Justifying the teaching of the humanities: A new economic approach

Abstract

In recent years much has been written about the declining status of the humanities and the effect this has had on teaching and the curriculum. This article begins by examining some key defenses for teaching and studying the humanities that have been offered in the literature and points to their limitations. It is argued that in a policymaking environment dominated by economic thinking, the justifications for teaching the humanities that are based on identifying its intrinsic and social values are bound to have little appeal for policymakers. It is also maintained that the attempt to justify teaching the humanities based on their possible contribution to increasing production is unconvincing. The article then proposes a new defense for teaching the humanities that stems from recent developments in economic thinking and public policy-making. It is proposed that teaching the humanities can be defended on the basis of its potential contribution to altering consumption patterns and offering ways to convert wealth into happiness more effectively. The article does not suggest that the defense proposed here is the only or best way to defend the humanities, but rather that it can have an important instrumental value in persuading policymakers to invest more in teaching the humanities.

Introduction

Over the last few decades much has been written about the decline in the status of the humanities. In higher education this is manifested, inter alia, in plummeting enrollment in humanities programs, reductions in funding, closing of programs and dwindling faculty hiring (Ferrall, 2011). Naturally, the decline in the status of the humanities has also been felt in school systems across the world and has directly influenced school curricula. Although some have remained optimistic, and argue that the humanities have the potential to regain a central place in the 21st century, most seem to be highly concerned that the status of the humanities is bound to deteriorate further (Davis, 2012). This concern stems mainly from the growing recognition that economic modes of reasoning have come to dominate the public sphere in general, and educational policy in particular. While the decline in study, teaching and research in the humanities has been linked in the literature to various social, cultural and political factors, there seems to be broad consensus that, currently at least, the dominant factor is the subjection of the educational system to economic modes of thought (Lea, 2014). This is clearly reflected in educational policy as it becomes increasingly oriented towards teaching what is useful, when in practice what is useful is often reduced to economic terms.

Confronting the challenge posed by economic modes of reasoning, many have attempted to defend the teaching of the humanities by arguing for their value. In this article I add my voice to theirs, and offer an additional defense that stems from and is grounded in current developments in economic theory and public policymaking. At the core of this defense is the idea that teaching and studying the humanities can potentially lead to a better use of economic resources by altering consumption patterns. I claim that this defense can prove to be instrumental in persuading policymakers and succeed where others have failed because it fits the intellectual climate that currently dominates educational policy. Cast in economic terms, it speaks the language of policymakers and addresses their concerns better than existing alternatives. Before I continue, however, two clarifications should be made. First, it is important to note that the defense of the humanities advanced in this article is not designed to replace the more traditional ones but, rather, to supplement them. Second, the focus of the article is on the policymakers’ perspective. I am concerned here with why policymakers should invest in teaching and studying the humanities and not why individuals should do so.

The article proceeds in five sections. The first section discusses non-economic justifications for teaching the humanities. It begins with the idea that the humanities should be taught because they have an intrinsic value and explains why this idea is seemingly bound to be rejected by policymakers. It also introduces the idea that teaching the humanities has a social value. The second section highlights some of the difficulties involved in relying on non-economic justifications under the climate of ideas that currently dominates educational policymaking. Also examined here is the argument that teaching the humanities can contribute to economic productivity and growth, and the limitations of this argument are presented. The third section introduces some current developments in economic theory that pave the way for a new justification for teaching the humanities. The focus is on behavioral economics and the economics of happiness. The fourth section advances the idea that teaching the humanities can be justified to policymakers based on their ability to modify consumer behavior. The fifth and final section offers some concluding remarks.

Non-economic justifications

A key feature of contemporary public policy is that it regards education in terms of costs and benefits (Olssen and Peters, 2005). Lyotard’s words (Lyotard, 1984: 46) that ‘the goal is no longer truth, but performativity – that is, the best input/output equation’ describe well the direction that educational policy has taken in recent decades. Viewed as a public investment like any other, policymakers demand that resources allocated to education be used in the most efficient way. Such a demand immediately raises questions about the value of the humanities. When education is approached in such a way, the possibility of justifying continued investment in the study and teaching of the humanities to policymakers hinges on the ability to demonstrate the value of the humanities in practical terms.

The utilitarian bent that dominates current educational policymaking has spurred various responses from supporters of the humanities. One response, which has been adopted by many, is to attack educational policy’s direction and portray it as misguided and even dangerous. It is argued that education in general and the teaching of the humanities in particular should not be evaluated mainly in practical terms. According to this line of argumentation, studying the humanities should be done for its own sake (Laverty, 2015). Viewed as serving noble aims that have their own internal rewards, such as developing our humanity, unveiling truths, perfecting the intellect or approaching the good, the study and teaching of the humanities is claimed to be indispensable regardless of its practical consequences (Roche, 2010). Moreover, it is sometimes maintained that any attempt to defend the humanities on any other basis is bound to fail since it disregards the ultimate reason for which they are taught and studied (Graber, 2012; Laverty, 2015). This disregard, it is held, results in a systematic underestimation of the value of the humanities when compared to other fields designed to serve practical aims.

The idea that studying and teaching the humanities should be justified based on their inherent value has a strong appeal for those looking to preserve their centrality, but has proven to be much less persuasive to educational policymakers (Menand, 2010). Indeed, policymakers have, from their own perspective, some very good reasons to reject the argument that money should be invested in teaching the humanities for their own sake. First, it is unclear why all the humanities should be accepted as having the same sort of value when they are actually diverse (Holden, 2004). The benefits of teaching history are, of course, not the same as those of teaching literature and all of these are also different from the benefits that stem from teaching philosophy.

Second, there are other areas of life that can be seen as having their own internal rewards, such as health (Bakhshi et al., 2009). A rationale, then, has to be provided to policymakers for investing in teaching the humanities rather than in other areas that have internal rewards; but relying on intrinsic value makes providing such as rationale extremely hard, if not impossible. Third, justifying investment in teaching the humanities on the grounds that they have their own internal rewards appears elitist because it prioritizes the value of high culture (Holden, 2004). Finally, and probably most significantly, the term ‘intrinsic value’ is grounded in the subjective experiences of individuals. Accordingly, it is hard to measure, demonstrate or translate it into terms of mass outcomes (Holden, 2006). However, politicians and policymakers seek to provide measurable, tangible results on a mass scale that can justify why investment decisions have been made (Holden, 2006). Considering this, Richard Pring’s observation that ‘claims to the intrinsic value of intellectual activities carry little weight in arguments promoting greater investment in education’ (Pring, 1995) should not come as a surprise. Moreover, for politicians and policymakers it makes little sense to invest money in something the benefits of which cannot be demonstrated or properly evaluated in favour of something which has clear and apparent benefits simply because it is argued that it has value in and of itself. There is, then, a significant gap between what policymakers require in order to justify educational investment and what arguments based on internal value can provide. Recognizing that this is the case, many have sought alternative routes to defend the study and teaching of the humanities.

It seems that the most common line of defense for teaching the humanities adopted by those who refer to their practical value has been to argue for their social benefits, and especially their political ones. Finn et al. (1984: 6), for example, state that ‘a well-conceived and well-taught humanities curriculum in the secondary schools is a means to larger ends: the enhancement of a free, just, stable, and secure society’. Since then there have been countless attempts to defend the teaching of the humanities on such grounds, ranging from their contribution to crime reduction to facilitating international cooperation, and it is impossible to review them all here. Instead, I will briefly present one recent and well-known example that demonstrates this line of argumentation. In Not for Profit, Martha Nussbaum argues that the teaching of the humanities is essential, inter alia, to maintaining a healthy democracy (Nussbaum, 2012). She contends that a healthy democracy rests on the ability to think critically, to transcend local loyalties and to relate sympathetically to other people's predicaments (Nussbaum, 2012: 7). The humanities, she holds, have an indispensable role in developing the above abilities. She warns, therefore, that the ongoing decline in the teaching of the humanities poses a direct and dangerous threat to the future of the world’s democracies.

Nussbaum’s stance has its own weak points. For example, it remains unclear why the skills necessary for maintaining a healthy democracy could be fostered only by the humanities and not in other ways (Small, 2013). Nevertheless, her arguments, and similar ones, provide what seem to be powerful justifications for teaching and studying the humanities even when education is perceived in terms of costs and benefits. In practice, however, the growing literature pointing to the sundry social and political benefits that stem from teaching the humanities has had little success in reversing existing policy trends and reinstating the status of the humanities. As noted by Bullen et al., (2004), arguments regarding social goods carry relatively little weight in the current world of educational policymaking. To understand why this is so and how the teaching of the humanities can be defended, we need to take a further look at the place of economic ideas in educational policymaking today.

The economic value of the humanities

The development of human capital theory in the 1960s opened the door for the gradual overtaking of educational policymaking by economic considerations. By conceptualizing education as an important engine of economic growth, human capital theory stimulated a growing involvement of economic interests and economic powers in education (Teixeira, 2000). Education came to be seen as an endeavor that had clear economic objectives. The rise of neo-liberal ideologies in the 1980s only strengthened further the grip of economic modes of reasoning on the world of educational policy. As argued by Davies and Bansel (2007: 249), ‘under neoliberalism both government and society have taken up, as their primary concern, their relationship with the economy’. Accordingly, education started to be viewed in terms of economic inputs and outputs and to be assessed according to how well it produces value for money (Marginson, 1997). In addition, the development of new growth theory gave rise to the notion that the value of education rests mainly on its ability to spur scientific innovations and technological advancements because they form the basis for economic survival in a competitive global economy (Bullen et al., 2004). The end result of these developments is that educational policymaking is now subordinated to economic policy, and policymakers examine education primarily through economic lenses (Ball, 1999). Marginson (1997: 224) summarized well the current state of affairs, by noting that ‘extended to new terrain in education and elsewhere, economics worked to colonizing or eliminating the non-economic “other” that was outside and opposite to itself – such as the non-pecuniary individual benefits of education, and its shared collective benefits, which dropped from view’.

The reduction of education to economic considerations raises the question of how those seeking to defend teaching the humanities should deal with it. How can policymakers be persuaded that the humanities are worth investing in? Many of those engaged in education have severely criticized the increased subordination of educational policy to economics and have suggested ways to reverse this (and justly so, I believe). There remains the fact, however, that at present economic modes of reasoning reign supreme, if not exclusively, in educational policymaking and merely rejecting the existing discourse is unlikely to help, at least in the short term, to improve the status of the humanities (Gietzen, 2010). In light of this reality, one course of action, which has been increasingly embraced by the defenders of the humanities, is to try and play the game and maintain that investment in the humanities can be justified to policymakers on economic grounds.

So far, the defense of the humanities on economic grounds has mainly focused on their contribution to enhancing production and has proceeded in three interrelated directions. First, it is argued that studying the humanities helps to develop capabilities that are economically valuable – such as critical thinking, communication skills and an ability to be creative and ‘think outside the box’ (Edelstein, 2010). It is maintained that the humanities can thereby facilitate a productive career in business, medicine, law, public services, and so on (Roche, 2010). Moreover, it has also been maintained that in a knowledge-based economy that is constantly evolving, acquiring the skills fostered by the humanities can make a larger contribution to increasing economic productivity than obtaining specified vocational knowledge (Levinson, 2002). To substantiate these claims many point to the fact that Google, Apple and other companies have recently shown a growing interest in hiring humanities graduates.

Second, it is argued that the humanities can contribute to the economy by enriching other disciplines (Roche, 2010). It is held that interdisciplinary collaboration with the humanities can increase productivity in other fields, such as psychology, computer science, law and even economics, by opening new horizons (Holm et al., 2015). Third, and finally, attempts have been made to establish the economic value of the humanities for society as a whole. For example, a report published in 2009 by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council argued that investing in research in the humanities had yielded substantial economic returns. The report showed that by attracting foreign students, supporting certain industries – such as the entertainment industry, and by providing workers for various sectors in the economy, teaching and research in the humanities had generated considerable profits for the state (AHRC, 2009).

While it remains unclear whether the case made above for the contribution of the humanities to increasing economic productivity is valid or not, it has had, for various reasons, a limited influence on policymakers. First, it has encountered internal criticisms and been rejected by many of those supporting the humanities. They argue that linking the humanities to increased economic productivity debases their true value, places them in a position in which they are bound to lose and reinforces detrimental trends in educational policymaking (Holm et al., 2015). Second, as argued by Graber, it is not clear that critical thinking, innovation and many of the skills developed by the humanities cannot be equally cultivated through subjects that also have a more practical orientation (Graber, 2012). In order to make a strong case for the humanities it must be shown that they can not only develop useful skills, but also do so better than any alternatives. This, so far, has not been convincingly done; and some claim it cannot be done (Graber, 2012). Third, research shows that despite an existing trend towards hiring humanities graduates in unrelated sectors of the economy, in most places across the globe, including the USA and the UK, those who study subjects that are directly related to science, technology, business and medicine earn more and are arguably more economically productive than humanities graduates (e.g. Chevalier, 2011). Moreover, current theories of economic growth stress the importance of training in science and technology. The humanities can be seen as a profitable investment in specific cases, but when attempting to increase productivity, directly investing in science and technology is clearly prioritized (Stiglitz, 1999).

Finally, in contrast to many other areas of study, the contribution of the humanities to economic productivity is difficult to measure, and therefore cannot be easily proven (Bullen et al., 2004). This feature of the humanities is very significant because in order to convince the public that they are performing well, policymakers and politicians require easily comprehensible measures that show they have advanced what people care about (Behn, 2003). This is especially true in light of what Biesta has termed the "rise of the culture of accountability in education’ (Biesta, 2004: 233). Today, education is increasingly perceived as a public service whose role is to meet the preferences of students and parents (Biesta, 2004). Educational policymakers are therefore judged primarily according to how well they fulfil this mission and must find ways of demonstrating that they did. This reflects negatively on investments in teaching the humanities and makes them less attractive for policymakers.

The difficulties, then, which stem from the attempt to justify to policymakers teaching humanities in terms of its contribution to economic productivity, raise the question of whether teaching the humanities can be defended in an educational policymaking environment dominated by economic modes of thinking. I will try, below, to argue that it can; but in order to do so, I must start by discussing some important new directions within economic theory and public policy.

Beyond economic productivity

After a long period of relative stability, over the last three decades or so economic theory is being transformed as it expands in many new directions. This transformation results from a questioning of selected economic assumptions, normally one at a time, and not from an attempt to develop an entirely new framework (Claveau, 2009). It is therefore the outcome of a gradual process rather than of a revolution. The change in economics, it is important to note, stems mostly from internal criticisms, namely those leveled against orthodox economic theory by those working within its premises. ¹ Many of the new research directions in economics have far-reaching policy implications, but the focus here will be on two central ones only: behavioral economics; and the economics of happiness. I chose to limit the discussion to these two because they have already had a significant impact on public policy and because they can have important consequences for justifying investment in teaching the humanities.

At the core of behavioral economics is the rejection of the standard economic assumption that people are fully rational and always maximize their individual utility (Santos, 2011). Standard economic theory presupposes not only that people have well-defined preferences and that they know how best to meet them, but also that such preferences are fully aligned with their holders’ actual interests (Camerer et al., 2003). However, it has been shown, through observations and experiments, that people make systematic mistakes in judging what is in their best interest and make decisions that fail to maximize their good (Santos, 2011). People do not act as rational decision-makers but, rather, are influenced by cognitive biases, deficiencies in self-control, emotions, pro-social preferences, and more (Frey and Benz, 2002). Building on these insights, behavioral economists have developed new models of behavior that are changing the way economics is conceived.

Recently, behavioral economics has also been starting to play an increasing role in public policy, leading it in new directions, because there is a growing will to accept its insights. For example, many countries, including the UK, the USA, Australia, Canada and France, have recently established institutions for the study of policies that take behavioral economics as their point of departure (Bhargava and Loewenstein, 2015). In addition, the World Bank recently published a flagship report, which has a bearing on education, dealing with how to improve development policies and which builds on behavioral economics (World Bank, 2015). What seems to be the main insight stemming from this research paradigm, at least in the educational context, is that shaping and directing people’s preferences might have an important role in improving the decisions they make and consequently their quality of life.

Another significant development in economic theory, which is especially relevant to the present discussion, is the emergence of the economics of happiness. Stemming from the work of Richard Easterlin in the 1970s, the economics of happiness has boomed over the last decade and a half, and is currently a flourishing and ever growing field of research (Levinson, 2013). Today, the economics of happiness examines a wide set of issues related to happiness, but at its center stands the investigation of the relationship between happiness and wealth. One key finding in this area has been that in contrast to what standard economics assumes, economic growth is often not translated into greater happiness. That is, despite the fact that actual wealth in affluent societies has grown considerably over time, levels of happiness seem to have remained stagnant (e.g., Easterlin, 1974; Layard, 2005). In addition, research has revealed that while the wealth of a country and the level of happiness of it habitants are positively correlated, this only holds true up to a certain economic threshold (GDP per capita of around US$25,000), which has been surpassed by most Western economies. Beyond this threshold a country’s wealth does not have a marked effect on the level of happiness of its people (Layard, 2005).

Such findings have led economists to investigate why greater wealth does not necessarily translate into greater happiness. Many explanations have been offered, two of which I would like to introduce here. The first is related to, or even stems from, behavioral economics. It has been shown that, due to cognitive and other limitations, people tend to use their resources ineffectively in promoting their own happiness (Stutzer and Frey, 2006). The main problem here is that people consistently underestimate the effects of habituation and overestimate the happiness that they will derive from material possessions (Layard, 2006). Second, it has been argued that even when people know how best to increase their happiness, simply providing them with more resources will not suffice in order to maximize happiness in society. This is because, as stated by Frank, ‘many forms of consumption appear more attractive to individuals than they are for society as a whole’ (Frank, 1997: 1839). The following example Frank presents helps to illustrate this point.

Frank noted that from the individual’s point of view it makes perfect sense for a family with children to save a little less for retirement in order to purchase a home in a better school district; but that if everyone did so all would be worse off because prices would simply go up and everyone would save less (Frank, 1997). Research suggests that a key reason why greater wealth does not lead to greater happiness is that we are caught in a zero sum game in which most resources are spent on gaining social status through the acquisition of material goods (Frank, 2004).

The findings of the economics of happiness pose a serious challenge to conventional thinking about economics. Policymakers and economists have traditionally placed growth and increasing productivity as prime policy objectives, and all activities, including the teaching of the humanities, have been mainly assessed by economists according to their contribution in these areas. Although growth might have other benefits, such as facilitating the development of new technologies, the main reason growth was and is accorded such a prominent place in policy is its supposed contribution to improving people’s sense of well-being (Oswald, 1997). However, if in affluent economies growth does not directly contribute to happiness, then simply increasing wealth will not do. Gradually coming to grips with this fact, politicians, governments and policymaking organizations have been arguing more and more that economic policy must aim at the broader objective of improving people’s life satisfaction and not just at economic growth. In different parts of the world many important policy documents that embrace this direction have been published, but arguably the most significant manifestation of this trend is found in the current work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Musikanski, 2015). In 2001 the OECD, which plays a key role in educational policymaking, published an influential report that clearly argued that education policy should aim at the ‘evolution of total and not just economic well-being’ because ‘beyond a certain threshold of income per capita, increases in subjective well-being diminish for higher income’ (OECD, 2001: 9–10). Moreover, the OECD’s current flagship project is called ‘Better Policies for Better Lives’ and it emphasizes how policies could increase life satisfaction. Significantly, a key ingredient of the policy initiatives spurred by the economics of happiness in general, and the OECD’s work in this sphere in particular, has been the development of new measurable indicators that assess happiness and well-being and can serve as policymaking guides (Kroll and Delhey, 2013; OECD, 2013). To conclude, we witness here a significant development. On the one hand, policy is still informed by economic research and is discussed in economic terms. On the other hand, the focus is no longer strictly on economic growth, as a broader understanding of the role of the economy gradually develops.

The insights drawn from behavioral economics and the economics of happiness and the new policy directions evolving from them, open the door, I would argue, for a new way to justify the teaching of the humanities to educational policymakers. It can be argued that the humanities can have a significant role in improving consumptions patterns in general and offering ways to better convert happiness into wealth in particular. Supported by new developments in economic thought, and found in accordance with raising directions in economic policymaking, this way of justifying the humanities might, I believe, play an instrumental role in leading policymakers to invest more in teaching the humanities.

The humanities and shaping consumption patterns

In The Economic Value of Education, Theodore Schultz (1963), one of the founding fathers of human capital theory and the economics of education, distinguishes between three types of economic benefits produced by education. The first is gained in terms of present consumption. This is when, for example, students derive current enjoyment from associating with their classmates. The second type of benefit is related to future consumption. Schultz (1963: 8) illustrates this with the example of someone who develops an ‘increased capacity to enjoy good books’. Finally, the third type includes the benefits that students obtain from developing improved producer capabilities that lead to higher earnings.

Although Schultz acknowledges that all three are important, the vast majority of educational economists, including Schultz himself, have focused almost exclusively on the third type. There are various reasons why the influence of education on consumption has been widely disregarded by economists, and I want to highlight here two central ones. To begin with, economists have traditionally considered the formation of preferences to be beyond the purview of economics and better examined by fields such as psychology and sociology (Bowles, 1998). This view is also linked to the fact that standard economic theory is built around the key normative principle that people are the best judges of their own interests and that their consumer preferences should be accepted as given (Penz, 2008). In addition, the difficulties in assessing and measuring the benefits that people derive from consumption, and especially future consumption, have deterred economists from studying them.

The emergence of behavioral economics and the economics of happiness, however, provide reasons and opportunities to extend the economic conception of education beyond its influence on production to questions related to consumption. By refuting the notion that people are the best judges of their own interests, behavioral economics tacitly raises the question of how education can contribute to shaping and improving people’s preferences. ² The economics of happiness, for its part, shows that simply increasing available economic resources through increased production does not enhance satisfaction sufficiently, and attention must be given to how efficiently these resources are used. In addition, the economics of happiness provides a set of tools that could enable economists to understand and measure better the benefits that people derive from both present and future consumption. By, for example, developing new measures of subjective well-being which draw on questioners and others techniques, the economics of happiness provides a useful scale for assessing the impact of consumption through the use of correlations. Behavioral economics and the economics of happiness, then, point to new directions for assessing the contribution of education to economics by placing a renewed emphasis on consumption, and it is here that the humanities enter into the picture.

Although those concerned with behavioral economics and the economics of happiness have, with the exception of Tibor Scitovsky (1992), paid little, if any, attention to the question of the humanities, teaching and studying the humanities can play an important role in altering consumer preferences and paving the way to increased consumption of what economists term ‘cultural goods and services’. While it is hard to define cultural goods and services precisely, because they can take various forms, they do have some common features that distinguish them from other goods. To begin with, the enjoyment of cultural goods demands a relatively high level of knowledge and understanding. In order to enjoy cultural goods and services fully one has to be exposed to them or learn about them (Throsby, 2001). In addition, they are pure consumption goods, namely, their main purpose is to increase utility. In contrast to most other goods, they are also assumed to have increasing rather than decreasing marginal utility. This means that the more you consume of them the more benefits you receive from their consumption (Brito and Barros, 2005). Finally, cultural goods and services are grounded in culture or can be seen as having a cultural value (McCain, 2006). In the literature there are several theoretical discussions which suggest that the consumption of cultural goods and services can play an important role in promoting happiness and achieving other important policy objectives. In particular, such consumption can help to create ways to transform wealth better into happiness and thereby tackle what the economics of happiness and behavioral economics identify as a key problem overlooked in economic policy based on orthodox economics. I would like to point out here two significant advantages that this type of consumption has in terms of translating wealth into happiness.

First, consumption of cultural goods and services tends to be less affected by habituation than by consumption of material goods. Research has shown that on average people adapt more readily to tangible material purchases, such as cars and houses, than intangible experiential purchases, such as movies and holidays (Nicolao et al., 2009). As a result, people in general derive more happiness from investing resources in experiential rather than material goods, because the positive impact of the latter normally decreases faster (Van Boven and Gilovich, 2003). Moreover, it has been argued that cultural goods and services, and especially those involving high culture, tend to be even more immune to the negative effects of habituation (Scitovsky, 1992). While the pleasure we can derive from consuming many goods whose enjoyment does not demand intensive exposure, training or education, such as light entertainment, this pleasure is limited because such goods easily become monotonous, repetitive and unchallenging. This is less often the case with cultural goods because, as mentioned before, the more we are exposed to cultural products and services, the more we should be able to appreciate them and derive pleasure form them (Scitovsky, 1992). In many cases, then, consumption of cultural products provides an important way of transforming resources into happiness by offering new and constantly developing forms of pleasure and stimulation (Scitovsky, 1992).

Second, many cultural goods are what economists term non-rival goods, namely, goods whose consumption by one person does not reduce another person’s ability to benefit from them (Malkin and Wildavsky, 1991). In most cases, consumption of material goods, such as houses, cars, jewelry or clothes, reduces or even precludes their enjoyment by others. This is often not the case with cultural goods. The fact that I read a book or watch a play does not normally impinge on or limit another’s enjoyment of them. In fact, just the opposite is often true. There are many cultural goods from which more pleasure can be derived if I consume them together with other people. For example, watching a show in public might be more rewarding than watching it alone. In terms of increasing happiness, the main advantage of consuming cultural goods is that, often being non-rivalry in nature, they are less likely to spur competitive forms of consumption – which can lead to a zero sum game in which ultimately everyone loses (Frank, 2004). Consumption of cultural goods, then, can be less wasteful and leave more resources for productive use.

Beyond these theoretical arguments that point to possible benefits of consuming cultural goods and services, empirical evidence indicating that consumption of cultural goods and services does indeed contribute to happiness, and that it is an effective way to transform wealth into happiness, is starting to accumulate. A few studies have shown that people who engage more in cultural activities, such as listening to music or participating in arts-related activities, tend to show higher level of satisfaction with their lives (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2010). Cultural consumption, however, will normally not happen spontaneously. In most cases, enjoyment of cultural products demands that, first, one is extensively exposed to them or receives some kind of training. For example, deriving full enjoyment from reading a complex philosophical text or a piece of classic literature can only take place after a person has acquired fundamental skills and knowledge. As a result, people who have not been sufficiently exposed to cultural goods, or have not received proper training, are unlikely to turn to cultural consumption because they are less well-equipped to enjoy cultural goods, or may even wholly lack the ability to evaluate their potential benefits properly. Teaching and studying the humanities can change this. By providing exposure to and training in history, philosophy, literature and various other fields, a door is opened for enjoying innumerable cultural goods and services, and the humanities actively encourage their consumption. It is possible, then, to justify the teaching and studying of the humanities in terms of altering consumption patterns in a way that permits a more efficient use of economic resources, which in turn yields greater levels of happiness.

Concluding remarks

The idea that teaching the humanities should be viewed as a form of consumer education might be appalling for some because it seems to debase the humanities. While this very well might be true in a sense, I have advanced the argument here that if our aim is to persuade educational policymakers to invest in the humanities then linking the humanities with consumption might still be the right course of action to pursue. Since the beginning of the new millennium, behavioral economics and the economics of happiness have been transforming the conception of policymaking. When viewed in light of this current change in policymaking discourse, it becomes clear why justifying the teaching and studying of the humanities in terms of their ability to turn wealth into happiness might meet with success in policymaking circles. It accords very well with this new economic agenda and seems to offer a way of dealing with many of the problems it identifies, principally the question of how to transform wealth into happiness more efficiently.

Moreover, among the economic justifications for teaching the humanities, the link to consumption has a clear advantage over the link to production. While the contribution that the humanities can make to enhancing production by developing critical thinking and so on can be achieved by other fields of study, this is not the case with consumption. The potential impact of the humanities on cultural consumption seems unparalleled, and probably cannot be attained in any other way. This renders the humanities indispensable, I would argue.

In conclusion, I have attempted here to advance the argument that in the current environment of educational policymaking it might be wise to defend the teaching of the humanities based on their unique capacity to facilitate the transformation of wealth into happiness. Again, I do not wish to claim that it is the only way, or necessarily the best way, to do so. If, however, our aim is to bolster the status of the humanities it is important that we use all available arguments to achieve this objective. Linking the humanities to consumption might be one more way to help save the humanities; a way that might prove to be more useful than others when approaching educational policymakers.