Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online 2026-1
On the enforcement of targeted sanctions: Estimating the control of sanctioned Russian entities over European companies and proposing a methodology to detect sanction circumvention
Despite the increased attention on enforcing international sanctions within the European Union (EU) following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, comprehensive studies mapping the economic influence of Russian entities sanctioned within Europe remain scarce. This article fills this gap by proposing a methodology to reconstruct ownership chains and estimate the economic influence of sanctioned entities over European companies. The findings indicate that European companies are significantly vulnerable to the influence of sanctioned Russian entities, which concentrate their economic interests predominantly in Ukraine and Western Europe. Key sectors affected include finance, wholesale trade, and real estate. Additionally, the analysis of ownership structures related to sanctioned Russian entities within Europe offers a new methodology for identifying sanction evasion tactics.
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