When progressive governments attempt to redistribute wealth, nationalize major industries, or empower unions, they are often faced with the threat of capital flight. Some republican theorists have suggested that this phenomenon might be a source of domination. However, the prominent neo-republican account of domination presented by Philip Pettit cannot justify this claim, since the class of investors is not usually an agent. In this article, I present a novel theory of domination by diffuse collectives that can justify the intuition that the threat of capital flight is a source of domination.
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