Abstract
We live in an age in which the destruction of the environment has become a major concern. However, until recently, environmental problems have not become a major issue for the philosophy of education. The reason for this is that for a very long time the philosophy of education was intimately related to the concept of nature as the foundation and the model of human activity. We can see such an understanding of nature not only among the philosophers of Ancient Greece, but also among the modern pioneers of pedagogy.
If we consider this situation, we may understand the challenge the environmental problem poses to the philosophy of education. Nature in this age of environmental problems cannot function as the foundation upon which an edifice of education can be built. It has become clear that nature is vulnerable to human intervention.
Philosophy of education has responded to this turn of events by not paying attention to the concept of nature. This has sometimes taken an anti-foundational and anti-traditional form that is typical of postmodern thinking. More often though, this omission has occurred by way of shifting the discussion of education exclusively to social and political issues.
In my opinion, this contemporary trend to exclude or ignore a metaphysical or ontological consideration of nature is too narrow. On one hand, it separates us from tradition, in which a consideration of nature played an important role. On the other hand, it excludes us from the experience of the whole that the Greeks called the
The environmental problem as a lifestyle-related disease
We live in an age in which the pollution and destruction of the environment have become a major concern. 1 Without exaggeration, we may call the 21st century the century of the environment.
What makes the environmental problem so difficult to manage is that there is no quick fix or magical remedy. As Hans Jonas has shown, this issue extends over a very long period of time, going beyond a single generation. It is trans-generational (Jonas, 1984). At the same time, it also extends beyond political territories. It is transnational and global.
One of the major difficulties related to the environmental problem is that its solution requires a change in lifestyle for us all (McKibben, 2011). We cannot delegate this solution to certain specialists such as politicians or scientists, even though they may play an important role. There may still be some optimistic believers in science who would contend that scientific progress might one day solve the environmental issues confronting us. However, we should refrain from relegating the solution and responsibility to scientists alone. There are three reasons for this cautious approach.
First, as history shows, progress in science has not kept pace with the destruction of the environment. Much of the remedy it offers often comes too late.
Second, we should also take into consideration that scientists require enormous amount of money for research, and money comes mostly from the government and industries. The nuclear power plant catastrophe in Fukushima has brought to light that the fields of government, industry, journalism, and science in the past joined hands to promote nuclear power plants under the name of “clean energy”. Some scientists who warned against the danger of these plants were pushed to the side. It is therefore necessary to create a public sphere, in which the issue of the environment can be discussed openly and the citizens’ voice can be heard.
Third, an exaggerated worship of science can fix and harden our relationship with nature in such a way that our peaceful coexistence with it becomes difficult to achieve. This is the problem often discussed by environmental philosophers under “anthropocentrism” (Fox, 1995), an attitude and way of thinking that places man at the center of the universe and makes other beings (animate and non-animate) into man’s subjects. Criticism of anthropocentrism is often linked with criticism of Western thought, as in the case of the celebrated paper by Lynn White Jr. published in 1967 (White, 1967). Sometimes, it is also linked with criticism of male centeredness as in the case of the provocative article, “Death of Nature” by Catherine Merchant (Merchant, 1998). In this paper, we will propose a more balanced picture of the modern age, in which anthropocentrism is another aspect of human isolation.
It is therefore prudent to regard the environmental problem as a kind of lifestyle-related disease that cannot be cured by a single operation or a powerful medicine. Here the metaphor of a lifestyle-related disease seems to be quite adequate. For just as a lifestyle-related disease is caused by a certain way of life, such as a bad diet, an environmental problem is also caused by a certain way of life that is disastrous to nature. As a patient with a lifestyle-related disease is expected to change their lifestyle to a healthier one, so must humankind be willing to change its ways of life to address the environmental problem. This change concerns not only the present but also future generations. As parents and teachers, we must be able to model for future generations a way of life that is not anti-environmental. Philosophy of education must play an important role in this.
The impact of the environmental problem upon philosophy of education
Until recently, the environmental problem has not been a major concern for philosophy of education.
Fifty years ago, with the publication of Rachel Carson’s
Also, in educational studies and educational sciences in general, there have been numerous studies concerning environmental education, especially since the United Nations General Assembly in 2002 (20 December) declared 2005–2014 the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development.
However, when we limit our view to philosophy of education, the landscape changes. It was only in the 21st century that ecological issues became a focus of philosophy of education. In 2003, the
The reason for this neglect is that for a long time philosophy of education was intimately related to the concept of nature, which had its origin in Greek philosophy and which remained influential until recently. According to this concept, nature was considered to be a firm foundation upon which human activities are based. As such, it presented itself as an exemplary model that should be imitated by man. This thought was expressed aptly by a famous medieval saying, “ars imitatur naturam”, or “art (which includes a variety of activities) imitates nature” (Moritz, 2009). Of course, human activities often deviate from nature. But this deviation was considered to be a crisis of man, not of nature.
This concept of nature remained influential deep into the modern age. Comenius’ pedagogy was built upon it. Its influence is easily retraceable in thinkers such as Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel. We might even say that the theory of evolution is an offspring of this concept.
If we consider this background, then we may understand the special challenge that the environmental problem poses to the philosophy of education. Nature in the age of the environmental crisis cannot function as a foundation, as a kind of firm rock upon which an edifice of education can be built. Instead, nature has exposed itself as vulnerable to human intervention. It has become manageable by sciences such as gene technology. At one time, nature was a divine being, seen as having been created by God as in the Judeo-Christian tradition, or it was itself a kind of God, as in the cases of Greek
This dethronement of nature was not caused by the environmental problem. Rather, this problem is the latest phenomenon that is a result of this dethronement. The actual dethronement itself has a much older ancestry. It began earlier than Froebel, earlier than Rousseau, and even earlier than Comenius. But philosophy of education has not taken this problem seriously until recently.
The environmental problem is certainly a challenge, but it is also a chance for the philosophy of education, in so far as it compels us to see the fragility of nature and it invalidates the idea of nature as a model and a norm. Has the philosophy of education responded to this challenge sincerely? The answer is no. Rather, it has responded by silently taking the concept of nature off the table. This may take the postmodernist form that is anti-foundational and anti-traditional, such as we see in Richard Rorty (Rorty, 1980). 2 This would imply “the death of nature”. 3 Or, more often, this omission occurs by way of shifting the discussion on education exclusively to social and political issues.
My intention here is not to propose a return to the past. Today, it would indeed be ridiculous to begin a discussion on pedagogy by observing the various activities of a bird, as Comenius did in his
However, I find the contemporary trends toward excluding or ignoring the metaphysical or the ontological considerations of nature too narrow. This narrowness has two aspects. On one hand, it separates us from tradition, in which a consideration of nature played an important role. On the other hand, it separates us from experience of the whole, which the Greeks called the
It is therefore advisable to look for a third way, which shows due respect to tradition without falling into the fundamentalism of nature. For this third approach, it is helpful to consider the historical origins of the environmental problem.
Two origins of the environmental problem
The environmental problem has two stages, which correspond to two origins. The stage that is familiar to us is the stage of environmental destruction and pollution, which followed the Industrial Revolution. It has its origin in the advancement of technology and the spread of industry. This is the stage that is usually meant when we talk about the environmental problem. But before this stage there was yet another stage that played a decisive role in the formation of modern technology, a stage in which nature lost its ontological priority and its status as a model. By “ontological priority” I mean that nature was considered to be prior to human activities and artifacts not only in time but also in worth and dignity. This is the reason why nature was considered to be a model and a teacher for humankind. As long as nature retained this ontological priority, it was difficult to consider it as a simple means to an end, as an object of exploitation. But when nature lost the ontological priority, the gate opened for the subjugation and exploitation of nature, which in its final phase has brought about the environmental problem.
The rise of modern epistemology and the dethronement of nature
The question that arises here is: “how did nature lose its ontological priority?”
First, to avoid any misunderstanding, I would like to mention that the ontological priority of nature has been an object of dispute since antiquity. On one side stood the Greek tradition of Plato, Aristotle, and Stoicism that bestowed priority to nature. Conversely, there was the Judeo-Christian tradition that seems to have emphasized the priority of man over nature, as the creation story of the
A completely new challenge to the ontological priority of nature came from modern epistemological thinking. Before such thought began, the ontological priority of nature was challenged only within the framework of ontology and theology, as was the case with medieval nominalism that stressed the contingent character of nature before almighty God. But with the rise of modern epistemology ontology itself became outdated and dethroned.
This shift can be seen in the change in the status that mathematics underwent in the 17th century. It is true that mathematics enjoyed a high status among the sciences from antiquity to the modern age. However, the nature of this status changed fundamentally in the 17th century. From the time of Pythagoras until the Renaissance, mathematics retained a high status from the point of view of ontology: numbers and geometrical figures were considered to be a higher kind of entity, nearer to the Platonic ideas. This was the reason why Plato in the
Mathematics underwent this change but retained its high status nevertheless. The case was completely different with nature. Nature, which was ontologically prior, became epistemologically secondary.
Cartesian understanding of nature in the Meditations
We can observe this change in the
Here we can clearly see the shift in the understanding of nature that came about through the rise of epistemology. Epistemology methodically creates a wall between the mind and things outside and gives priority to the examination of inner ideas. Once, contemplation of nature had been the first step toward God, as we can see in Bonaventure’s
Oscillation and modernity
However, to do justice to such a complex matter, we would like to also remark that in the sixth chapter of
This oscillation concerning the status of nature offers us an important insight: even though nature lost much of its dignity through the epistemological turn, it retained some of its ontological priority. This oscillation became even greater, more complex and dynamic in the following centuries. Let us consider Kant. In his first critique, nature lost its former dignity. It became a product of human intellect, constructed according to categories. Furthermore, it also became the thing in itself (
This oscillation was also discernible in modern philosophy of education. While there was a strong appeal to method, which was grounded on epistemology, there was at the same time a passionate appeal to nature as the teacher. Interestingly, these two tendencies were often found in the same thinker, such as Comenius or Pestalozzi.
This oscillation is also dominant in our attitude toward nature and the environmental problem. On one hand, there is a cool-headed approach to dealing with nature and controlling the environmental problem technologically. This is represented by what is called by its opponents as “shallow ecology” or “anthropocentrism”. Even though this approach received harsh criticism by thinkers of deep ecology such as Naess (Naess, 1989) and transpersonal ecology such as Warwick Fox (Fox, 1995), it is still the dominant mode of thinking among politicians and business people. This has been true even since the nuclear disaster of 11 March 2012.
On the other hand, there is intense enthusiasm toward nature, which takes a variety of forms, such as some trends of deep ecology and ecocentrism. Michael Cronon showed that the concept of wilderness, which originally had a negative connotation, underwent a radical change and developed a positive connotation. This was symbolized by the famous declaration of Thoreau: “In Wildness is the preservation of the World” (Thoreau, 2011). Cronon detected behind this change the influence of Romanticism as well as of the concept of frontier. It is due to this history that wilderness became “the ultimate landscape of authenticity” (Cronon, 1995, 1996). Even though this romantic worship of wilderness helped to create national parks like Yosemite and Yellowstone, it hindered us to cherish the nature near and around us.
How should we understand this intriguing issue? Clearly, epistemology cannot get rid of ontology completely. In fact, epistemology itself is a kind of ontology, in so far as it interprets being as inner ideas or representation. 5 But this version of ontology as epistemology is too narrow to give a proper account of our experience of such things as nature or our social self. This may be a reason for the persistent revival of traditional ontology in the modern age. However, so long as epistemological and technological thinking have the upper hand in our society, the ontological remnant remains secondary or reactionary.
This oscillation is not the worst option. It is better than a narrow-minded epistemology or a blind worship of nature. However, the deep gap that separates the two extreme poles must be mitigated. Otherwise, not only society but also our own self may be split into two conflicting elements. We might end up living the life of a technocrat during weekdays and a nature lover over the weekend.
To avoid this, epistemology must acknowledge the relevance of ontology. Ontology must also learn to be humble and stop dictating. Instead of being a “strong thought”, both must learn to be a “weak thought”, to use an expression of Gianni Vattimo. 6
Features of an alternative ontology
What kind of features should this ontology take? There are four features I would like to emphasize.
First, an alternative ontology must break down, or at least weaken, what Hannah Arendt once called the “prison of mind” (Arendt, 1989: 288). Epistemology, in its obsession with certainty, constructed the wall that separated the mind from things outside. As Charles Taylor has expressed in his recent book,
Gregory Bateson’s criticism of the Western understanding of the self as an autonomous “I” can also be understood in this context (Bateson, 2000). This concept of the self establishes the self as an observer of an external world. And this way of thinking is still very common. According to C.A. Bowers, expressions that take the autonomous subject for granted can be found not only in the academic world, but also in public schools and university classrooms (Bowers, 1993: 159).
The breaking down of the wall of the narrow self places the self in a web of relationships with other beings, both human and non-human. This relationship is not an accidental property that adheres to an autonomous subject but rather the essence of the subject. In this respect, our position is in harmony with the deep ecology of Naess, who rejects “the man-in-environment image” and favors “the relational, total-field image” (Naess, 1989: 28).
Second, an alternative ontology should resist foundationalism, not to mention fundamentalism. In other words, it should be critically aware of its own limitations, which correspond to human finitude. Whereas traditional ontology, which Vattimo calls a “strong thought” (Vattimo, 1999), could not free itself from the Platonic dream of a philosopher king and used concepts, such as God or Nature, as an authority or a teacher, an alternative ontology as a “weak thought” should resist such temptation. This ontology would listen carefully to the voice of nature, but would neither obey it blindly nor exploit it without scruple. This criticism of foundationalism is to a certain degree a legacy of postmodernism, even though history provides examples of people who resisted the temptation of foundationalism. Without this caution, our relationship with nature would be left with a sterile alternative of “anthropocentrism” and “ecocentrism”.
Nature and culture
Third, the proposed ontology should also be aware of the cultural aspect of nature. Nature is no abstract
Such experience is not limited to East Asia. In fact, each culture, if it is worthy of its name, 7 has developed its own manner of living in and with nature such that the destruction of nature is at the same time the destruction of the culture. Only by recognizing the cultural aspect of nature and the natural aspect of culture can we escape from the futile opposition between nature and culture and enter into a fruitful conversation with nature.
We should therefore be cautious of the extreme form of nature worship that appears in the writings of the nature lovers such as Rousseau and Thoreau. Also we should remind ourselves that Rousseau’s admiration of the state of nature expressed in his books such as
The range of culture is quite wide. It includes not only activities of fine arts but also a variety of forms of collaboration between nature and mankind such as farming, hunting and fishing. Farming is especially important. The word culture itself was born from the experience of cultivation ( Farming by the measure of nature, which is to say the nature of the particular place, means that farmers must tend farms that they know and love, farms small enough to know and love, using tools and methods that they know and love, in the company of neighbors that they know and love. (Berry, 2012)
Now, this kind of farming is not a novel idea. This is a type of farming that was widely practiced throughout the world before modern technology and capitalism (and now also globalization) made out of agriculture yet another kind of industry or business.
The narrow connection between nature and culture also warns us that the rapid disappearance of living natural languages has a serious negative effect on our relationship with nature. According to David Crystal, half of the living natural languages, which numbered between about 6000 and 7000 at the beginning of this century, will disappear by the end of this century (Crystal, 2002). There are many reasons to lament this loss. One of the reasons is that through the disappearance of a language, the knowledge and experience of nature, which the speakers of the language have acquired through a long history, will be lost forever. In this regard, the disappearance of languages (on average, a natural language disappears every two weeks) is also an ecological problem (Crystal, 2002).
Ecology and self-transformation
Finally, an alternative ontology should not be a matter of abstract philosophy. Rather, it concerns our way of life and has an educational impact. It must promote and encourage us to transform ourselves.
In this context, the concept of transpersonal ecology proposed by Warwick Fox deserves special attention. As a friend of Naess and a learned scholar of environmental philosophy himself, Fox belonged to the circle of deep ecologists. But he was not satisfied with this somewhat ambiguous and self-congratulatory label of “deep” ecology and offered the new label of transpersonal ecology (Fox, 1995). By “transpersonal” he did not mean “between persons”. Instead, the term meant transcending the individual and identifying oneself with the larger and higher entity such as nature or the universe. Fox borrowed the term “transpersonal” from transpersonal psychology of Abraham H. Maslow and Anthony J. Suich. But for the explication of transpersonal ecology, he referred to various writings of deep ecologists, as well as to a variety of thinkers such as Spinoza, Gandhi (the two favorite thinkers of Naess), Heidegger and Dogen, a Japanese Zen Buddhist.
The idea of transpersonal ecology has a strong educational dimension. This can be shown through the remarkable affinity it has with the traditional understanding of education as self-transformation. This affinity escaped the notice of Fox, whose treatment of philosophers was somewhat sporadic. We hope to fill the gap here.
Before the rise of modern education, traditional education was mainly concerned with self-transformation. This applies to both the East and the West. In the East, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism shared an understanding of education as self-transformation, in which spiritual exercises of different forms were occasionally used. In the West, there was also a strong tradition of spiritual exercise. It is the contribution of a French historian of philosophy, Hadot, that brought this clearly to light. In his book
This is an important message for us. In an artificial world of man-made things, mankind will forever be enclosed within “the prison of mind”. An alternative ontology, which is suggested here, may show us the way out of this impasse. However, without the actual effort of self-transformation supported by the wonderful presence of nature, this alternative ontology will become yet one more theory destined to be consumed by academia. 10
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.