Untangling the relationship of law and liberty is among the core problems of political theory. One prominent position is that there is no freedom without law. This article challenges the argument that, because law is constitutive of freedom, there is no freedom without law. I suggest that, once properly understood, the argument that law is constitutive of freedom does not uniquely apply to law. It also applies to social norms. What law does for freedom, social norms can do too. Thus, I claim the question facing us is not the easy one of either law or social norms. Respecting this draws attention to the unique risks to our freedom introduced by both sets of norms.
AndersonE (2015) Equality and freedom in the workplace: recovering republican insights. Social Philosophy and Policy31(2): 48–69.
3.
AxelrodR (1986) An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review80(4): 1095–1111.
4.
BenthamJ (1838–1843) The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring. 11 Vols. Vol. 2. Edinburgh: William Tait. Available at: http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1921 (accessed 14 February 2017).
5.
BerlinI (1969) Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6.
BicchieriC (2006) The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7.
BlackstoneW (1893) Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Notes selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and others, Barron Field’s Analysis, and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood. In Two Volumes. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co. Available at: http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2140 (accessed 5 May 2016).
8.
BrennanGErikssonLGoodinRE. (2013) Explaining Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9.
BrooksRRoseC (2013) Saving the Neighborhood: Racially Restrictive Covenants and Social Norms. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
10.
CarterI (1999) A Measure of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press
11.
CohenGA (2011) On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12.
EllicksonR (1991) Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
13.
GausG (2016) The Tyranny of the Ideal. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
14.
GilbertM (1999) Social rules: some problems for hart’s account and an alternative proposal. Law and Philosophy18(2): 141–171.
15.
HartHLA (2012) The Concept of Law, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16.
HayekFA (2011) The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
17.
HaywardC (2011) What can political freedom mean in a multicultural democracy?Political Theory39(4): 468–497.
18.
KeohaneRGrantR (2005) Accountability and abuses of power in world politics. American Political Science Review99(1): 29–43.
19.
KolodnyN (2016) Political Rule and its Discontents. In: SobelDVallentynePWallS (eds) Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 35–70.
20.
KramerM (2003) The Quality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
21.
LeesonP (2009) The laws of lawlessness. Journal of Legal Studies38(2): 471–503.
22.
LevyJT (2015) Rationalism, Pluralism, & Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23.
ListCValentiniL (2016) Freedom as independence. Ethics126(4): 1043–1074.
24.
LockeJ (1980 [1690]) Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
25.
LovettF (2012) Harrington’s empire of law. Political Studies60(1): 59–75.
26.
LovettFPettitP (2009) Neorepublicanism: a normative and institutional research program. Annual Review of Political Science12: 11–29.
27.
MavrodesG (1975) Conventions and the morality of war. Philosophy and Public Affairs4(2): 117–131.
28.
McCammonC (2015) Domination: a rethinking. Ethics125(4): 1028–1052.
29.
MorrowP (2016) Identity-directed norm transformations and moral progress. Unpublished Manuscript.
30.
OstromE (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions of Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31.
PettitP (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32.
PettitP (2009) Law and Liberty. In: BessonSMartiJL (eds) Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39–59.
33.
PettitP (2011) The instability of freedom as non-interference: the case of Isaiah Berlin. Ethics121(4): 693–716.
34.
PettitP (2012) On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35.
PettitP (2014) Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
36.
RazJ (1990) Practical Reason and Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
37.
RipsteinA (2009) Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
38.
RogersM (forthcoming) Race, Domination, and Republicanism. In: AllenDSomanathanR (eds) Difference without Domination: On Justice and Democracy in Conditions of Diversity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
39.
SchmidtzD (2011) Property. In: KloskoG (ed) The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 599–610.
40.
SchmidtzD (2015) Corruption: What Really should not be for Sale. In: RanganS (ed) Performance and Progress: Essays on Capitalism, Business, and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 49–64.
41.
SenA (1992) Inequality Reexamined. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
42.
SharonA (2016) Domination and the Rule of Law. In: SobelDVallentynePWallS (eds) Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 128–155.
43.
Van ParijsP (1995) Real Freedom for All. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
44.
WatkinsD (2016) Slavery and freedom in theory and practice. Political Theory44(6): 846–870.
45.
YoungIM (2011 [1990]) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
