Abstract
Yacek, Jonas, and Gary’s volume begins with a question: ‘Why does moral education matter in the 21st century?’ The answer that follows is a condensed tour de force to set the stage. Every corner of formal education is morally tinged, according to the editors. Education is inescapably moral because education is a situated undertaking; it happens in particular places, with particular teachers, at particular times, with particular content, for particular aims. To think that education is a non-neutral endeavor is nothing new, whether we reach back to Plato or consider the many contemporary traditions in education such as liberalism (Nussbaum, 2006) and critical pedagogy (Freire, 1998), to name but a few. Not only does the nature of education impart its moral valence, but moral considerations may also crop up by virtue of their own relevance. Life for any person is morally fraught, but the moral morass in which each generation finds itself is not unchanging. The editors are quick to point out a set of moral challenges they believe young people today uniquely face, many of which flow from new technologies and the ever more powerful engine of global capitalism. As such, moral education matters in the present age both because education is inescapably moral and because moral education can enable people to self-assuredly and competently grapple with issues that regularly form the bedrock of their lives.
With that brief but incisive foundation, the volume then turns to its three parts: historical insights, new approaches, and responses to contemporary problems. In Part I, ‘Historical Insights for Contemporary Moral Education’, the reader encounters five chapters each unpacking the moral educational theory of a different philosopher or philosophical tradition. The philosophers or traditions discussed in Part I include Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, Kant, and Hellenistic skepticism. Marshall’s Plato chapter and Jonas’ Aristotle chapter home in on particular aspects of each philosopher’s theory, which for Marshall is Socrates’ ‘protreptic’ and for Jonas is Aristotelian friendship. Conversely, Pigliucci’s skepticism chapter, Yacek’s Nietzsche chapter, and Johnston’s Kant chapter attempt to provide a more holistic overview of their subject’s theory of moral education. Each of these chapters should be of interest to scholars whose work focuses on the chapter’s subject; however, not all chapters are equal when it comes to their attention to contemporary educational practice. Whereas Marshall’s, Pigliucci’s, and Johnston’s chapters stay predominantly at the level of interpretive theory, Jonas and Yacek are the two authors who provide substantive suggestions about the implications of Aristotle’s and Nietzsche’s philosophy, respectively, for contemporary classroom teaching. Specifically, Jonas illuminates the pedagogical value of classroom friendships and epiphanic experiences for moral education and Yacek demonstrates the transformational capacity of Nietzschean exemplarism and aspiration.
In Part II, six chapters address ‘New Approaches to Moral Education’. These chapters cover the sticky wicket of state-provided moral education in liberal contexts, the application of Sen’s capabilities approach to moral education, the notion of recognition (à la Honneth, 1995) as an aim of character education, care ethics in schools, a culturally responsive update to Aristotelian virtue ethics, and a pragmatist moral education. Particular standouts of Part II include Martin’s chapter on moral education in liberal states and Thompson and Oskay’s chapter on pragmatism. Martin’s contribution attempts to resolve some of the reasonable concern with a state moral education, which, even when legitimate, is nonetheless coercive to some degree. The question for Martin becomes, what state moral education is ‘consent-worthy’? His chapter explicates the interplay between public morality in a liberal society and state authority and, from that basis, outlines his consent standard with accompanying theoretically viable reasons for withholding consent. In their chapter, Thompson and Oskay provide an overview of pragmatism in the Deweyan tradition and then argue for its value as an approach to moral education. Particularly helpful in their contribution are their sections detailing the import of pragmatism to various contemporary topics in moral education and drawing out – and responding to – hesitations educators might have about their proposal.
Finally, in Part III, contributors offer ‘Responses to Contemporary Moral Problems’. This section is varied in style and subject. Robertson and Johnson give an account of moral education for virtual spaces and moral education in virtual spaces. Norris details the threat that consumerism poses to contemporary moral education. Affolter contributes a bleak chapter that suggests the deep disagreements of our age pose a potentially insurmountable hurdle for moral education to meet the demands of liberal justice. Welch draws on Iris Murdoch and the 1999 film American Beauty to argue for a sex education that centers moral vision instead of moral action. And in the volume’s final chapter, Gary gives a phenomenological typology of boredom followed by an Albert Borgmann-inspired account of how certain practices can help students overcome being boredom-prone. The highlight chapter of Part III, for this reader, was Robertson and Johnson’s chapter on moral education in virtual contexts. They adopt a virtue theory framework to consider how virtual spaces can help or hinder virtuous self-formation. The chapter is neither overly optimistic about virtual spaces, nor overly fatalistic about them. Instead, Robertson and Johnson shed light on the way the ‘virtual world’ is intertwined with the ‘real world’, and provide concrete ways educators can use virtual spaces to develop and inform virtues valuable for physical spaces.
The volume is characterized by accessible writing throughout, but never sacrifices insight for clarity. Altogether, these chapters represent analysis at the juncture of philosophy and education that manages to be relevant, scholarly, and readable – no easy accomplishment. What will a reader not find in this volume? There are perhaps three minor quibbles I have with the volume, though the quibbles should not be taken to undermine the excellent work on display in this book. First, there is very little discussion of conceptual or practical differences between, say, moral education, ethics education, and character education. Are these projects isomorphic with each other? Each term is used at different times throughout the book; virtue ethics, notably, receives extensive attention, but is virtue education part and parcel of ‘moral education’? Perhaps a section prior to the existing Part I could have outlined the theoretical dimensions demarcating moral education.
Second, while the historical and theoretical chapters are engrossing, there is conspicuous absence of realms of philosophy outside the Hellenistic, European, or American pragmatic and liberal traditions. To remedy the absence, chapters examining Eastern, African, Indigenous American, or Black American frameworks and topics in moral education would have been a fruitful addition.
Third, the contemporary moral problems the volume directly addresses are virtual spaces, consumerism, social disagreements, sex education, and boredom. Arguably the most distinctively ‘21st century’ moral problem is that of what to do about virtual spaces. I wonder if there was room in Part III to include treatments of a greater set of problems that are distinctively present-age (or even future-age) by nature, such as evolving social mores related to substances or family dynamics, new issues in health and medicine, and, of course, the rapidly evolving domain of technology.
As I said, these quibbles are merely remaining items on a wish list that is mostly crossed off thanks to the 16 impressive contributions comprising this volume.