Abstract
Reciprocal libertarianism is a version of left-wing libertarianism that combines self-ownership with an egalitarian distribution of resources according to reciprocity. In this paper, I show that reciprocal libertarianism is a coherent and appealing view. I discuss how reciprocal libertarians can handle conflicts between self-ownership and reciprocity, and I show that reciprocal libertarianism can be realised in a framework of individual ownership of external resources or in a socialist scheme of common ownership (libertarian socialism). I also compare reciprocal libertarianism with left-libertarian approaches: I argue that a reciprocity-sensitive version of left-libertarianism (reciprocal left-libertarianism) is coherent and morally superior to traditional left-libertarianism, on grounds of incorporating a distinctively solidaristic and recognition-oriented aspect of equality. The policy implications of reciprocal libertarianism will differ depending on which rights people can have over external resources, but all reciprocal libertarian views acknowledge the existence of social rights that people have as co-operators.
Self-Ownership, egalitarian reciprocity and left-wing libertarianism
In this paper I discuss ‘reciprocal libertarianism’, a version of left-wing libertarianism that combines self-ownership with an egalitarian distribution of resources according to a principle of reciprocity. 1 I examine how reciprocal libertarians can handle possible conflicts between self-ownership and reciprocity, and I show that reciprocal libertarianism can be realised in a framework of individual ownership of external resources or in a socialist scheme of common ownership (libertarian socialism). This will also involve a discussion of which kind of equality underpins reciprocal libertarianism, and a comparison with left-libertarian approaches (Otsuka, Steiner, Vallentyne). I conclude with some reflections on policy implications.
In this section, I illustrate the two pillars of reciprocal libertarianism: self-ownership and reciprocity. Let us begin with self-ownership. A commitment to self-ownership is the distinctive feature of libertarian political philosophy. Self-owning individuals initially (perhaps almost) fully own themselves: they have over their bodies all the moral rights that an individual has over an object when she privately owns it (Cohen, 1995: 214; Otsuka, Steiner, and Vallentyne, 2005: 201–208).
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These rights are as follows: “(1)
The second pillar of reciprocal libertarianism is reciprocity. Reciprocity prescribes rules of fair treatment for those involved in co-operative practices (the co-operators). In the paper I focus on the distributive implications of reciprocity, which can be understood as follows:
The distributive requirements of reciprocity can be spelled out in different ways. In this paper I work with an
Assessing the compatibility of self-ownership with reciprocity: Bodily resources
Are there cases in which fulfilling reciprocity infringes on self-ownership? How can reciprocal libertarianism handle such cases? Perhaps the possibility of a conflict between self-ownership and reciprocity is best illustrated with Nozick's famous assertion that ‘[t]axation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor’, in that ‘taking the earnings of
Since the domains of application of self-ownership and reciprocity are distinct – that is, since self-ownership is about body ownership, while redistributive taxation concerns external resources – it seems that the extensive redistribution of resources implied by reciprocity does not infringe on self-ownership. What's more, there is a sense in which reciprocity may be
Even so, there is one respect in which reciprocity clashes with self-ownership, as Nikolas Mattheis (2017) has noted. Applying Otsuka's seminal analysis to cases involving cooperation, the litmus test to judge whether self-ownership is compatible with reciprocity consists in examining cases involving exclusively bodily resources (Otsuka, 2003: 16–19). In situations in which two individuals jointly produce something only using their bodily resources 13 or exchange products made exclusively of bodily resources (e.g. blankets made of hair), self-ownership implies that it is illegitimate for a third agent (e.g. the state) to take away anything from the individuals involved in cooperation (e.g. a hair-made blanket every ten produced) or to impose a pattern of distribution. Since the individuals fully own their bodies, imposing a distributive pattern constitutes an infringement of self-ownership (Mattheis, 2017: 65). 14
How can reciprocal libertarians address this conflict between self-ownership and reciprocity? Since the bulk of cooperation typically involves (also) the use of external resources, we can say that this tension between self-ownership and reciprocity is
Assessing the compatibility of self-ownership with reciprocity: External resources
Having considered cases in which cooperation involves bodily resources, we can ask: how can self-ownership be reconciled with reciprocity when cooperation
The argument presented above may be challenged on a number of grounds: so, let's consider possible objections. One could object that reciprocity-sensitive distributions infringe on people's right to keep the fruits of their labour – understood as a right to whatever one can gain from using one's body and mind to improve external resources in a series of voluntary interactions with others. As far as one understands self-ownership as I do in this essay, this objection cannot be successfully sustained. Indeed, as Otsuka and Vallentyne have shown, there is no reason to believe that an unqualified right to keep the fruits of one's labour should be part of self-ownership. For example, surely one would not be entitled to keep the fruits of one's labour if one had worked to improve resources
Second, it may be argued that, after being redistributed, the fruits of cooperation are fully owned by the co-operators, who could then freely engage in acts of cooperation in reciprocity-subverting ways. For instance, imagine that at t0
The foregoing reasoning applies also to cases in which someone appropriates some unimproved natural resources (at t0), then works on them without the help of others, and afterwards (at t1) uses the now improved resources for cooperation. Suppose that at t0
Then, consider the case in which someone exercises the Hohfeldian powers associated with self-ownership by transferring all self-ownership rights to someone else: that is, a case in which someone willingly becomes a slave (Otsuka, Steiner, and Vallentyne, 2005: 212). As far as these extreme situations are concerned, there is no sense in which reciprocity can obtain between the master and the slave since the slave can acquire no property rights without their being simultaneously transferred to the master. And notice that cases of this type are structurally different from those in which someone contractually agrees to perform labour for others: true, such cases imply transferring some of one's control rights over one's body and mind (within the limits stipulated by the contract) to others, but this does not contradict the fact that, in so far as cooperation involves the use of external resources, such agreements are legitimate only on conditions of respecting the requirements of reciprocity, and that therefore the worker is entitled to an equal share of what is co-operatively produced. Of course,
Finally, I wish to consider libertarian accounts that claim that the justification of
There are good reasons, I think, to reject Wheeler's account.
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But, even granting that Wheeler's analysis is correct, here I wish to point out that there is room for some reconciliation of self-ownership with reciprocity within it. In Wheeler's article there is no discussion of cases of
Reciprocal libertarianism, left-libertarianism and equality
Having discussed possible conflicts between self-ownership and reciprocity, I now want to show that reciprocal libertarianism is a promising left-wing libertarian view. I do so by comparing it with left-libertarianism. Reciprocal libertarianism combines self-ownership with an egalitarian distribution of what is co-operatively produced (the fruits of cooperation). Left-libertarianism, instead, combines self-ownership with a claim to a fair share of natural resources wealth. Typically, left-libertarians justify the distributive aspect of their view by appealing to an egalitarian interpretation of the Lockean proviso. According to the Lockean proviso, in the state of nature an individual's appropriation of natural resources is morally permissible ‘at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others’ (Locke, 1967: 306). Left-libertarians draw on this proviso to claim that individual appropriations of natural resources are just to the extent that all relevant others are not disadvantaged – at the bar of egalitarian justice – by such appropriations. Hillel Steiner endorses a resourcist approach, according to which everyone is entitled to an equal share of the value of natural resources (Steiner, 1994: Chaps. 7–8; 1997: 299–302), whereas Michael Otsuka interprets the proviso in welfarist terms. 22
As Quong notices, left-libertarians and reciprocal libertarians have different views on the issue of ‘the metric’ of justice, the things that justice aims to distribute equally: left-libertarians assume that people have a claim to natural resources (or their value), reciprocal libertarianism is concerned with distributing the benefits of cooperation (e.g. income, job opportunities, etc., when they result from cooperation) (Quong, 2011: 81–82; Otsuka, Steiner, and Vallentyne, 2005: 201, 213–215). 23
In my view, the metric issue stems from a deeper disagreement about the
In my view, left-libertarianism is inadequate if it doesn’t also recognise the kind of equality between co-operators captured by reciprocity. Yet, I will show that a reciprocity-sensitive version of left-libertarianism (reciprocal left-libertarianism) is possible. Left-libertarians raise the point that a theory of justice is
That said, the two types of equality are not mutually exclusive. One can endorse a version of left-wing libertarianism (reciprocal left-libertarianism) that appeals to both. In such a view, egalitarian justice requires both granting an equal share of natural resources to self-owning individuals (like left-libertarianism)
Telic/deontic equality and self-ownership
A further point concerning equality should be discussed. Quong observes that commonly left-libertarians appeal to luck-egalitarianism: they justify a commitment to distributive equality on grounds that it is pro tanto objectionable if someone is disadvantaged due to brute luck – that is, due to circumstances that are beyond the individual's control or that the individual has not chosen – rather than due to the individual's deliberate choices (Quong, 2011: 75–76; see Steiner, 1997; Otsuka, 2018: 131–133). 24 Quong argues that a luck-egalitarian rationale is especially problematic for left-libertarians, since it stands in the way of a coherent reconciliation with self-ownership (Quong, 2011: 75–78). In what follows I challenge Quong's argument: I aim to show that existing left-libertarian accounts should not be criticised on grounds of conceptual incoherence (as Quong would have it), but on grounds of failing to account for the solidaristic dimension of equality expressed by reciprocity.
I shall focus on Quong's discussion of cases involving compensation for natural disadvantage (e.g. for inferior natural talents) (Quong, 2011: 68–75). For example, against Steiner's resourcist approach, Quong argues that, given the existence of great talent differentials between individuals, it cannot be excluded that compensating for the disadvantage suffered by the severely disabled would entail entitling them to so much of the worldly resources that an able-bodied individual ‘will not be permitted to move, or even exist (since existence requires the use of physical space) anywhere without Infirm's consent’ (Quong, 2011: 71). In turn, this would undermine the self-ownership of the able-bodied individual, since such an individual could not even exist without inevitably violating the disabled's ownership rights. 25 This exemplifies the sense in which, for Quong, at the heart of the left-libertarian project there is a tension between self-ownership and luck-egalitarian equality. 26
Note that such a tension is present only if
Also reciprocity-based egalitarianism is a deontic view – it prescribes equal treatment for co-operators – and hence it is immune from the problem examined above, because a reciprocity-based view does not require to compensate for disadvantage by giving
The significance of this discussion is twofold: first, Quong has identified a conflict between self-ownership and telic views of equality. But this does not mean that left-libertarians should necessarily abandon the appeal to luck-egalitarianism: the conflict can be solved by assigning lexical priority to self-ownership, or left-libertarians can frame their luck-egalitarian claims in deontic terms. Second, this underscores a more general point: in my view, the best way of solving the family quarrel between different left-wing libertarian approaches is by way of arguments concerning which view better expresses the value of equality in those contexts that are relevant for distributive justice, rather than by way of ruling out certain attempts to reconcile self-ownership with equality on grounds of conceptual incoherence. And I have argued that existing versions of left-libertarianism should be supplemented with a commitment to reciprocity to account for a solidaristic and recognition-oriented dimension of equality.
Libertarian socialism and reciprocity
So far, I have examined how reciprocity can be part of a framework in which in the state of nature people can unilaterally acquire resources for production. I now want to explore the possibility of embedding reciprocity in a libertarian socialist framework in which external resources are commonly owned. Under this framework, the external resources (e.g. the major means of production) are not controlled by single individuals, but by the collective as a whole. The following arguments supplement those of the previous sections as follows: if Nicholas Vrousalis is correct that self-ownership can be combined with a socialist principle of joint ownership of external resources (Vrousalis, 2011), and reciprocity can be part of such a framework, a fortiori this will provide a further way of realising reciprocal libertarianism. According to Vrousalis, self-ownership is compatible with “some principle of joint – or communal or collective – ownership of the means of production. Call any commitment to joint ownership the
To show that self-ownership can be coherently combined with the socialist principle, Vrousalis imagines that two individuals (‘Able’ and ‘Infirm’) live on an island where the total amount of resources is constituted by three coconut trees: Able can use the resources of the island productively, while Infirm can access only the coconuts that fall on the ground. Assuming that to guarantee that Able and Infirm have enough resources to survive and meaningfully exercise their self-ownership (effective self-ownership) is sufficient that they each privately own one coconut tree, the libertarian socialist would argue that the remaining resources (‘the
Now, consider how reciprocity can be embedded in a libertarian socialist framework. One question concerns ‘who’ should be entitled to collectively own the resource surplus. For Vrousalis ‘
Before that, we should consider the simplest scenario: a situation in which the island is inhabited by a number of able-bodied individuals (Able1, Able2, etc.) who jointly own the resource surplus. The co-owners set as condition for authorising each other's use and appropriation of external resources that, if they co-produce – if they work together on the resources of the island – they will divide what they produce equally between them.
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In other words, they agree on sharing the benefits of cooperation according to a principle of reciprocity. Notice that, as collective owners, they can agree on
Let us now consider how a version of libertarian socialism committed to reciprocity can address the issue raised above concerning ‘who’ should be considered a common owner: only the co-operators, or also Infirm? A powerful objection against reciprocity-based egalitarianism is that, on such a view, the disabled would not be entitled to a share of the social product at the bar of egalitarian justice, on grounds of being unfit for making a productive contribution (e.g. Barry, 1995: 42; Cohen, 1995: 224–225). Reciprocity-based egalitarians have attempted to address this objection in many ways (e.g. Becker, 2005; Quong, 2007: 91–97). Here, I want to show that the socialist appeal to collective ownership offers a promising way of addressing the objection while rendering it possible to maintain a commitment to reciprocity.
Paul Warren claims that ‘in a left-wing libertarian society where there is common ownership of productive assets, Infirm, one of the common owners, would be entitled to material support in virtue of that common ownership’ (Warren, 1994: 44). If Infirm is a common owner, she will be entitled to contribute to the decisions concerning how to distribute the social product. Although this goes towards guaranteeing that the interests of Infirm are adequately protected, how can it not at the same time undermine the appeal to reciprocity? To address this question, we should look at theories of reciprocity. According to Stuart White, in reasonably just societies ‘each citizen has an obligation to make a decent productive contribution, proportional to ability, to the community in return for claiming the high minimum share of the social product’ (White, 2003: 91). Hence, on White's account the ‘contributive obligation’ is ‘proportional to ability’, and discharging the contributive obligation will be more onerous for the more talented (White, 2003: 91, 114). At the same time, the ‘[i]ndividuals who suffer significant productive handicaps should be altogether exempted from the work expectation’ (White, 2003: 115). What matters is that, by making the contributive obligation conditional upon people’s potential for productive contribution, White offers a reason compatible with reciprocity to consider those who are unable to make a productive contribution as entitled to the social product, while at the same time justifying the exclusion of Surfers (at least on purely reciprocity grounds) from such benefits. If this is correct, a libertarian socialist account that appeals to reciprocity can coherently claim that Infirm (but not Surfer) should be considered a joint owner.
The distinctiveness of reciprocal libertarianism
We have seen that reciprocity can be coherently reconciled with self-ownership, assuming different schemes of ownership rights over external resources. I now want to illustrate some policy implications. As Quong notices, appealing to self-ownership implies that people cannot be forced to cooperate with others: in a society committed to self-ownership people have the right to decide whether to offer their labour services (Quong, 2011: 82). From the perspective of a commitment to self-ownership, it may also be intuitive to claim that people have the right to make a contribution using their bodies in any way they see fit (Quong, 2011: 87). Indeed, when cooperation involves only the use of bodily resources (e.g. when
Let me conclude with some reflections on labour regulations. Libertarianism is typically understood as a procedural view that reduces claims of justice to claims about pre-institutional rights and individual voluntary choices (e.g. Olsaretti, 2004: 89–91). However, reciprocal libertarianism subverts this traditional understanding, since it endorses aspects of (Rawlsian) institutionalism (Rawls, 2001). Indeed, reciprocal libertarianism recognises that society's institutions are the proper object of distributive justice, and that therefore they can be reformed to achieve egalitarian aims. Most obviously, if reciprocity prescribes an egalitarian distribution of the social product, the income distribution should conform to such a prescription, and the income gap between executives and employees will not be excessively large. Second, the rights that people have as co-operators should be described as social rights, rather than as (pre-institutional) natural rights. Third, there can be different ways of spelling out which (social) rights people should have as co-operators: at a policy level there can be different reasonable ways of realising reciprocity in a society committed to self-ownership. For example, given the importance of participating in the economy, a society committed to self-ownership and reciprocity can and should intervene to make it possible for the largest number to make a productive contribution (i.e. to achieve nearly full employment) – for example, through retraining programmes and welfare benefits for the unemployed (see Daskal 2010: 39–43). And which kinds of limits there will be to what the state can legitimately do to realise reciprocity will be set by considerations concerning self-ownership
Conclusion
I have argued that reciprocal libertarianism is a promising way of interpreting the left-wing libertarian ideal. We have seen that reciprocity can be embedded both in a left-libertarian framework in which external resources are individually owned (reciprocal left-libertarianism) and in a libertarian socialist framework of common ownership of external resources. Indeed, questions concerning which economic system is better suited to reconcile self-ownership with egalitarian justice remain largely unaddressed in the left-wing libertarian literature. Moreover, I have argued that the discussion concerning different forms of left-wing libertarianism should be led on normative (rather than purely conceptual) terms. In my view, left-libertarians and libertarian socialists have reason to make their views sensitive to reciprocity to express a solidaristic and recognition-oriented dimension of equality that is particularly fitting in the context of distributing the benefits of cooperation.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2021 PSAI Annual Conference (Political Studies Association of Ireland), at a Work-in-Progress Seminar of the Centre for Justice and Values (Trinity College Dublin), at the Northern Lights Workshop (jointly organised by the Hoover Chair (Université Catholique de Louvain) with Aarhus University, Aalborg University and Oslo University) and at the Midi Intime de la Chaire Hoover (E-Mich) (Université Catholique de Louvain). Some ideas of the paper were also presented in an early stage form at a seminar at the University of Graz. I wish to thank those who attended on those occasions for their very useful feedback. And I am especially indebted to Showkat Ali, Axel Gosseries, Philippe Van Parijs, Adina Preda, Jesse Spafford, Hillel Steiner and Peter Stone for their written comments and/or very helpful feedback. I also wish to thank two anonymous referees for their very constructive and insightful comments. The revisions on this paper were completed during a stay at the Hoover Chair (Université Catholique de Louvain) as Honorary Hoover Fellow.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research is funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant No. 819043, PI of the project: Prof. Adina Preda).
