Normativity in Realist Legitimacy

Abstract

Political realists reject the view that politics is applied morality. But they also usually claim that judgements about political legitimacy are normative. Where, then, does this normativity come from? So far, realists have given two answers: ‘concessive realism’, which identifies legitimacy as a norm internal to political practice while delegating to morality the task of explaining why this practice is valuable; and ‘naturalist realism’, which holds that alternatives to legitimate politics are not ‘real options’ for anyone. I argue that concessive realism should be rejected because it neglects the importance of the realist critique of morality. I also argue that naturalist realism should be rejected because alternatives to legitimate politics remain ‘real options’ for some people. I conclude with some thoughts on how a plausible account of the normative force of realist legitimacy should proceed.