The dilemma of the dilemma: Getting education issues out of their dilemmas

Abstract

This study seeks to introduce a new lens through which applied linguistics might be better conceived of. Importantly enough, this lens has already found itself in a good many disciplines, but it can hardly ever be seen in language teaching. To this end, this paper has taken a stance akin to that of Larsen-Freeman, when for the first time chaos/complexity was introduced into second language acquisition. Thus, after reasoning the usefulness and meaningfulness of social dilemmas in applied linguistics, different conundrums in applied linguistics are viewed from a social dilemmas’ lens, particularly through that of prisoner’s dilemma. Importantly, instead of putting forward some answers to the dilemmas in applied linguistics, the study focuses on what exactly the problems are. Therefore, this very new lens gives us the chance to dissect the problems clearly, and subsequently some insights might be gained.

Introduction

There is almost no doubt that applied linguistics is not in its heyday. Researchers have produced too many theories, a good many of which contradict or at least do not support each other. According to Widdowson (2003), we should not search for good theories, as they might not exist or might be relative. Instead, he implies that applied linguists should make theories good rather than heading for good ones. By extension, we can conceive of bringing other deep-seated theories from other disciplines into applied linguistics as making theories good. Not dissimilar to Widdowson’s point of view, Kumaravadivelu (2003) contends that looking for a best method might be an illusion. In his eyes, methods have several shortcomings, two of which are being insensitive to different contexts and being too limited to explain the complexity and chaotic nature of language teaching. In a similar vein, Lantolf (1996) holds that the modernist stance of applied linguistics has little to say, and we should take a stance which is more natural. However, Jordan (2004) does not fully subscribe to Lantolf’s stance. He regards the modernist stance of applied linguistics as extremist and has having only some truth. As a matter of fact, he seeks for the truth between the modernist view and that of the postmodernist by striking a balance between the two. Seemingly, having accepted Lantolf’s view, Larsen-Freeman (1997) has already brought the chaos/complexity theory to applied linguistics. As mentioned before, this state of applied linguistics has brought about some differences in styles and perspectives towards it. The need for a change can be felt and this could be the reason for the above stances. Therefore, not dissimilar to that of Larsen-Freeman, this paper tries to bring game theory into applied linguistics. More specifically, it is suggested that applied linguistics can be viewed from other perspectives like social dilemmas, and consequently some blind spots might be discerned. In doing so, first game theory and one of its solutions the Nash equilibrium, are investigated. Then, social dilemmas are viewed from a teaching point of view. Finally, as regards to social dilemmas and teaching, some conclusions are drawn.

Game theory and Nash equilibrium

According to Leyton-Brown and Shoham (2008: 1) ‘Game theory studies what happens when self-interested agents interact'. Dixit and Nalebuff (1991: 2) hold that game theory might be defined as ‘the branch of social science that studies strategic decision making'. The root of game theory can be found in in some unsophisticated examples. For instance the following example is provided by Poundstone (1992: 7):

Most people have heard of the reputed best way to let two bratty children split a piece of cake. No matter how carefully a parent divides it, one child (or both!) feels he has been slighted with the smaller piece. The solution is to let one child divide the cake and let the other choose which piece he wants. Greed ensures fair division. The first child can't object that the cake was divided unevenly because he did it himself. The second child can't complain since he has his choice of pieces.

Game theory has several characteristics, some of which are (Smith and Shane, 2003):

Players: the people involved in the game;

Strategies: the techniques employed by the players;

Rules: the norms and regulations of the game;

Outcomes: the results of a particular action taken by players;

Payoffs: the benefits or loss of a given action.

One of the well-known solutions to game theory is the Nash equilibrium. Leyton-Brown and Shoham (2008: 27) defined it as follows:

Intuitively, a Nash equilibrium is a stable strategy profile: no agent would want to change his strategy if he knew what strategies the other agents were following:

We can divide Nash equilibria into two categories, strict and weak, depending on whether or not every agent’s strategy constitutes a unique best response to the other agents’ strategies. … … Intuitively, weak Nash equilibria are less stable than strict Nash equilibria, because in the former case at least one player has a best response to the other players’ strategies that is not his equilibrium strategy. Mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are necessarily always weak, while pure-strategy Nash equilibria can be either strict or weak, depending on the game.

Nevertheless, the Nash equilibrium seems to promote self-interest strategies. It focuses on individual interests to the exclusion of others. Importantly enough, one might say that such a strategy is context-independent, as it always suggests the same solution for all situations.

What are social dilemmas?

Social dilemmas can be regarded as a part in game theory. Generally speaking, three ramifications might appear when we want to classify social dilemmas, namely the prisoner’s dilemma, the public good dilemma, and the tragedy of the commons. To Gray (2011), a social dilemma appears when a given action will be in favour of an individual, but harm other members of the group and bring about more harm than good to every member of the group if everyone takes that action. To Weber et al. (2004: 281) ‘Social dilemmas are everywhere. It is difficult to imagine a sphere of social life that is not dogged by one kind of social dilemma or another'.

In what follows, first each of these social dilemmas is elaborated, then their applications in applied linguistics are briefly discussed. Finally, the pros and cons of the interface of these dilemmas and applied linguistics are explicated.

The prisoner’s dilemma

The prisoner's dilemma (PD) can be regarded as the prototype of social dilemmas. Based on this dilemma, the prisoners are of two minds whether or not to cooperate with each other. If one of them confesses and the other denies, the one who has confessed will be set free and the other will be sentenced to life. If both of them deny the crime, both will serve in prison for one year. If both confess and say that the other one has committed the crime, both will serve in prison for three years. Kuhn and Moresi (1995) state that some distinctions can be drawn from PD games; they can be pure or impure and utilitarian or non-utilitarian. To them, in pure PD games, neither of the protagonists changes his strategy, whereas in the impure PD games, either protagonist can employ mixed strategies. In utilitarian PD games, there may be some transfer of utilities from the defector to the cooperator, for example some amount of money, while in non-utilitarian PD games there is no transfer.

An example in business

The following example is provided by Dixit and Nalebuff (2008):

Let’s consider two companies of cola, namely Pepsi and Coca. If one of them tries to outwit the other by reducing its price in order to attract the customers of the other one and the other one remains inactive in this regard, the company which has reduced its price will benefit and the other one will lose. However, if both of them try to outwit each other, the result will be a great loss for both of them, as both have reduced their prices, but have not increased their customers. Finally, if both prefer to keep the status quo, neither of them will benefit nor lose, and they will have their moderate status quo.

Some fictitious examples in teaching

Imagine a class consisting of two students, let’s call them student A and student B. The teacher wants to enhance the student talking time (STT) as much as he can. Therefore, he asks the students to talk more. Now the dilemma starts.

If both of them start talking at length, there would not be enough time for the teacher to instruct.

If student A starts to talk, and student B prefers to remain inactive, student A will improve quite more than student B, and vice versa.

If both of them prefer to remain as active as before, they will moderately improve as there will be enough time for the teacher to instruct.

As can be easily inferred, the worst example is the first one, when both of the students prefer to talk at length, and the teacher can find no time to instruct. The last example could be the best one for both of the students if they try to be a bit more cooperative.

Imagine that there is a learning-centred class in which the roles of students and teacher are left to themselves. The students probably feel more comfortable when the class is student-centred. On the other hand, the teacher probably feels more comfortable when the class is teacher-centred. Care must be taken; the pros and cons of teacher-centred versus student-centred classes are quite controversial and it is a difficult task to say whether the majority of teachers feel comfortable with teacher-centred classes or the other way round. Instead researchers mainly focus on the outcomes in student-centred and teacher-centred classes. For instance Knowlton (2000) holds that student-centred pedagogy is better than that of teacher-centred for online classrooms. Nevertheless, the status quo is somehow moderate for both the teacher and the students.

If the teacher tries to take the initiative and turns the class into a teacher-centred one and at the same time the students want to turn it into a student-centred one, there appears a conflict between the two parties.

If the teacher wants to turn the class into a teacher-centred one and the students take inactive roles, the teacher will feel more comfortable, and vice versa.

If both of the parties try to maintain the status quo, they will both feel somehow comfortable, but not as much as when it is a student-centred class for the students or a teacher-centred class for the teacher.

Suppose that in a given class for teaching grammar, the teacher reconsiders his students’ improvement and tries to enhance their improvement by teaching grammar in his students’ mother tongue. The following four situations might appear:

If the teacher teaches in their mother tongue, his/her students may better digest grammar without being conditioned to their mother tongue.

If the teacher teaches in his/her students’ second/foreign language, the status quo, their improvement will be moderate.

If the teacher teaches in their mother tongue, his/her students will get conditioned to it and will no longer understand any grammar unless it is explained through their mother tongue.

Solutions to the prisoner’s dilemma

Axelrod (1984) carried out an experiment based on which computers played the prisoner’s dilemma game with each other for many times with a variety of strategies employed by the contestants. At the end, Tit for Tat (TFT) was found be the best strategy as far as cooperation was concerned. Simply, the strategy was based on the fact that one should cooperate unless the other one defects, then defect once, and return to cooperation. Another strategy tested in the experiment was called Tit for Two Tats, based on which you defect only if your opponent has defected twice in succession. Nevertheless, this Tit for Two Tats strategy was not as promising as TFT.

Getting back to the solution based on the Nash equilibrium, as mentioned before, with regard to the Nash equilibrium, the best answer for each person is the one he would not change if he knew his opponent’s decision as it would bring less harm or more benefits. Applying this rule to the prisoner’s dilemma, we will find out that the best strategy is always defecting for each person. The reason lies in the fact that if you think that your opponent is going to defect, your best strategy will be defecting too. More importantly, if you think your opponent is going to cooperate, you will get the best result by defecting. Therefore, overall, the best strategy by either protagonist could be defecting. Nevertheless, this solution, the Nash equilibrium, has been contested as it seeks self-centred results and overlooks the overall gains for all. More specifically, it rests on self-interest gains, and consequently encouraging self-centred actions. Taking a long-term view, it might not be beneficial at all if such an atmosphere of defecting prevails. Instead discouraging self-interest strategies might bring the atmosphere of cooperation to the fore, which would be more beneficial to all protagonists.

Public goods

Public goods refer to a dilemma in which if someone or some people do not contribute, they will take advantage of (‘freeload') certain facilities or commodities. However, if all the people involved try to freeload, the prospective facility or commodity will not be established, and all will be in a disadvantageous position. The following example might better represent the situation (Weber et al. 2004: 281):

When the local hospital tries to raise funds for a new oncology center, a public goods dilemma arises for individuals. Those who choose not to contribute will likely still get access to the oncology center in the future if they need it—so they maximize their personal payoffs by not contributing. If nobody contributes, there will be no oncology center for anyone. Compared to the consequences of nobody contributing, everyone is better off if everyone makes a contribution.

Imagine that a teacher divides his class into some groups and gives each group consisting of several students a task. The students are supposed to do the task within 20 minutes. Now the dilemma begins. One of the students may try to freeload and avoid doing the task as he thinks that the group will do the task anyway. However, there is the possibility that more than one of the students (if not all of the students) in each group will try to freeload. The result will probably be a disaster. The task cannot be completed.

The tragedy of the commons

The tragedy of the commons was first put forward by Hardin (1968). The story might be described as follows:

There is a pasture and all herdsmen have the right to graze their cattle there. However if each herdsman tries to increase their cattle in order to gain more benefits, the result may lead to the destruction of the pastor. That is to say, their self-interest might stand against their shared interest, or the benefit is not shared whereas the price for the destruction of the pasture is shared.

Translating this tragedy into a second language learning atmosphere, we can imagine a class consisting of several students in which their teacher encourages them to be more active. In so doing, the dilemma might start. If each student tries to take part in the discussions of the class without considering the amount of time, the class will be futile, as there might not be enough time for either instruction or cooperation. The central point of this issue is not cooperation or defection. Rather, it is more to do with consideration. That is to say, the students should have an altruistic sense of teamwork in which they must override their self-interest strategies. Apart from their altruistic sense, their profound and critical view might be of great help to them in that they might come to the conclusion that if all the students go for the self-interest strategies, then there will be a great loss for all. This fictitious example is similar to the one mentioned in the prisoner’s dilemma. However, here the class consists of more than two students.

Conclusion

This paper does not claim that analysis of social dilemmas or even game theory can solve all of the problems in applied linguistics. Such a solution does not exist. Nor does it claim that its imaginary situations exactly correspond to reality. As has already been mentioned, it can be stated that, for example, students might prefer teacher-centred classes. That is why the imaginary situation is untenable. But the purpose of the paper is more to do with the practical conclusions. That is, if applied linguists or other scholars in similar fields come to the conclusion that certain theories are quite tenable, they still should think about the aftermath dilemmas. Rather, metaphorically speaking, by bringing a new flower to bloom, the paper tries to echo the voice of Lantolf and other postmodernists. Taking a more cautious stance, this paper holds that there is some truth in each method and approach, but a relative vantage point might be preferred. The vantage point could be a brand new one or even one which is borrowed from other disciplines.

It could be inferred that this lens might deepen our view, and might give us some insight concerning the practical level of theories. Put another way, while there is nothing wrong with some theories, on the practical level those theories might not be put into practice. For example, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the task-based approach, but while the teacher gives their students a task some of the students (if not all), may want to freeload and avoid shouldering their responsibility. Metaphorically speaking, game theory is an anti-theory rather than a theory. It calls into question the theories out of their contexts, especially their social and psychological contexts. A theory is not a genuine theory, unless it accounts for its implementation. Thus virtually all theories are not genuine in the real sense of the word, since they are concerned with assumptions rather than implementations. Game theory takes theories out of their ‘ivory towers' into the ‘real world' where most of the theories will not survive. Nevertheless, its application should be regarded with circumspection, because as Martin (1978) holds game theory is only selectively useful in so far as it does not impugn the underlying structures or institution. Put simply, game theory should be in harmony with the nature of the field it is applied to. Furthermore, it should take some of the assumptions for granted, as it relies heavily on them. As regards the Nash equilibrium, research suggests that it lends itself well to self-interest strategies. However, care must be taken, the statistical nature of this equilibrium should not be the only deciding factor for subscribing to it. Instead, we should take into account the interaction of the equilibrium and the non-statistical, emotional, nature of human beings. In light of the lens introduced in this paper, research should focus on the practical use of these theories.