers on how to deal with contemporary global challenges like climate change, global poverty and pandemics like COVID-19, there is a growing interest in state responsibility from a normative perspective. Thus, Sean Fleming’s recently published book Leviathan on a Leash: A Political Theory of State Responsibility that sets out to develop and discuss the concept is very welcome.
In the book, Fleming reconstructs and develops a Hobbesian theory of state responsibility. It is based on Hobbes’ writings on the state but diverts from Hobbes in some crucial points to be able to speak of state responsibility at all. Very briefly, this Hobbesian theory can be summarized as follows: A state can be said to bear responsibility because it is a (fictional) person that is represented by its government, who acts in its name; the government in turn is authorized by subjects, who will bear the costs and burdens of the state’s responsibilities.
Each of these three entities is necessary to properly conceptualize state responsibility according to Fleming. The state cannot be taken out of this ‘complex triad of relations between the state, its government, and its subjects’ (p. 2), since it then would be unclear why responsibilities should extend beyond the lifetimes of both governments and subjects.
Fleming argues against two rivalling contemporary theories of state responsibility – the agential theory and the functional theory – as each neglects one entity. The functional theory – prominent in International Law – takes the subjects out of the equation and only considers the relation between the state and its representatives. Thus, it has a blind eye towards legitimation of the representatives and the distribution of the burdens of state responsibilities to subjects.
The agential theory – dominant in International Relations, political theory and philosophy – in turn neglects the representatives of the state and only focusses on the relation between subjects and the state. This results in the counterfactual view that the state can act on its own and thus obscures the role of state representatives.
Fleming does not only lay open this often-unnoticed theoretical divide between different fields, but his theory may also be able to bridge this divide.
Fleming works out the details of this theory by means of three ‘Fundamental Questions’: ‘How can actions be attributed to the entity? [. . .] How can the entity be identified over time? [. . .] How can the entity discharge its responsibilities?’ (p. 6). According to Fleming, any complete theory of responsibility must answer these questions. These questions fit very smoothly to the three relations between the entities of Fleming’s theory.
While these questions are undoubtedly important in debates on state responsibility – one might even agree with Fleming that they are ‘perennial questions in ethics and law’ (p. 7) – it is also clear that these specific questions were selected among many to fit the structure of the theory rather than covering all aspects that a theory of responsibility needs to take into account.
Another question that needs to be answered in a theory of responsibility is, for example, the question of authority or to whom states are responsible. Fleming neglects this question even though it is especially important for responsibility in the international realm, since ‘there is no higher authority that can compel states to fulfill their responsibilities’ (p. 68) as Fleming summarizes Hobbes. While, as Fleming convincingly explains (pp. 68–69), a theory of state responsibility does not need to be abandoned because of this, further elaboration on this subject would have benefited the theory overall, especially since his Hobbesian theory necessarily diverts from Hobbes’ theory on this point.
After having laid out this theory, what is Fleming’s take on state responsibility as a potential solution to contemporary challenges? Pessimistically, he finds ‘the practice of holding states responsible [. . .] inherently unjust, tragic, and lamentable’ (p. 3). Thus, he rather asks why and under which conditions it makes sense at all to assign responsibility to states. Still, I argue, this book is highly relevant for those interested in state responsibility normatively, since in using Fleming’s Hobbesian theory of state responsibility, one does not need to adopt his pessimist perspective on state responsibility. This makes it amenable to being used in normative theory about contemporary challenges.
In conclusion, Fleming’s book offers a novel theory of state responsibility, that can not only offer a logically stringent answer to who or what the state is but also how it relates to other entities and actors like governments. While this may sound trivial, existing theories struggle with at least one part of this. Overall, it is a well-argued and convincing account of state responsibility with many potential applications. This will make the book of interest to a wide range of researchers in political theory, International Relations, International Law and philosophy but also researchers working empirically wishing to bolster their work with a thorough theory of state responsibility.
