It seems natural to adopt a historical approach when it comes to property titles: When property titles have a clean history, they are to be respected as a matter of justice; when they do not have a clean history, for example, in cases of prior theft, they must be returned to the original owners or their descendants. But the historical approach has serious drawbacks. This paper presents an alternative. Starting from the idea that property rights must be stable, we offer an account of why historic injustices sometimes do, but sometimes do not, undermine current titles. This account offers a standard of better or worse claims, and maintains that current titles are not undermined unless there are contestants who can put forward comparatively better claims.
BoxillB (2003) A Lockean argument for Black reparations. The Journal of Ethics7: 63–91.
2.
CohenAI (2009) Compensation for historic injustice: Completing the Boxill and Sher argument. Philosophy and Public Affairs37: 81–102.
3.
CowenT (2006) How far back should we go? Why restitution should be small. In: ElsterJ (eds) Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 17–32.
4.
EpsteinRA (1985) Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
5.
HeydD (2024) Group (non) identity and historical justice. Res Publica (Liverpool, England)30: 705–722.
6.
HumeD (1740/2000) A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7.
LockeJ (1690/1988) Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8.
LoeweD (2024) Compensation and overcoming of historical injustice. Res Publica (Liverpool, England)30: 723–740.
9.
LyonsD (1977) The new Indian claims and original rights to land. Social Theory and Practice4: 249–272.
10.
MerrillTW (1985) Property rules, liability rules, and adverse possession. Northwestern University Law Review79: 1122–1154.
11.
MerrillTW (1998) Property and the right to exclude. Nebraska Law Review77: 730–755.
12.
MerrillTW (2012) The property strategy. University of Pennsylvania Law Review160: 2061–2096.
13.
MeyerL (2003) Past and future: The case for a threshold notion of harm. In: MeyerLPaulsonSPoggeT (eds) Rights, Culture and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 143–160.
14.
MeyerLSanklechaP (2014) How legitimate expectations matter in climate justice. Politics, Philosophy & Economics13: 369–393.
15.
MollerD (2019) Governing Least: A New England Libertarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16.
MooreM (2015) A Political Theory of Territory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17.
MorrisCW (1984) Existential limits to the rectification of past wrongs. American Philosophical Quarterly21: 175–182.
18.
NarvesonJ (2009) Present payments, past wrongs: Correcting loose talk about Nozick and rectification. Libertarian Papers1: 1–17.
19.
NineC (2008) Superseding historic injustice and territorial rights. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy11: 79–87.
20.
NozickR (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
21.
PennerJ (1997) The Idea of Property in Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22.
PennerJ (2013) On the very idea of transmissible rights. In: PennerJSmithH (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Property Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 244–272.
23.
PerezN (2011) On compensation and return: Can the ‘continuing injustice argument’ for compensating for historical injustices justify compensation for such injustices or the return of property?Journal of Applied Philosophy28: 151–168.
24.
PerezN (2014) Must we provide material redress for past wrongs? In: WellmanCHCohenAI (eds) Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell, 203–215.
25.
ReiboldK (2022) Why indigenous land rights have not been superseded – a critical application of Waldron’s theory of supersession. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy25: 480–495.
26.
RoseCM (2015) The law is nine-tenths of possession: An adage turned on its head. In: ChangYC (eds) Law and Economics of Possession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 40–64.
27.
RostillL (2021) Possession, Relative Title, and Ownership in English Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28.
SandersonD (2011) Against supersession. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence24: 155–182.
29.
SchmidtzD (2010) Property and justice. Social Philosophy and Policy27: 79–100.
30.
SherG (1981) Ancient wrongs and modern rights. Philosophy & Public Affairs10: 3–17.
31.
SherG (2005) Transgenerational compensation. Philosophy & Public Affairs33: 181–200.
32.
SimmonsAJ (1995/2001) Historical rights and fair shares. In: Justification and Legitimacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 222–248.
33.
SimmonsAJ (2016) Boundaries of Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
34.
SmithHE (2011) Property is not just a bundle of rights. Econ Journal Watch8: 279–291.
35.
SteinerH (1984) A liberal theory of exploitation. Ethics94: 225–241.
36.
SteinerH (1994) An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell.
37.
SternJY (2013) Property’s constitution. California Law Review101: 277–326.
38.
StilzA (2011) Nations, states, and territory. Ethics121: 572–601.
39.
StilzA (2019) Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
40.
Truccone-BorgognoS (2022) Responding to historical injustices and the moral irrelevance of group identity. European Journal of Political Theory23: 65–84.
41.
Van der VossenB (2021) Consent to unjust institutions. Legal Theory27: 236–251.
