Can one be open-minded about a strongly held belief? I defend a reconciliation of the suggested conflict that turns on open-mindedness as an educational aim subordinate to the aim of knowledge, and as an attitude about one’s beliefs (a second-order or meta-belief), not a weakened attitude toward a proposition believed. The reconciliation is applied to a number of related issues such as the tension between teaching for autonomy and rightful claims to authority.
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