Politicization of the Jewish and Muslim minorities in Poland

Abstract

With Poland’s political transformation after 1989, religious minorities including Jews and Muslims gained more autonomy and support from the state authorities. At the same time, the liberal democracy principles of religious equality and the state’s neutrality have still not been fully implemented. The paper focuses on this problematic situation, using the concept of politicization to portray the situation of the Jews and Muslims in contemporary Poland, and their relations with the Polish state. It presents four instances of politicization of religious minorities (specifically, Muslims and/or Jews). The research is based on public surveys, interviews with members of the Jewish and Muslim communities, legal documents, and NGO reports. According to the hypothesis of the paper, Muslims and Jews are significantly politicized in the Polish public discourse, and both communities play significant roles in shaping the political identity of the Polish polity. Their roles differ in character due to historical factors and the contemporary international context.

Introduction

Although Poland is home to 13 officially recognised national and ethnic minority groups ¹ as well as 170 registered churches and religious associations (Ministry of the Interior and Administration 2024), Polish society is continuously perceived as homogeneous in terms of both nationality and religious denomination. According to the 2011 public census, members of national and ethnic minorities constituted only 0.75% of the total population (38,036,118), while in the 2021 public census, nearly 1,5 million Polish citizens, or 3.69% of the total population, declared national or ethnic identity other than Polish. In other words, 96,31% of the census participants identified themselves only as Poles (GUS, 2023; Malicka, 2017). 72,57% of those describing themselves as Polish declared some religious affiliation. Within that group, 89,77% belong to the Roman Catholic Church. Catholics and other Christian denominations counted together amount to over 90% of the religious population (ca. 8.64% identified themselves as not belonging to any religion). The share of followers of non-Christian religions was below 1%.

Despite the very limited size and, therefore, scope of their operations, minorities in Poland attract a lot of attention which is reflected in both the public discourse and scholarly debates. There are several reasons to study the issue of minorities in Poland in general, and Jews and Muslims in particular. First of all, Poland represents an interesting case of a country that went through a turbulent, rapid, and drastic transformation of its social-ethnonational structures – from a diverse to a remarkably homogenous society (and polity). In pre-war Poland, minorities constituted as much as 30% of the total population (Rykała, 2014: 78). During and right after World War II, this proportion shrank drastically due to border changes, expulsions, the Holocaust, and the general human toll of the hostilities. These days, it seems that the relative homogeneity of the Polish society which was evident throughout the second half of the 20th century is slowly, but steadily eroding. It is therefore interesting to enquire how this socio-demographic change is impacting public discourse and policies.

A long history of a robust Jewish presence on the Polish lands and, later, the public debate on antisemitism and tragic chapters of this history positioned Jews in the centre of the public discourse, even though the actual community in contemporary Poland is tiny (Interview #2). In turn, the significance of the Muslim minority stems partly from a limited but steady increase in its size, but even more so from its central position in the public discourses of many Western European countries which influence Polish public opinion.

In the course of the post-communist systemic transition and democratisation, the values of political liberalism, religious and ethnic pluralism, and civic freedoms – including the freedom of religion – became guiding principles of public policies. This was also reflected in the changing character of the state’s approach to ethnic and religious minorities (Krajewski, 2023). Thus, the transition from a homogenous to a more pluralistic, diverse society was seen as a move that might reverse the detrimental impact of the communist era. At the same time, it was interpreted as the implementation of the Western model of social order based on respect for human rights. After Poland’s political transition from a socialist regime to a democracy in the early 1990s, the European Union and its norms became a point of reference that structured the country’s political system (Kamusella, 2003). The principles of tolerance, inclusion, and valuing diversity influenced public policies toward minorities. Simultaneously, a more xenophobic narrative that regarded these principles as foreign and dangerous to Poland also emerged. Paradoxically, these days the more exclusionary – especially Islamophobic – tendencies are partially adopted from the public debates in other EU countries. The above-mentioned trends make these minorities particularly vulnerable to politicization, and therefore an interesting case to study.

This article has two complementary objectives. Firstly, we aim to provide an updated overview of the situation of the Jews and Muslims in Poland through the prism of the politicization of minorities. The second goal is to trace the general trends shaping the relationship between the state and minority communities, as well as to identify the character and causes of the differences between Jews’ and Muslims’ legal status and their relations with the public authorities. By doing this, we refer to one of the main points of interest of the Special Issue which is addressing the importance of vertical relations (specifically top-down) between the official state authorities on one side and Jews and Muslims on the other. Our paper focuses mostly on major Polish cities which are the centres of community life and institutional development for minorities (GUS, 2023). Jews and Muslims in Polish metropolises are engaged in socio-political relations with local authorities and the majority population, which in turn have an impact on the overall relationship between minorities and central state authorities.

Conceptually, the paper uses the category of ‘politicization’ which we see as processual and dynamic. In order to organize the analysis, we first propose to identify two major, opposite formats of the relationship between state authorities and a minority group. Minorities can either be agents of public policies or become objects of politics (through the process of politicization). A situation when minorities have agency in the discourses and practices employed by the authorities requires their far-reaching legal and political recognition which results in the acknowledgment of their autonomy, and respect for their specific rights and needs. Moreover, it calls for minorities to be perceived as immanent parts of the country’s social and political tapestry, as reflected in the ongoing process of collective identity formation. In contrast, politicization is a situation whereby minorities become objects of politics. Their rights and needs are considered irrelevant, marginal, illegitimate or subordinate to the will of politicians, and minorities as such are deprived of autonomy.

To assess the scope of such politicization, we employ an approach proposed by Carolina Ivanescu (2010: 312) who analysed the trends and directions of state policy towards minorities. According to her study, the two main driving forces in this regard are: “the historically determined view on citizenship, seen both as a form of membership in the nation-state and an inclusion/exclusion mechanism” and “second, the particular secularisation arrangements, a certain established modus vivendi between religion and the secular institutions of the state”.

Our study has been informed by an analysis of existing literature and an overview of the primary sources including legal and institutional documents. We have also utilized reports and analyses produced by non-governmental organizations. Moreover, the research is also based on insights from eight unstructured, anonymous in-depth interviews with members of the Jewish and Muslim communities, as well as experts from Polish metropolises who in their professional activities combine academic research with social work with the minority communities. The interviews were carried out in the summer of 2021 as a part of a larger project investigating the Jewish and Muslim encounters in Poland, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates (Menachem Zoufalá et al., 2022).

Bearing in mind the above considerations, the article proceeds as follows. In the first part, we map the existing literature to locate research gaps and formulate a hypothesis. The second part provides background information about the history as well as contemporary character and functioning of the Muslim and Jewish communities in Poland. It is followed by two main parts where we elaborate on the state’s official policy towards Jewish and Muslim minorities and analyse instances of their politicization.

State of the art and research gaps

The last five decades have seen a political struggle for the inclusion of different minorities in the Western world. It was mirrored in the rich academic debates on effective and appropriate public policies that make it possible (Fording and Poe, 2014). In Poland, however, the scholarly discourse on minority populations was less prolific and gained momentum later – with the start of the democratization process and preparations for EU accession. A particularly high number of minorities-oriented works have been published over the last decade.

The main themes of the academic debate on Muslims in Poland are aptly detailed by Balwierz and Pycińska in this volume (p. 213-217). Here we relate to those touching upon issues connected with politicization and public policies. These works focus largely on the Muslim minority – a choice most probably triggered by the pan-European debate on immigration. There are studies on securitization, but they are predominantly concerned with refugees. K. Sobczak-Szelc et al. argued that the trend of politicians and media presenting immigrants, especially Muslims, as a threat gained momentum during the parliamentary campaign in 2015 and again in 2021. Concerns about immigration were clearly intertwined with Islamophobia. Often the image of a refugee constructed in the right-wing discourse was, in fact, an image of a Muslim (Sobczak-Szelc et al., 2022: 45-67). One of the most important themes in the securitization narrative was the issue of terrorism. This confirms the results of research by Górak-Sosnowska and colleagues (2024: 17-18) who contend that the discourse on Islam in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries is transplanted from Western societies with substantial Muslim communities originating from non-European countries. In other words, it is not related to the local reality and local Muslim groups, but to experiences and events from outside the CEE as conveyed through media (“Eurabia” and “stop Islamisation” slogans). Useful data about the political dimension of Muslims’ functioning in Poland might be found in informative chapters by A. Nalborczyk in successive editions of Yearbooks of Muslims in Europe (Brill). There is also an in-depth legal analysis of the laws related to the functioning of the Muslim religious associations written by Paweł Borecki (2014).

Some works tackle the difference between the functioning and perception of Muslim minorities in Western and Eastern Europe. D. Bell and Z. Strabac (2020) point to lower exclusion levels in Western societies and claim that actual contacts with Muslims reduce exclusion. M. Bobako puts the specificity of Poland and its treatment of Muslim minorities in the context of the core-periphery structure (Bobako 2018). A negative view of Islam is also a part of the liberal feminist narrative (Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr 2017).

An important share of literature on contemporary Polish Jews deals with the phenomenon of the rebirth of Jewish community life in the post-Holocaust and post-communist era. Studies related to that subject analyse the identity-related issues, such as the process of its construction and reconstruction (Gebert 2020; Gudonis 2001) which includes the discovery of one’s Jewish roots (Krajewski 2023; Reszke 2013) – a phenomenon that often leads to de-assimilation, but not necessarily to diminishing one’s ties to the dominant culture (Zubrzycki 2022). Moreover, literature on the Jewish minority focuses to a great extent on the specificity and intensity of antisemitism and stereotypes in Polish society (Babińska et al., 2018; EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2018; Kofta and Sedek 2005; Kucia et al. 2014), legal issues related to the functioning of religious associations (Borecki 2020b, 2022a; Czohara and Zieliński 2012) and restitution of Jewish property (Belniak 2008; Kozłowski 2014; Lehrer and Meng 2015).

All of these publications provide important insights into particular topics. At the same time, their scope is limited, and the literature lacks a deeper account of the relations between the Polish state and the Jewish and Muslim minorities. What is more, most of them employ legal or sociological perspectives. Our paper will contribute to the academic discussion by:

1. providing an overview of the politicization of the Jewish and Muslim minorities by Polish state authorities,

2. analysing the functioning of the Jewish and Muslim communities in Poland through the perspective of their relations with state authorities,

3. juxtaposing the state’s position and stance towards these two minorities.

We hypothesize that both Jewish and Muslim minorities are politicized in the Polish public discourse. Both communities have a significant role in shaping the political identity of the Polish polity. However, the character of their roles differs – a fact which results in different approaches adopted by the Polish authorities toward the two groups.

General overview of the Muslim and Jewish life in Poland

Historical perspective

Muslim presence in the Polish lands can be traced back to the 14^th century, but official cultural and religious associations were only established in the 1920s and 1930s (Dziekan 2011: 27-29). One of them was the Muslim Religious Union (pol. Muzułmański Związek Religijny w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, or MZR). This religious organization has functioned since the interwar period until today. Its relationship with the Polish state is regulated by a law dating back to 1936 that still remains in force (Jastrzębski 2022: 169-172). The Polish Muslim community became more diverse in the second half of the 20^th century as more young people from Muslim-majority countries decided to study in Poland. Immigration of Muslims to Poland increased after Poland joined the European Union (Górak-Sosnowska, 2011: 13-15). It resulted in the creation of two dichotomous groups: the established Tatars, and the “newcomers” (Pędziwiatr 2011: 171-175).

Jewish presence in Poland was first noted back in the 10^th century. The Jewish community has been a part of Polish history for centuries, experiencing remarkable development but also suffering from discrimination and persecution. When it comes to the 20^th century, the significance of Polish-Jewish encounters was reflected in the fact that the Polish Jewish community was the second largest in the world, and in the inter-war period (1918-1939) Jews constituted the country’s largest minority, constituting nearly 10% of total Poland’s population. Tragically, most members of that community did not survive the Holocaust. After World War II the number of Jews in Poland the Jewish population was estimated to exceed 215,000., Yet due to the communist authorities increasingly anti-Semitic policies where the Jewish organizations were subjected to strict control by the state apparatus which, together with propaganda campaigns and antisemitism (Interview #4), became a key reason for successive waves of Jewish emigration from Poland to Israel, the United States, and Western European countries. In the 1950s the number of Jews in Poland reached approximately 70,000 and already at the beginning of the 1960s it dropped to ca. 30,000, yet after 1968 already highly secularised and assimilated Jewish community sized to few thousand (Grabski and Grudka, 2023: 556).

Only Poland’s political transformation which began in 1989 opened the window for a gradual rebirth of Jewish life. As argued by S. Krajewski (2023), it largely came down to the process whereby Poles who, for various reasons, acknowledged their Jewish origins went through de-assimilation, that is, their identity (also religious) shifted from mono-cultural Polish to Polish-Jewish. At the same time, one important feature of Jewish life in Poland was discontinuity which has been visible in various instances and at different levels (Interview #4).

Size and institutional shape of the Jewish community in contemporary Poland

According to the most recent national census, held in 2021, 17,156 surveyed citizens declared themselves as belonging to the Jewish national-ethnic minority. ² Interestingly, the 2011 census indicated only 7353 Polish citizens describing themselves as Jewish. It is important to mention that in 2021 respondents were allowed to declare their primary and secondary national identity. Offering this option was a move of political significance, as it doubled the number of Polish citizens claiming their Jewishness. The decision to acknowledge and accept ethno-religious ambivalence was a move fostering plurality and heterogenization within Polish society. 8064 of those surveyed in 2021 indicated the Jewish identity as a primary choice, and 9092 as a secondary one (meaning that for a majority within that group, Polish was the primary identity) (GUS 2023).

Although the census data provides exact numbers, it does not fully reflect reality. One should remember that not every eligible Polish citizen actually took part in the survey. Moreover, identity is a subjective matter (Mateńko, 2010). Jewish organizations themselves claim that the estimated number of people conscious of their Jewish origin stands at about 20,000. For instance, the Institute of Jewish Policy Research claims that ca. 22,500 Polish citizens have at least one Jewish grandparent and are eligible to emigrate to Israel under the “Law of Return” (IJPR 2023). There are also several hundred Israelis in Poland, and there is an upward trend of temporary or permanent relocation.1

In the first years after the political transition of 1989 the principal organization was still the Jewish Social and Cultural Association (Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne Żydów, TSKŻ) established in 1950s, but new circumstances created ground for rebirth and development for the network of Jewish institutions (Grabski and Grudka 2023: 571). In 1993, the Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Poland (Pol: Związek Gmin Wyznaniowych Żydowskich, or ZGWŻ) was officially established and recognised by state authorities as a continuation of the Religious Union of the Mosaic Faith, established in 1946 (a legal successor of pre-war Jewish communities). The Union consists of 10 independent Jewish communities in: Bielsko-Biała, Gdańsk, Katowice, Gliwice, Krakow, Legnica, Łódź, Poznań, Szczecin, Warsaw, Lublin, and Wrocław. Currently, it has ca. 1700 members (approximately 800 of them are members of the Jewish congregation in Warsaw) (Krajewski 2023). Interestingly, members of the Union do not need to identify themselves with the Jewish religion. The organization also accepts any person of Jewish nationality or descent who is not affiliated with any religion (GUS 2022: 249-250). This naturally reflects the complexity of the Jewish identity with its ethnic, national, cultural, and religious facets, but also a far-reaching flexibility of state authorities.

Even though tiny, the Jewish community in Poland has been going through a process of evolutionary institutional development, accompanied by a rising fragmentation and diversification which is particularly visible in the larger centres of community life (Interview #3). For instance, in today’s Warsaw, both Orthodox and Liberal synagogues operate under the umbrella of the local Jewish Religious Community. Since 2005, Jewish life in Poland has also been increasingly influenced by the growing Chabad Lubavitch community (in Warsaw and Kraków). Moreover, an independent liberal community of Beit Poland has been functioning since 2009 in Warsaw (Interview #2) and Kraków and, since 2014, also in Gdańsk. Important centres of religiously non-affiliated Jewish life are the Jewish Community Centres (JCC) in Warsaw and Kraków.

Size and institutional shape of the Muslim community in contemporary Poland

The exact estimates vary (cf. Balwierz and Pycinska in this volume), but the Muslim community in Poland constitutes less than one percent of the entire population (Menachem Zoufala et al., 2022). According to the public census (2021), the biggest Muslim religious association was the Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland (MZR) – 2209 of the surveyed people claimed they were affiliated with this organization. At the same time, it is quite clear that the number of Polish Muslims is in fact far greater. The results of a recent survey by Statistics Poland (GUS 2022) confirm that it is at least 10 times as high. It is estimated that MZR has only 519 members, but the biggest Muslim group in Poland, with around 15,500 followers, is the Muslim League in the Republic of Poland (Pol: Liga Muzułmańska w RP, or LM). Next to these two Sunni associations, there is the Ahl-ul-Bayt Islamic Assembly which, according to the same survey, has 6000 members. Other Muslim organizations are much smaller, with membership counted in mere dozens. Romański-Cebula (2023: 160) claims that the number of Muslims associated with any formalized religious body is over 40 thousand.

Muslims in Poland are a very diverse group. 5000 Polish Tatars are represented predominantly by the MZR. The “newcomers”, that is, Muslims that have immigrated to Poland in the last decades, are significantly more numerous and represent different ethnicities. Most of them are Arabs of different nationalities, but also Turks, Indians, Pakistanis, Bosnians and Chechens. Most of them are associated with the LM (Górak-Sosnowska et al., 2024; Nalborczyk, 2015: XIII-XIV, Interview #6). Some distinguish a third, smaller group of ethnically Polish converts to Islam. The “established Muslims” often racialize them by including them, along with Arabs, as foreign elements incompatible with the local Islam (Górak-Sosnowska et al., 2024).

Minorities-state relations – between good governance and politicization

The existence and role of minority groups, just as any other issue of public concern which relates to the substance of society’s functioning, are subjects of public policies. Preferably, such a policy should consist of comprehensive goal-oriented actions undertaken by authorities, and aimed at managing contentious issues. Moreover, it should encompass a system of laws, regulatory measures, courses of action, and funding priorities (Howlett and Cashore 2014). The literature on public policy design juxtaposes it with the concept of ‘good governance’, which “implies presence of rule of law, safeguard of human rights, and the existence of honest and efficient government, accountability, transparency, predictability, and openness of the ruling authorities” (Landellmills and Serageldin 1991) and requires “competent management of a country’s resources and affairs in a manner that is (…) responsive to people’s needs”. It entails cooperation with civil society organizations, recognizing their agency and the importance of political, social, and cultural pluralism (Asbjørn 2002), but also the principle of equality.

Legal and institutional framework of the relations between state and minorities

There is no ‘wall of separation’ between the state and religious associations in Poland. Polish Constitution envisages cooperation between these parties and even mentions the state’s obligations towards religious associations. This friendly partnership is not unlike in other European states (Borecki 2022b). At the level of central authorities, the main body responsible for the relations with religious communities is the Department for Religious Denominations and National and Ethnic Minorities. ³ It keeps an official state register that enumerates recognized religious associations (MSWiA, 2024) as well as national and ethnic minorities. The Jewish minority is present in both lists (religious and national). As such it is also represented in the Joint Commission of the Government and National and Ethnic Minorities. The Committee is responsible for protecting, preserving and developing cultural identity of minorities (Hołub 2017). This involvement of the state is quite natural and consistent with the values of liberal democracy (diversity and affirmative action for underprivileged groups).

At the same time, it should be said that religious associations are not treated fully equally in the Polish legal system. Some of them function on the basis of general laws of associations and are listed in the above-mentioned official register of churches and other religious associations. The more privileged ones, like some Jewish and Muslim associations, operate based on individual legislation. However, even within this group, major Christian churches enjoy a more advantageous status than other denominations (Borecki, 2020a). This applies to, for instance, regulations on charitable activities, education, taxation, and religious service in the army. In the case of the Jewish community, Polish law also sets the most restrictive regulations on membership. Members of the recognized Jewish community need to be Polish citizens and residents of Poland (Borecki 2020b).

Legal provisions for the Jewish community in Poland

The evolutionary social-political changes related to Poland’s democratization in the late 1980s and 1990s also concerned the state’s relations with religious minorities. As early as 1989, the Polish Parliament passed new legal provisions including the act on the guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion, still in force today. It enshrines the freedom of religion for citizens, foreigners and stateless persons, in accordance with international laws on human rights. One aspect of particular importance to the followers of Judaism was the inclusion of the right to: participate in the work of international religious organizations; produce, purchase and use items necessary for the purposes of worship and religious practices; produce, acquire and possess articles necessary for the observance of religious rules (Borecki 2010: 89).

Currently, relations between the Polish state and the Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Poland (ZGWŻ) are regulated in a separate law: The Act of 20 February 1997 on the state’s relations with Jewish religious communities in the Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustaw, 1997), which very much resembles laws on several other churches functioning in Poland. However, unlike in the case of acts regarding relations with Christian communities, it is particular Jewish religious communities that are granted a special status, rather than their Union itself. This approach reflected the recognition of the decentralized character of Jewish religious life. The 1997 Act grants Jewish communities’ legal personality – a fact which has definitely strengthened their position vis-a-vis state apparatus, and enabled a more efficient articulation of communal, or collective interest. The special character of the adopted legal provisions has been reinforced by the fact that Jewish religious entities were granted the right to reclaim property which had belonged to pre-Holocaust Jewish communities. The scale of the restitution process become a huge boost to the communities’ financial standing (Grabski and Grudka, 2023: 572).

These legal changes fostered the institutionalisation of relations between the state and the Jewish community, and facilitated further internal institutional development of the religious community itself – a process which led to the adoption of its Internal Regulations on January 15^th 2006 (Zieliński 2011).

Legal provisions for the Muslim community in Poland

The legal status of the Muslim community in Poland is complicated. There are several Muslim religious organizations officially registered as religious groups (Department for Religious Denominations and National and Ethnic Minorities, 2023). Still, only the Muslim Religious Union (MZR) is recognized as an official representative of the Muslim community, as per the legislation from 1936. The interwar-era act is a relict unsuited to contemporary political and legal realities, especially as the Muslim community in Poland is becoming increasingly composed of immigrants rather than established Polish Muslims. This situation engenders intra-Muslim tensions that are exacerbated by the differences between the model of Islam cultivated by the “established” Polish Muslims (Tatars) and those immigrating to Poland in recent decades. Moreover, the legality of MZR’s functioning has raised some doubts. Firstly, the statute adopted by the Union was not officially approved by the Polish government (as the 1936 law stipulates it should) – MZR merely notified the authorities of its adoption. Secondly, and more importantly, the 2004 election of the Union’s leader (Mufti) was also contested. Some of its members appealed to the court claiming that the procedure was flawed. The case reached the Supreme Court which stated that it was outside its scope of jurisdiction to decide on the internal regulations of MZR, an autonomous religious body. Finally, the minister responsible for religious matters did not accept the notification of this election, claiming that the Ministry could not interfere with the Union’s internal matters (Interview #1).

The interwar-era law regulating the functioning of the MZR requires the state to be directly involved in the internal affairs of the organization. For example, it stipulates the procedure for electing its governing bodies. Consequently, in legal terms, MZR is unable to change this procedure (the law can only be changed by the Polish Parliament). The election of aMufti needs to be approved by the Polish President. This situation grants the state an instrument to influence the Tatar Muslim community, but at the same time puts it in an inconvenient position. The resulting scope of infringement on the autonomy of a religious community is incompatible with the principles of a liberal state. Additionally, the almost 100-year-old law includes completely obsolete elements (e.g., it regulates the function of the Polish governor of Vilnius, a city that has been outside Polish territory since World War II) which create legal chaos (Jastrzębski 2022).

Politicization: Minorities as an object of politics

Politicization is not merely an act of naming something as political and making it subject of political actions. When defining the phenomenon of politicization, the literature focuses on its dynamic and processual nature, whereby merit-based criteria are substituted for political ones (Peters 2013). As argued by B. Peters, the process itself “proceeded through several stages, producing the high level of political involvement”. More specifically, politicization is an active use of contingency, of rendering something contested or controversial. This, importantly, is not an extension of the boundaries of politics itself, but rather is constitutive of politics (Palonen et al., 2019). Minorities are objects of politicization primarily when their religiosity, ethnicity or other features of cultural identity become issues of political dispute (Ivanescu, 2010).

Considering this and following P. Statham and H.-J. Trenz (2013: 3), we define politicization as a process that “occurs when issues become subject to debates and controversies among political parties, interest groups, NGOs and social movements in the public sphere.” It is “distinct from conflicts and bargaining that remain behind closed doors” of state institutions (Statham and Trenz 2013: 3). Authorities always adopt a certain approach toward minorities. It becomes politicized only when it is turned into a public issue that political actors use to pursue their interests. In the following subsections, we present four instances of politicization of the Jewish or Muslim minority in Poland.

Politicization through legal differentiation

Most of the Jews and Muslims in Poland do not associate themselves with any official religious association recognized in the state register (Interview #5). The two largest organizations representing them are the ones that have a legally regulated relation with the Polish state. Still, less than 10% of Jews and Muslims are their members (2029 members in the Muslim MZR, and 1706 members in the Jewish ZGWŻ). The status of these two organizations puts them in an advantageous position compared to other, smaller entities. ² The state manifestly diversifies its approach toward different religious groups. The most visible indication of this is the unique role of the Catholic Church entrenched in the Concordat. But relations with Jewish and Muslim communities also go beyond the simple objective of guaranteeing people’s right to religion.

Differentiating the legal status and privileges of different religious organizations constitutes a form of public policy. It provides the state with a tool to support the model of religious expression and engagement it deems preferable. In principle, creating a legal structure that influences people’s religious activities is accepted also in liberal democracies (e.g., banning child marriage, facilitating religious charitable work). At the same time, the form and intensity of the Polish state’s intervention seem far-reaching and problematic.

For example, the law on MZR envisages some privileges for the association. The state supports it financially, grants tax exemptions and the status of public offices to its institutions. The law also stipulates that any land the MZR inherits through a will may be, pending approval from the ministry, granted the status of wakuf (Arabic waqf). In such case, the sale and purchase of this land is prohibited. The only operation on wakuf permitted by law is exchanging it for other property (Kiliszkiewicz 2016). The issue did not generate political debates, but may be treated as part of the Polish state’s public religious policy. The provision brings more stability for MZR and constitutes an act of favouring this particular Muslim organization over all others.

Poland and other countries in the CEE region have worked out a unique model of European Islam, in which autochthonous Muslim communities (like Polish Tatars) “contribute to the local and national cultures of their homelands” (Górak-Sosnowska 2011). Polish government tries to build on this situation by supporting MZR as a representative of “assimilated” Muslims. MZR also engages actively in this relationship, presenting itself as entrusted with safeguarding “Polish Islam” and manifesting its allegiance to the Polish state (public celebrations of the National Independence Day and three the Constitution Day, organizing prayers for the homeland) (Nalborczyk 2015; Interview #8). This general attitude toward Poland does not translate into clear political preferences toward any particular party. As one Muslim community leader emphasised in the interview: “We do not want to be part of politics and political games, we can cooperate with everyone but do not want to be on anybody’s side; our role is in working for the community” (Interview #5).

A comparable situation exists in the case of the Jewish community. The state has special relations with ZGWŻ based on a separate law, mentioned above, that gives this Jewish association an advantage over all others. This is especially visible in the case of the Jewish communal property. Three other Jewish religious associations, that is, Beit Poland – Association of Progressive Jewish Communities (pol. Beit Polska – Związek Postępowych Gmin Żydowskich), Niezależna Gmina Wyznania Mojżeszowego w Gdańsku and Gmina Wyznaniowa Starozakonnych w RP, do not enjoy the same privileges as ZGWŻ. Interestingly, Beit Poland’ see as the main rival of the ZGWŻ, in 2009 formally entered in the register of churches and other religious unions, despite the ZGWŻ’s campaign to prevent the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration from registering Beit Poland. ZGWŻ’s was primarily concerned about who should have the right to represent Polish religious Jews, and whether Beit Poland would lay claim to the newly restored Jewish communal assets (Grabski and Grudka, 2023: 573).

The above-mentioned inner differentiation and fragmentation within the Jewish community was partly related to its development and its members’ growing awareness of their preferences, considering the variety of options that contemporary Judaism and Jewish life may offer. In part, it was also a consequence of internal struggle, competition and conflict within the community (GUS, 2022) which affected the relations between the state and the Jewish minority. State authorities somehow disregarded those developments – a choice which could be seen as an expression of non-interference and maintaining neutrality, but in practical terms, left one institutionalised community in a legally privileged position compared to other, emerging communities (Interview #6). Moving from the legal toward the more socio-political dimension, our interviewees observed that the landscape of state-minority relations additionally changed due to increasing public activity of the Chabad movement which, although not officially registered as a religious community, ⁴ is socially and politically recognised by state authorities. For numerous non-Chabad affiliated Jews, the movement is seen as ‘too tightly connected with the states’ political elites’, which is sometimes seen as inappropriate and contested (Interview #2).

This model resembles the state-religion relations in Germany. At the same time, the inequality of the status of religious associations and the scope of the state’s intervention in religious affairs is greater in Poland. The German regulations concerning religion and religious associations are based on Article 140 of the German Basic Law which incorporates provisions of the earlier law of 1919 (Basic Law, 1949). The state must adhere to the principle of neutrality, but there is no strict separation between it and the religion. The status of religious associations is diverse. Any religious group may apply to register as a public law corporation (KdöR) which grants it significant privileges (levying taxes on its members, teaching religion in public schools). Islamic associations found it more difficult to attain this status as it was tailored for the hierarchically organized bodies similar to established Churches. For a long time, Muslims had no KdöR – status association though in recent years the situation has started to change (Barb, 2019: 1042-1044). The situation of the Jewish community is better and there is a long tradition of Jewish religious associations operating as public law corporations. In 2003 the main Jewish umbrella organization, the Central Council of Jews in Germany, signed an agreement with the German government that secured public funding for its functioning. However, the Jewish associations independent from the Central Council protested that they are not treated equally by the state. The special status of the largest Jewish organization in Germany, but in recent years additional state support has also reached progressive Jews not associated with the Central Council (Mühlstein, 2016).

This hierarchy and differentiation of the state’s policies also resemble the practices in Poland. At the same time, the extent of the state’s involvement and privileged treatment of some religious associations is more far-reaching. The decision of the Polish government to grant special status embedded in the law legislated by the parliament is more discretionary. In the case of Germany, any association can apply for the KdöR status and appeal to the court if it feels the government’s decision infringes on its rights. Moreover, as presented above, these legal provisions in fact influence German policy facilitating greater equality in support for different Jewish and Muslim associations. The difference between Germany and Poland can also be discerned in the special status of the Polish Tatars’ Muslim Religious Union (MZR). Though Polish law stipulates that religious organizations administer their affairs autonomously, the law regulating the functioning of MZR contradicts this provision. It explicitly bestows on state privilege to co-shape internal by-laws of the organization and election of its officials. Even if the government bodies try to avoid executing this law, it stands against the principle of the state’s disengagement from religious affairs.

Attitudes, opinions and narratives as instances of politicization

One can argue that in Polish public narratives there is no space for ‘no opinion’ regarding attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, or broadly defined Jewish- and Muslim-related issues. However, as for the dominant attitudes towards Jews, one can clearly distinguish between ‘sympathy’ and ‘antipathy’ (Winiewski and Bilewicz 2015). In the case of Muslims, the overall perceptions and attitudes are rather negative (CBOS 2019). In both cases, social attitudes are rooted in national political culture and often emotionally driven. Furthermore, public attitudes towards the minorities in question are reflected in political narratives and disputes which are often polarized or, indeed, are a means of polarization.

Between ‘philosemitism’ and ‘antisemitism’ – the paradoxical dichotomy

As was mentioned above, the past three-and-a-half decades in Poland have been marked by a rebirth of Jewish life which has been driven by, on the one hand, the inner dynamics of the Jewish community (Reszke 2013) and, on the other hand, the increasing general social demand for restoring the vanished Jewish life. As argued by S. Krajewski, “the sympathetic interest in the Jewish heritage produced a need for Jews” (2023:18). This specific demand, which started to be visible in the late 1980s was, first and foremost, a bottom-up, socio-cultural process that gained momentum in 1990s and early 2000s. The process, “guided by a curiosity and desire to learn about Judaism, Jewishness, and Jewish history (…),” was “implying various degrees of objectification and instrumentalization of Jews” (Zubrzycki 2022: 10). A wide range of philosemitic practices (e.g., festivals, public commemoration initiatives, cultural and educational projects) was deeply connected with the shaping of the new Polish political identity, where Jews were to play the role of ‘others’ in an inclusive, cosmopolitan and pluralistic society. The existence of Jews and Jewish community life was a form of legitimisation of the socio-political order, both domestically and internationally. In a state-oriented narrative, philosemitism and its products were to counterbalance (or prevail over) antisemitism. Moreover, the visible (almost systemic) turn in the way Polish political class approached Jewish issues was related to the pro-Western policy orientation, which further translated into the foreign and security policy reorientation.

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, measurable negative views and hesitation towards Jews were declining, while antisemitism as a public phenomenon – specifically taking on a political character – was increasing (Winiewski and Bilewicz 2015: 35). The antisemitic attitudes and opinions intertwined with politics were often associated with conspiracy theories (ibid: 32), Jews having ‘too much impact on power’ or ‘Jews seeking to extend their influence on the global economy” (Barna et al., 2022). Paradoxically, however, it can be said that in the relevant mainstream post-transformation political circles, antisemitism was rejected and condemned as ‘politically incorrect’, and ‘unacceptable’. The rejection itself – sometimes proactive, but more often reactive – has become an affirmative political statement or, even more, a permanent position.

An important instance where Polish society was confronted and collectively delt with the significance of the Polish Jewish relations were discussions on history, its legacy, and its role in civic education (Hackmann 2018, Zubrzycki and Woźny, 2022). A flagship example of this was a heated public and political debate, sparked by the publication of the historical essay titled “Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland” by J. T. Gross, began in the early 2000s. The debate initially centered around the elaborated in the Gross’ book history of the 1941 massacre committed on the Jewish inhabitants of the town of Jedwabne by their Polish neighbors, this served as a point of departure for a significant public and political dispute regarding the role, scope, and character of Polish involvement in the persecution of Jews during World War II (Michlic 2012). Back then, the debate already engaged various public actors, and although it could be perceived as a rather decentralized, bottom-up phenomenon, it spilled over into public and political life. As such, it reevaluated contemporary Polish-Jewish discourses and opened new avenues for critical reflection on the boundaries of shared history and its modern implications, primarily in the internal- domestic Polish context. It worth mentioning that the dynamics of this crucial debate, revealed the transformation potential with the Polish society, where the confronting and embracing the difficult past played a key role in absorbing and implementing principles of liberal democracies. On the other hand, it also revealed and spotlighted the phenomenon of sharp contestation (or even denial) of any Polish responsibility for the persecution of Jews, promoting a new Polish politics of memory. This new approach sought to “highlight Polish heroism and sacrifice throughout history” rather than focusing on “negative episodes.” (Subotic 2019).

Consequently, the landscape of Poles’ attitudes and opinions on Jews and Jewishness, as emerging from the above considerations, is marked by a fairly consistent, moderately positive social attitude towards Jews and a general rejection of antisemitism as a tool in politics. On the other hand, it is strongly influenced by a common anti-Jewish prejudice and incidental (but recurring) antisemitic incidents. This inconsistency in public perceptions of Jews in Poland, together with increasing polarisation of views on Jewish-related issues, create an environment conducive to the politicization of Jews and their community.

Political instrumentalization of Islamophobia

Public surveys show that the level of acceptance toward Muslims in Poland is low. Almost half of all respondents have negative views of Muslims (a proportion higher than that for any other religious group). In 2019, 38% of the surveyed people believed that a violent conflict with Islam was unavoidable (CBOS 2019). This negative perception has been strengthened by the public media, especially since their take-over by the conservative government in 2015 (Górska 2022). Sowing fear of Muslim refugees was a staple of right-wing parties’ campaigns, one of the keys to their electoral success, and a clear example of politicization. This approach translated into a growing level of prejudice based on negative stereotypes. Muslims suffered from acts of aggression, hate speech, and various kinds of discrimination (Bertram et al., 2017; Interview #3, Interview #7). Interestingly, the campaign targeting the much-feared Muslim refugees was put in place even though the scale of their actual presence was insubstantial. The number of Muslim refugees entering Poland at that time was low, and the ones who crossed the border were soon leaving for Western European countries (Buchowski 2020; Górska 2022).

This way, the politicization described above gained another layer. The right-wing government (and, to a lesser extent, other nationalist politicians) formulated yet another, more hostile, approach that additionally complicated the differentiating policy toward Muslims. Paradoxically, this new stance targeted a group that was essentially non-existent in the Polish context. It was to a great extent an imagined ‘Other’, whose image was built upon media coverage from other countries. Nonetheless, the impact of the negative campaign against ‘illegal Muslim immigrants’ was much broader and, to a large degree, shaped the public perception of Muslims in general. It is worth mentioning that the above-mentioned “enemization” of the imagined Muslim immigrants did not translate into a significant change in public policies toward other Muslim groups. This compartmentalization of state policies indicates that they are instrumentally used by politicians. In the same period starting with 2015, the number of work permits granted to the citizens of other countries, including those predominantly Muslim (Uzbekistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Bangladesh), rose significantly.

Another display of the compartmentalization of state policies may be observed when comparing approaches to the 2015 and 2022 immigration debates. The wave of Ukrainians coming to Poland after the Russian invasion was met with a positive attitude by the central and local authorities and the Polish society alike. The government employed a narrative of solidarity which was followed by keeping borders open for the immigrants and providing them with a certain degree of support (financial allowance, free access to medical services) (Pędziwiatr and Magdziarz 2022). The contrast in the state’s reaction to the 2015 and 2022 immigration indicates that the religious profile of the newcomers was politicized. Differentiation of the approach to the Muslim ‘others’ and the Ukrainian ‘companions’ can also be discerned in the story the Crimean Tatars in Poland after the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in March 2014. Some of the Crimea Tatars sought refuge in Poland, but initially Polish institutions did not address their demands. It was the Polish Tatars who offered them help and engaged in a public campaign of support (Nalborczyk 2015: 452-453). They criticized public bodies for not granting refugee status to the displaced Crimeans (MZR 2014). The openness that state institutions displayed towards Ukrainians in 2021 was mostly absent in their approach to the Muslim Ukrainian Tatars.

Politicization of minorities and foreign relations

There is a connection between Jewish communities living in different countries and international Jewish diaspora organizations as well as the State of Israel, observable both in public discourses and certain practices. This connection has many layers, takes different forms, and has diverse dynamics. In the case of Poland, a gradual improvement of its contacts with the Jewish Diaspora worldwide (especially in the US) and with Israel was seen as a sign of democratisation and, at the same time, a foreign policy tool (Gebert 2014). It was explicitly mentioned during Poland’s NATO accession negotiations. However, there is a general pattern according to which the commemoration of the historical Jewish community in Poland is a shared concern of contemporary Polish Jews and international Jewish circles. This has been recently reflected in the context of an Amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance adopted by the Polish Parliament in January 2018, which made it a crime to publicly claim that Poland as a state, or Poles as a nation carry responsibility for or are guilty of complicity in the Holocaust (Dziennik Ustaw, 2018, article 55a). This caused strongly critical international reactions which, inter alia, led to a diplomatic crisis between Poland and Israel, strongly resonating in the disputes involving also the Polish Jewish community.

An even more evident causal spill-over mechanism is evident with regard to the issue of Jewish public and private property restitution, which has tied diaspora organizations, the Jewish community in Poland, as well as governments in Warsaw and Jerusalem in a thorny dispute. Restitution of public Jewish property was regulated by the 1997 Act (Dziennik Ustaw, 1997) and had been conducted for over 20 years by the Regulatory Commission for Jewish Religious Communities, as the tiny contemporary Polish Jewish community was recognised as the moral and legal heir of the pre-war congregation. This sparked criticism among the Diaspora Jewry and in Israel, with reservations further fuelled by the Supreme Court’s decision in 2007 to narrow down the catalogue of eligible legal entities to former Jewish religious communities. The ruling excluded new associations and foundations established by the religious Jewish community, dedicated to the preservation of Jewish heritage in Poland, from the restitution process (Borecki 2020b).

However, the issue of private Jewish property restitution had an even greater potential for politicization. The past 30 years have seen several stages of discussion on the need to return private property or compensate its former owners (including Jews) for confiscation and nationalisation of their wealth. Nevertheless, despite several attempts, this important but complicated issue has not found a comprehensive and satisfactory legal solution. The latest phase of the dispute, which resulted in an escalation of the Polish-Israeli diplomatic crisis, was brought on by the amendment to the Code of Administrative Proceedings (CAP, Pol. KPA) adopted by the Polish Parliament on June 24^th, 2021, and signed by President A. Duda on August 14^th. The amendment introduced a statute of limitations (30 years) for declaring an administrative decision on property nationalisation invalid if it had been originally issued with a gross violation of law. In practical terms, the amendment eliminated the possibility of any further restitution claims. It is worth noting that the act was passed in the Parliament with cross-party support and was a legislative response to the public demand to address the so-called ‘wild’ reprivatisation. For over three decades, the sphere of private property claims in Poland remained unresolved. Surprisingly, reprivatisation was not only possible, but often took on pathological forms. The phenomenon of fraudulent cases of reprivatisation that abused the system was facilitated by two unique civil law constructs: the possibility of trading legal claims, and the institution of a legal representative for a person whose place of residence is unknown (McNaughton 2018: 452).

Meanwhile, Jewish organizations such as the World Jewish Restitution Organization criticised and condemned the legislation, and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement branding the new Polish law as “antisemitic and unethical” and decided to lower the level of diplomatic relations with Poland (MFA IL 2021). The entire issue strongly resonated in Polish public discourse, in which the Polish Jewish community took a moderate but noticeable part. It expressed its reservations about the regulation, but also distanced itself from Israel’s sharp reaction and strongly condemned the radical Polish right-wing circles that provocatively protested against Jewish restitution claims (Rzeczpospolita 2021). Importantly, the far-right protesters in their public narratives often employed antisemitic clichés, which might have reignited antisemitic sentiments. However, this did not occur on a larger scale, partly because of nuanced – moderate and balanced stance of both domestic Jewish organizations and de-escalating tone of the mainstream public-political figures.

The politicization of the Muslim minority in Polish foreign policy was less noticeable. Emphasizing the freedom of religion of Polish Muslims was one of the elements of the transition into a liberal democracy. At the same time, diasporic connections of Polish Muslims and their relation to the Muslim-majority countries of their origin weren’t politicized in a significant way. Interestingly, the political use of Islamophobia by the Polish government did not have a notable impact on the relations of Poland with Muslim-majority states. The portrayal of immigrants from the MENA region as potential terrorists didn’t translate into any diplomatic tensions on the inter-state level (Sasnal, Wojnarowicz, 2017: 208, 221-222). It seems foreign governments recognized that Islamophobic rhetoric is used only for internal politics and doesn’t influence Polish foreign policy. Polish governments made attempts to use Muslim Tatars to improve the country’s international image. The Tatar community was presented as “fully integrated” and a successful model of European Islam that may be followed by others.

Another instance of politicization on the international level of both Jewish and Muslim minorities relates to the Polish stance on the Middle Eastern conflict. This issue has been tragically brought forth again by the Hamas attack on Israel and the War in Gaza that followed. In general, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is presented in the Polish public discourse with an inclination toward a pro-Israeli perspective. One of its elements is the framing of Israel as one of the partners within the broader ‘Western’ or ‘pro-American’ world, the allegiance to which is part of Poland’s international identity. The other aspect is binding the attitude towards Israel with general Polish-Jewish relations, and embedding it in the historical context. Part of the process of overcoming the antisemitic burden of Polish history entailed improving relations with the Jewish state. This was not mirrored in the relations between Polish state and Muslim community.

Polish authorities’ condemnation of the October 7^th, 2023 attack was swift, clear, and strong. After 3 months of the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, Polish Foreign Minister still expressed “his unwavering solidarity with Israel”, but also “stressed the obligation to keep the military response moderate” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2024). The reaction of the Polish society to the conflict was lukewarm. There were pro-Palestinian protests held in major Polish cities (especially in Warsaw, in front of the Israeli embassy), but they were rather small (up to hundreds of people) and did not attract much attention from the general society. Polish authorities mostly ignored them, with one exception. At one of the early pro-Palestinian demonstrations, one of the participants held an antisemitic banner. This was met with strong condemnation by Polish president Andrzej Duda, who claimed that such incidents would not be tolerated in Poland “due to the memory of those murdered during the Holocaust” (Prezydent, 2023). The overall pro-Israeli stance and the tendency to overlook the Palestinian issue may suggest that historical memory, as well as relations between Poland and the Jewish community influence Polish foreign policy.

Discussion and conclusion

Poland is a country with rich traditions of religious, national, and ethnic diversity that were abruptly severed by World War II, its aftermath, and decades of communist rule. A part of the political transformation that Poland experienced after 1989 was related to the issue of minorities and their relations with the state, a well as the society at large. Polish authorities took positive steps to address the needs of minority communities to a greater extent, and grant them broader political agency. Far from being exhaustive or sufficient, these steps nevertheless alleviated their situation, also in the case of Muslims and Jews. An important trigger for these changes was the dynamics of Poland’s relations with the West. Warsaw made efforts to build a new, Western international identity, with the creation of institutional and legal guarantees for minorities as one of its key elements. The process of integration with NATO and the EU, as well as close relations with the USA reinforced this identity transformation.

At the same time, one must be aware of the deficiencies and flaws of this process. Our analysis suggests that the state policy towards minorities in Poland was lacking in organization, incoherent, and guided by the principle of equality only to a limited extent. There is no single model of the state’s approach to different minorities. The legal provisions for the functioning of different religious associations diverge, and some of the state authorities’ decisions regarding relations with them are made on an ad hoc basis. This leaves a greater space for the state to differentiate its policies toward specific minorities based on subjective premises rather than guidelines of public policy toward religious communities in general. Consequently, the state shapes its relations with specific minorities in line with the current political demands – a fact which often leads to the politicization of minorities. In some instances, it translates into granting certain privileges to some religious groups, while others are put in an inferior position. It may further the particular interests of a political party or a group that utilizes this differentiation, but it does not serve the principles of good governance: equality, transparency, accountability, rule of law.

The politicization of religious minorities is manifested also in the case of the Jewish and Muslim communities. The relationship between the state institutions and each of these two groups differs. Likewise, the state’s approach to particular religious associations belonging to the same minority is formulated on a case-by-case basis. Their different legal status, format, and shape of institutional representation influence their position and efficiency within the state’s institutional and social structures. The dual status of the Jewish community adds further to this complexity. Jews as a community are legally recognized in Poland as a national minority, while their institutions have a primarily religious character.

The intensity and character of the Jewish and Muslim communities’ presence in the public political discourse in Poland signifies that they both constitute “significant others” for the contemporary Poles. The size of the Jewish community in Poland is very small. The number of Muslims living in Poland is considerably greater, but nonetheless constitutes less than 1% of the population. The sheer demographical significance of the two minorities to Polish society and polity does not explain their role in the political debate, or the legal provisions regulating their status. Two specific contexts that appear in political discussions about Jews and Muslims in contemporary Poland are: historical heritage and the international context. This suggests that both religious minorities, and even more so their image in the public discourse, influence both the construct of Polish national identity, and the identity of the Polish state in the international sphere.

The historical context of Poland’s religious diversity gives ground to the special status of some of the Muslim and Jewish associations. Both MZR and ZGWŻ are seen as continuators of the well-established historical communities of Polish Jews and Muslims. They are co-opted into the national community and seen as part of the Polish identity. This provides them with a special status which at the same time does not come with a significant political cost for the dominant political establishment (i.e. predominantly non-Jewish and non-Muslim). This approach reinforces the image of Poland as a heir to the multicultural past, a country continuing policies in support of cultural diversity. Maintaining this image enables the state to sustain its policies toward minorities in general, and not to tackle the current challenges related to the diversity of Polish society. Policy on minorities in Poland is incoherent and outdated. The special relation of the state with some of the religious communities that were present in the Polish past helps perpetuate this problematic condition. ⁵

The international context of Jews and Muslim’s politicization in Poland is probably even more impactful. Over the decades, the state policy towards the two minorities was to a great extent subordinated to key priorities of the Polish foreign policy. The most important of them was the construction of Poland’s international role and identity as part of the Western world. This was especially prominent in three instances. The first of them occurred during the post-1989 transformation, when Poland adopted new legal guarantees for the functioning of minorities. The second instance refers to the international context of the relations between Poland and the Jewish minority which Polish authorities perceived through the prism of pro-American stances in foreign policy. Cordial relations with the Jewish community were seen as a precondition for effective cooperation with the USA and Israel. Specifically, the security-related objectives of Polish foreign policy were a key factor in this regard. The third manifestation of the international context which played an important role in the process of politicizing minorities pertains to the exploitation of Islamophobia. The perceptions and official narratives on Muslims, at least since 2015, have been strongly intertwined with the highly politicized dispute on migration in other European countries. ⁶