As is well known, many social sciences have recently attempted a sort of ‘institutional turn’ by recognizing the centrality of the institutional framework, when dealing with social and economic phenomena. Interest in such an approach has also begun to emerge in planning theory. But the passage from understanding the decisive role of institutional frameworks to suggesting how to design and modify those frameworks, is sometimes, in planning literature, overly simplistic and still somewhat ‘engineeristic’. I believe that this institutional turn could be of considerable importance for planning theory and practice, although it is perhaps better not to adopt a strictly ‘instrumentalist’ view of institutions and to recognize the marked specificity of them that calls for a more prudent and ‘evolutionary’ approach.
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