Abstract
I offer in this paper a new conception of democratic self-determination. My proposal defends Rafanelli's peaceful reform intervention from the concern that we should not promote justice abroad, because it would interfere with the self-determining choice of other people to select an authoritarian government. I challenge this influential view of authoritarian self-determination. I argue instead that self-determination should be democratic in its input, or the procedure deliberating and voting on the constitution. Self-determination should also be democratic in its output, or the constitution's rules. Democratic self-determination offers three important advantages: it joins self-determination indivisibly with other inalienable human rights, such as the human right to racial non-discrimination. Second, it guards against the problem of the false mandate, or authoritarians attempting to legitimate their autocratic rule using rigged referenda and suppressed debate. Third, democratic self-determination reduces the risk of ethnic conflict given the diversity of actual states. Democratic self-determination passes the actual deliberation test, since it has been vindicated by inclusive deliberation with people from diverse cultures.
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