As a key consequence of government formation negotiations among executive and legislative actors, portfolio allocation offers a window to understand the impact of constitutional design and presidential prerogatives on cabinet dynamics across democratic regime types. This article uses Shugart and Carey’s emphasis on the implications of regime distinctions and institutional variation in presidential powers for executive-legislative relations as a starting point for an examination of the extent to which presidents influence government formation outcomes in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Many presidents in these political systems have some influence on government formation, which enables them to shape cabinet composition. Yet, whether these powers advantage presidential parties in reaping more cabinet spoils than their proportional share has yet to be investigated. Using data on 442 government formation situations in 23 European parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies during 1945–2015, this study finds that parties of strong presidents generally, or presidents formally empowered to choose a formateur, are more likely to be advantaged in the allocation of cabinet seats than their peers who are not allied with the head of state.
AlemánETsebelisG (2011) Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas. Journal of Politics in Latin America31: 3–28.
2.
Amorim NetoO (2002) Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil. In: MorgensternSBenito Nacif (eds) Legislative Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.48–78.
3.
Amorim NetoO (2006) The Presidential Calculus. Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas. Comparative Political Studies394: 415–440.
4.
Amorim NetoOSamuelsD (2010) Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: a Global Perspective. Revista Iberoamericana De Estudios Legislativos11: 10–23.
5.
Amorim NetoOStrømK (2006) Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies. British Journal of Political Science364: 619–643.
6.
AnghelV (2017) ‘Why Can’t We Be Friends?’ The Coalition Potential of Presidents in Semi-presidential Republics – Insights from Romania. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures2010: 1–18.
7.
ArterD (1999) Finland. In: ElgieR (ed.) Semi-presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 48–66.
8.
BäckHDumontP (2008) Making the First Move: A two-stage Analysis of the Role of Formateurs in Parliamentary Government Formation. Public Choice135: 353–373.
9.
BaronDPFerejohnJA (1989) Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review834: 1181–1206.
10.
BassiA (2013) A Model of Endogenous Government Formation. American Journal of Political Science574: 777–793.
11.
BischofD (2017) New Graphic Schemes for Stata: Plotplain and Plottig. Stata Journal173: 748–759.
12.
BrowneECFranklinMN (1973) Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies. American Political Science Review672: 453–469.
13.
BrowneECFrendreisJP (1980) Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations. American Journal of Political Science244: 753–768.
14.
BucurC (2017) A Mould-breaking Cabinet? Changes and Continuities in the Formation of the 2017 French Government. French Politics153: 340–359.
15.
BucurC (2018) Cabinet Payoffs in Coalition Governments: A Time-Varying Measure of Portfolio Importance. Party Politics242: 154–167.
16.
BucurCCheibubJA (2017) Presidential Partisanship in Government Formation: Do Presidents Favor their Parties when they Appoint the Prime Minister?Political Research Quarterly704: 803–817.
17.
CarrollRCoxGW (2012) Presidents and Their Formateurs (Working paper). Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1905305 (accessed 15 May 2019).
18.
ChaistyPNicCPowerTJ (2014) Rethinking the ‘Presidentialism Debate’: Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective. Democratization211: 72–94.
19.
ChaistyPNicCPowerTJ (2018) Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20.
CutlerJDe MarchiSGallopM, et al. (2016) Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems. British Journal of Political Science461: 31–43.
21.
DöringHManowP (2016) Parliaments and Governments Database (Parlgov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies. Development Version. Available at: http://www.parlgov.org/ (accessed 15 May 2019).
22.
ElgieR (2015). Heads of State in European Politics. In: MagoneJM (ed.) Routledge Handbook of European Politics. London: Routledge, pp. 311–327.
23.
ElgieR (2016) Three Waves of Semi-Presidential Studies. Democratization231: 49–70.
24.
ElgieRPassarelliG (2018) Presidentialisation: One Term, Two Uses – Between Deductive Exercise and Grand Historical Narrative. Political Studies Review17: 115–123.
25.
Falcó-GimenoAIndridasonIH (2013) Uncertainty, Complexity, and Gamson’s Law: Comparing Coalition Formation in Western Europe. West European Politics361: 221–247.
26.
GlasgowGGolderMGolderSN (2011) Who ‘Wins’? Determining the Party of the Prime Minister. American Journal of Political Science554: 937–954.
27.
KangSG (2008) Government Formation and Termination in European Democracies with Presidential Heads of State. PhD Thesis, University of Rochester, New York.
28.
KangSG (2009) The Influence of Presidential Heads of State on Government Formation in European Democracies: Empirical Evidence. European Journal of Political Research484: 543–572.
29.
LaaksoMTaageperaR (1979) ‘Effective’ Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies121: 3–27.
30.
LaverMSchofieldN (1990) Multiparty Government. the Politics of Coalition in Europe. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
31.
MorelliM (1999) Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining. American Political Science Review934: 809–820.
32.
MüllerWC (1999) Austria. In: ElgieR (ed.) Semi-presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 22–47.
33.
ProtsykO (2005) Prime Ministers’ Identity in Semi-presidential Regimes: Constitutional Norms and Cabinet Formation Outcomes. European Journal of Political Research44: 721–748.
34.
SamuelsD (2009) Separation of Powers. In: BoixCStokesSC (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 704–26.
35.
SamuelsDJShugartMS (2010) Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36.
SavageL (2018) How and When do Presidents Influence the Duration of Coalition Bargaining in Semi-presidential Systems?European Journal of Political Research572: 308–332.
37.
SchleiterPMorgan-JonesE (2009) Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semi-presidential Democracies Compared. European Journal of Political Research485: 665–693.
38.
SchleiterPMorgan-JonesE (2010) Who’s in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets. Comparative Political Studies4311: 1415–1441.
39.
SekiKWilliamsLK (2014) Updating the Party Government Data set. Electoral Studies34: 270–279.
40.
ShugartMS (2005) Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns. French Politics33: 323–351.
41.
ShugartMSCareyJM (1992) Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42.
StrømKBudgeILaverM (1994) Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. American Journal of Political Science382: 303–335.
43.
TavitsM (2008) Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter?. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
44.
UrbanaviciusD (1999) Lithuania. In: ElgieR (ed.) Semi-presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 150–169.
45.
WarwickPVDruckmanJN (2001) Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments. British Journal of Political Science314: 627–649.
46.
WarwickPVDruckmanJN (2006) The Portfolio Allocation Paradox: An Investigation into the Nature of a Very Strong but Puzzling Relationship. European Journal of Political Research454: 635–665.
47.
WilliamsLSekiK (2016) Seki-Williams Government and Ministers Data. Harvard Dataverse, Version 3.0. Available at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0UNUAM (accessed 15 May 2019).
48.
WoldendorpJKemanHBudgeI (2000) Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998): Composition, Duration, Personnel. Dordrecht: Kluver Academic Publishers.
49.
Zarate’s Political Collections (2015) World Political Leaders, 1945–2015. Available at: http://zarate.eu/countries.htm (accessed 15 May 2019).
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
