This article proposes that key CEO demographic factors reflect alternative modes of rationalizing the choice to engage in and/or facilitate accounting fraud. Specifically the authors theorize that younger, less functionally experienced CEOs and CEOs without business degrees will be more likely to rationalize accounting fraud as an acceptable decision. Based on a sample of 312 fraud-committing and control firms, the study finds support for the authors’ predictions. It also finds that CEO stock options (a form of executive equity incentive) also predict fraud, and that this relationship is not moderated by CEO demographics. The study thus extends upper echelon theory by demonstrating how key demographic variables influence CEO decisions to rationalize accounting fraud.
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