Colonial sovereignty and religious necropolitics: The sacred victimization of infidel Kurds in the Middle East

Abstract

This article critically explores the intersection of colonial narratives and religious necropolitics in the systematic oppression of the Kurdish nation across the Middle East. From the latter half of the 20th century, governments representing Iranian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms, alongside non-state actors like ISIS and the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army, have employed demagogic religious policies to legitimize the persecution and mass killings of the Kurds. These regimes and groups brand the Kurds as infidels, subjecting them to a continuous state of war and dehumanization, while positioning themselves as defenders of Islam to quash Kurdish demands for national rights and autonomy. The article explores how these religious necropolitics policies have fuelled genocidal massacres, such as Khomeini’s fatwas in Iran, Erdoğan’s rhetoric in Turkey, the Anfal genocide in Iraq, Yazidi genocide by ISIS, and the dehumanization of Yarsans by Islamic Shia authorities in Iran. The systematic de-Kurdification of regions like Afrin in Syria further exemplifies the lethal consequences of conflating religious ideology with noo-state sovereignty. Through this analysis, the article underscores the profound impact of religious necropolitics on the Kurdish struggle, revealing how these policies have not only dehumanized the Kurds but also framed their aspirations for freedom as existential threats. The article concludes by highlighting how the interplay of colonial sovereignty and religious necropolitics has perpetuated the sacred victimization of Kurds in the Middle East, framing them as infidels to justify their ongoing oppression and marginalization. Through this lens, the study reveals the deep-seated mechanisms of control and violence that have been used to maintain power over the Kurdish nation, emphasizing the critical need to understand these dynamics within the broader context of Middle Eastern geopolitics.

Keywords

Colonial sovereignty religious necropolitics infidel Kurds genocidal massacres Anfal Yazidi genocide dehumanization of Yarsans

Introduction: colonial narratives and necropolitics

In the early 1990s, during our student years, it was common in Iran to see the walls of schools, universities, and offices adorned with slogans supporting the Islamic Republic of Iran. This strategic utilization of walls as visual mediums for the propagation of revolutionary and anti-imperialist maxims, intertwined with demonstrations of solidarity with Islamic tenets, resonated overtly. Within the corpus of these revolutionary slogans, certain expressions were intentionally tailored to censure and assail the endeavours of Kurdish factions dedicated to the emancipation of the Kurdish populace. Emanating from this milieu of slogans, one particular utterance has etched itself indelibly in our consciousness: a pronouncement attributed to Khomeini, the progenitor of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “We are fighting against heresy, not Kurds.” The terminological constructs heresy and Kurd invariably garnered augmented dimensions and chromatic embellishments. New paragraph: use this style when you need to begin a new paragraph.

Certain venerable individuals likely traversed past these walls with an air of detachment and perhaps a modicum of trepidation. For numerous others, these slogans served as poignant reminders of the ruthless quelling of governmental forces and the resultant loss of life for countless Kurds. Yet, our curious juvenile intellects engaged them with a query: “So, like, if we’re Kurds, then who are these infidels, you know? Why do the ‘Ajam¹ people come to Kurdistan to hurt them, while the ‘Ajams are hurting us? It’s so confusing!” In tandem with a shrug of the shoulders and a contemplative gaze into the distance, the customary rejoinder invariably vacillated between a promise that comprehension would dawn in due course or an impassioned caution that such inquiries could engender adverse consequences.

In an almost parrot-like fashion, we were compelled to commit a multitude of these slogans to memory and recite them vociferously as an integral facet of our scholastic regimen and at the commencement of educational sessions. Now, within the confines of this scholarly exposition, we endeavour to rekindle that very same inquisitive interrogation, aspiring to unearth the genesis of this dichotomy between “Kurds” and “Infidels” and to fathom how this paradigm became an authorized instrument catalysing the loss of life for hundreds of thousands within the Kurdish demographic.

In this article, we posit that the practice of composing slogans by the revolutionary forces within the Islamic regime of Iran upon the walls of Rojhelat (Iranian Kurdistan) cannot be regarded as a mere propagate or anomalous phenomenon. Rather, it finds its roots in a broader historical context, notably emerging during the latter half of the 20th century in tandem with the ascension of Islamic ideology throughout the Middle East. Within this ideological framework, Kurdish communities, hitherto perceived as infidels, have been systematically incorporated into the exclusive narratives propagated by Iranian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms.

The governments of the Islamic regime of Iran, the AK Party in Turkey, the Baath regime in Iraq, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA) have consistently depicted the Kurds as infidels. Concurrently, they have pursued dual objectives: the reinforcement of their colonial dominion over the Kurdish regions and the legitimization of the Kurdish genocide. Furthermore, the determination of which Kurds are deemed fit to reside in the colony has assumed an integral position within the daily agendas of these regimes, as they endeavor to quash Kurdish liberation movements through the prism of sanctity. These necropolitics dictates, couched in Islamic rhetoric, have precipitated the tragic consequences of mass killings and forced displacement, exacting a grievous toll upon hundreds of thousands of Kurds.

In brief, necropolitics may be succinctly characterized as the concept wherein the ultimate expression of sovereignty fundamentally lies “in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die.” (Mbembe, 2003: 11) Necropolitics exemplifies the darkest facets of political authority, highlighting its capacity to not only govern but also to exert dominion over life and death, thus underscoring the profound ethical and moral questions it raises for society and its leaders. This concept sheds light on the harsh realities of our world, where certain groups and societies are subjected to systemic violence and exclusion, often resulting in the deliberate deprivation of life opportunities for some while favoring others.

In Mbembe’s view, the colony is the locus where sovereignty primarily manifests as the exertion of power that operates beyond the law, and in such a context, the notion of “peace” tends to resemble an enduring state of “war without end.” (Mbembe, 2003: 23) The central premise of our argument in this article revolves around the contention that Kurdistan, within its colonial context, was perpetually embroiled in a state of warfare. Within this framework, the colonial nation-states, such as Iran, Turkey, and Iraq, and non-state actors, for example, ISIS and TFSA, depicted the Kurds as infidels, employing Islam as a tool to legitimize the systematic massacre of Kurds.

While Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics provides a framework for understanding the sovereign power to determine life and death, particularly in colonial contexts, another critical lens through which we can examine the Kurdish experience is Agamben’s notion of Homo Sacer (Agamben, 1998). Although these theorists developed their ideas independently, both address the ways in which sovereign power exerts control over life, albeit from different perspectives. The Kurds have been positioned as entities outside the protection of law, rendered vulnerable to unchecked violence by the sovereign powers of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and extremist groups like ISIS. In the necropolitical framework, the Kurds are subjected to religiously justified violence, where their lives are stripped of value and rendered disposable. This reduction to “bare life” is exemplified by the massacres, genocides, and forced displacements that have been perpetuated under the guise of maintaining religious and national purity.

By labeling the Kurds as infidels, these powers have effectively declared them as Homo Sacer, whose existence is seen as a threat to the sanctity of the state and religion. The relentless violence they endure is not merely a consequence of warfare but a systematic effort to erase their existence, justified through religious rhetoric. This dynamic highlight the intersection of colonial sovereignty and religious necropolitics, where the sovereign’s ultimate power over life and death is exercised in its most extreme form, leading to the sacred victimization of the Kurdish people.

A historical analysis of oppression in Kurdistan: colonial atrocities and subjugation

The Kurds are often regarded as one of the largest stateless nations, lacking an independent nation-state of their own. They primarily inhabit a region known as Kurdistan, which spans parts of several countries in the Middle East, including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This division of the Kurdish population among these four Muslim majority nation states is a result of historical geopolitical factors and the redrawing of borders during and after World War I. Throughout their history, the Kurds have indeed faced significant challenges and human rights abuses. These include forced displacements, cultural assimilation, discrimination, and, in some cases, outright violence and genocide. The plight of the Kurds has led to numerous international human rights concerns and calls for recognition of their national rights, including the right to self-determination, cultural preservation, and political representation. (Gunter, 2010, 2019)

On theoretical grounds, in recent decades, scholars within the field of Kurdish studies have demonstrated an increasing inclination to scrutinize the historical context of Kurdistan as a colonial entity. This scholarly pursuit aims to establish a causal link between the colonial administrations of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria and a series of grave atrocities, including genocide, widespread violence, discriminatory policies, and the systematic denial of the Kurdish nation’s rights. As per Ghassemlou’s analysis, Kurdistan is geographically divided among four countries situated on the periphery of the global economic core, subjecting it to the weight of imperialist colonialism. (Ghassemlou, 1973) Beşikçi’s enduring analysis of Kurdistan as an international colony (Beşikçi, 2004) has significantly influenced a cohort of scholars who are increasingly drawn to postcolonial and decolonization theories. (Duruiz, 2020; van Bruinessen, 2005)

Researchers have primarily focused on employing the concept of internal colonialism to illustrate the Kurdish colonial predicament within Iran and Turkey. They delve into various dimensions, including historical (Houston, 2009; Mohammadpour and Soleimani, 2022), political (Jongerden, 2016; Soleimani and Mohammadpour, 2019; Tuğrul, 2022), cultural (Erdelan, 2019, 2021; Gambetti, 2009), economic (Soleimani and Mohammadpour, 2020; Yarkin, 2015), environmental (Hassaniyan, 2021; Hassaniyan and Sohrabi, 2022; Mohammadpour, 2024), linguistic (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1996; Zeydanlıoğlu, 2012), and gender-related factors (Turkyilmaz, 2016), shedding light on their detrimental impact on the Kurdish nation by means of denial and assimilation. In his recent article, Mohammadpour criticizes Iran’s colonial policy concerning Kurdish cross-border labor, known as kolber. He suggests that Kurdish kolbers are marginalized and subjected to a precarious form of necro-labor practice, resulting in a state where they exist in a liminal space between life and death due to the Iranian state’s necropolitics. (Mohammadpour, 2023)

Furthermore, in “Weeping Without Tears: Kurdish Female Kolbers and the Gender Necropolitics of State in Iran” (Mohammadpour and Javaheri, 2024), Mohammadpour and Javaheri explore how Persian-Shiite nationalism, originating in the early 19th century and solidified during the Pahlavi era, has targeted non-Persian cultures, particularly Kurds, as threats to Iran’s national identity. They argue that Iranian state necropolitics seeks to erase the Kurdish “other” through linguicide, religious suppression, and environmental destruction. Focusing on Kurdish female kolbers, the authors illustrate how the Kurdish homeland has become a borderland, weaponized for mass destruction, demonstrating how coloniality and necropolitics impact Kurdish bodies and territories.

The multifaceted analysis of internal colonialism in Iran and Turkey provides a crucial foundation for understanding the broader implications of necropolitics on the Kurdish nation. By synthesizing these insights, scholars can better address the shared colonial strategies imposed across Kurdistan, revealing the weaponization of religion as a tool for sustaining violence and oppression against the Kurdish people. Through this integrative approach, Kurdish studies can more effectively engage with the enduring mechanisms of control that have shaped the Kurdish experience, offering a unified and critical perspective on the region’s colonial history.

In light of these considerations, Kurdish studies has encountered epistemological challenges that have led to research often focusing on specific issues within one part of Kurdistan, largely due to the geopolitical fragmentation of the region. This disintegration has been a significant barrier to applying comprehensive social sciences theories and conducting critical analyses across the broader Kurdish context. However, by adopting an anti-colonial theoretical framework, particularly Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics, reinterpreted here as religious necropolitics, we can overcome these challenges. This approach allows us to examine the shared colonial policies imposed by various powers on Kurdistan as a whole, revealing how religion has been weaponized to justify violence and oppression against the Kurdish nation. Through this lens, Kurdish studies can engage more deeply with the mechanisms of power and control that have historically shaped the Kurdish experience, offering a more unified and critical understanding of the region’s colonial history.

Scholarly research on Islamism often delves into contexts where Islamist movements and political parties function as anti-colonial and oppositional forces. However, Mehmet Kurt asserts that the AKP (Justice and Development Party) employed Islamist ideology as an instrument of governmentality to maintain and legitimize the practice of internal colonization the Kurdish region of Turkey (Kurt, 2021). In this scholarly exposition, we aim to elucidate that the instrumentalization of Islam for the purpose of suppressing and perpetrating violence against the Kurdish population extends beyond the purview of Turkish Islamists. Indeed, it is evident within the governance apparatus of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, within recent years, the process of deeming the infidelization of the Kurds has become an integral component of the discourse propagated by non-state extremist actors such as ISIS and TFSA.

Furthermore, the religious necropolitical governance extends its pernicious influence to incite “genocidal massacres” (Kuper, 1981: 10) against ordinary people in various Kurdish regions. Notable instances include the Qarna and QaraGol massacres in Rojhelat, the Roboski and Kuşkonar massacres in Bakur (Turkish Kurdistan), Ethnic Cleansing in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan), and the genocide inflicted upon the Kurdish population through the notorious Anfal campaign, along with the devastating chemical bombing of Halabja in Bashur (Iraqi Kurdistan). Conversely, when examining extremist non-state actors like ISIS and Tahrir al-Sham, whose brutal actions are no longer constrained by the need for legitimization, a more sweeping and uncompromising stance is adopted. Here, they indiscriminately label all Kurds as infidels, resulting in atrocities such as the genocide perpetrated against the Yazidi Kurds in Shingal (or Sinjar) in Bashur and the slaughter of Kurdish individuals in Afrin in Rojava.

In examining these largely overlooked transgressions, it becomes clear that Kurdistan is uniquely vulnerable to colonial exploitation. This region has served as a backdrop for the perpetration of heinous acts, where the rule of law is suspended, and the perpetrators operate with impunity. The dehumanization of the Kurdish populace, branding them as deserving of extermination, displacement, and coerced migration, hinges on the classification of those advocating for their national rights as heretics, thereby laying the sinister foundation for mass killings and genocidal campaigns. Kurdistan, in the eyes of colonizers, becomes a space to be purged of its perceived impure infidels. Employing religious necropolistic governance, the intent is to transform it into a milieu where a submissive subaltern population is coerced to endure.

Khomeini’s Fatwa on the Kurds in Iran

The transformation brought about by the events of 1978–79, which culminated in the downfall of the monarchy and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic, had a profound and far-reaching impact on the political landscape. Right from the beginning, the connection between Kurdish nationalism and Khomeinism (‘Khatt-e Imam’), in particular, was marked by a certain degree of tension and incongruity. A fundamental disparity existed between the democratic principles and secular orientation championed by Kurdish nationalists and the unwavering commitment to Islamic fundamentalism upheld by the followers of Khomeini (1902–1989). (Shamsaddini, 2007: 194)

This period of change ushered in a complex dynamic where the goals and ideologies of these two distinct groups often clashed. Kurdish nationalists, driven by a desire for greater autonomy and recognition of their cultural and political rights, naturally gravitated towards secularism and democracy as means to achieve their objectives. On the other hand, the Khomeinists, staunchly adhering to a rigid interpretation of Islamic doctrine, emphasized the singular importance of Islamic law and religious authority in shaping the new political order.

The national referendum on the constitution, concluded on December 3, 1979, marked a pivotal moment in Iran’s political landscape. It brought approval for an intricate and somewhat precarious hierocratic system. Notably, during the initial creation of the Islamic Republic in March 1979, Iranian Sunni Kurds set themselves apart from their fellow citizens by abstaining from voting, displaying a certain degree of political dissonance. The constitution, which they didn’t directly influence through the referendum, bore significant consequences for the Kurdish community. Article 5 of the constitution stipulated that, as long as the Twelfth Imam remained in occultation, a qualified Islamic jurist (‘faqih’) would have the right to rule and exercise leadership. Furthermore, Article 110 delineated the extensive rights and prerogatives of the Guardian Jurist, ranging from being the supreme commander of the armed forces to heading the radio and television network and appointing the supreme judicial authority of the country. Additionally, the third Article 91 dictated that the Guardian Council would be responsible for ensuring the compatibility of all legislation with Islamic ordinances. (Rahnema, 2014: 96–7) For the Kurds, this meant that their political agency and autonomy would be considerably limited within this centralized and religiously oriented political structure, potentially resulting in disparities in rights and representation for this distinct ethnic group.

In the 1980s, some Kurdish groups, such as the supporters of Ahmad Moftizadeh (1933–1993) (Mofidi, 2015) and the Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, 2010: 24), initially sought to align themselves with the new Iranian government to emphasize their Muslim identity and find common ground with other Iranians. The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), advocating for political autonomy, briefly identified as a non-separatist organization. Although, ‘autonomy’ as uttered in Kurdistan sounded like ‘secession’ in Tehran. (McDowall, 2001: 276) Kurdish militants, mainly from the KDPI, initially made territorial gains in Mahabad, temporarily driving out Iranian troops. However, in the spring of 1980, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched a large-scale offensive that shifted the course of the conflict. In mid-August 1980, the Revolutionary Guard ambushed Paveh, where they were unprepared for battle and were overpowered and encircled by Kurdish militants. This situation led to a meeting between Khomeini and the heads of the government and army. On August 17, Khomeini declared a jihad (a struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam) (Khomeini, 2018a) against Kurdish separatists (‘tajziy-e talab’) and labeled key Kurdish nationalist figures, including Ghassemlou (1930–1989), as enemies of the state. (BBC, 1979; Khomeini, 2018c)

Khomeiniism gained prominence as a dominant force within the Shia community, owing not only to its religious attributes but also to its potent populist elements. Khomeini emerged as a distinctive figure in the country’s socio-political landscape, successfully captivating the hearts and minds of the populace. Furthermore, Khomeini’s populist rhetoric had a profound impact in the post-revolutionary Iran, as he skillfully reinterpreted early Islamic history to reinforce these populist notions. (Abrahamian, 1993: 51) In 1980, Khomeini delivered a public speech, now widely disseminated on social media, in which he referenced a verse from Surah al-Fath (Mofidi, 2022: 971) regarding the Prophet of Islam’s severe interactions with infidels, advocating for a resolute approach in dealing with those identified as infidels in Kurdistan:

“Severe against infidels and merciful among themselves.” [Quran 48:29] These conspirators are among the infidels. These conspirators in Kurdistan and other places are among the infidels. They should be treated severely. The government should treat them severely. The army should treat them severely. If they do not do so, we will treat them severely.” (Gordyaen B. Jermayi, 2023)

Fatwas and explicit violence sanctioned by Khomeini to suppress the Kurdish independence movement were perceived by the regime’s forces as the final word against Kurdish fighters, legitimizing the killing of anyone who advocated for the rights of the Kurdish nation. (Mofidi, 2022: 961) The regime’s initiation of a military offense in Kurdistan with the pretext of ‘purging’ the region of infidels. (Shamsaddini, 2007: 203) In his memoirs, Yahya Rahim Safavi, a senior commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Kurdistan, recalls that Khomeini instructed them to combat infidelity in Kurdistan, not the Kurdish people. (Rahim Safavi, 1998: 33–4) This dichotomy, which can be seen as a form of religious necropolitics, effectively divided the Kurdish population into two categories. Those who sought their rights were labeled as infidels, subject to elimination, while Muslim Kurds who accepted their perceived inferior status were allowed to coexist within the framework of the Islamic government.

Aside from the deadly ramifications of granting colonial sovereignty the authority to kill Kurdish political activists, being categorized as an infidel can lead to intricate consequences that extend into various aspects of the daily lives of all Kurdish people. In Iranian Shia tradition, the status of being an infidel carries with it not only the perilous burden of legitimizing violence against them but also the weighty label of impurity. Non-Muslims were categorically deemed kafer (‘infidels’), and this classification, according to Shia Iranian customs, marked them as najes (‘unclean’). This uncleanliness held far-reaching consequences, as it rendered them ineligible to marry Muslims, restricted their ability to touch the holy Quran, prohibited the burial of their deceased in Muslim cemeteries, and even excluded them from using shared public spaces such as barbershops, town baths, and the streets during rainstorms. The fear, in this regard, lay in the potential for their washed-away sweat to inadvertently come into contact with Muslims, a breach of ritual purity that was to be vigilantly guarded against. (Abrahamian, 1993: 46)

For instance, there is the case of a teenager named GhorbanAli Khaybali (1968–1984), who tragically lost his life in the city of Mariwan while participating in a conflict involving Kurdish groups advocating for the autonomy of Kurdistan and Iranian democracy. Remarkably, at the tender age of 15, he penned a letter to his mother, expressing that he had entered this battle in obedience to Imam Khomeini’s command, emphasizing that they were fighting against heresy, not against Kurds. (Khaybali, 2019) The classification of the Kurds as infidels had profound repercussions, resulting in numerous massacres, particularly during the 1980s (Social Affairs Commission of PDKI, 1990), within the cities and villages of Kurdistan. Noteworthy among these events are the two massacres in Qarna and QaraGol, where there were explicit appeals to spare the lives of innocent, unarmed, and defenseless Kurdish civilians. In both instances, people sought refuge behind the Quran, in accordance with a longstanding Islamic tradition, hoping that the sanctity of the Quran and their Muslim identity would dissuade their assailants from taking their lives. Tragically, these pleas were met with apathy and disrespect.

Qarna massacre

Qarna, a Kurdish village situated approximately seven kilometers to the southwest of Naghadeh, became the focal point of a military offensive by the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the Kurdistan War on September 2, 1979. (Cabi, 2020: 13) This tragic event resulted in the loss of over 60 lives among the village’s inhabitants.

According to testimonies from local witnesses, upon learning of the heinous acts committed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against defenseless civilians, Mulla Mahmoud Behtarzadeh, the cleric of Qarna village, implored them to refrain from such inhumane actions and cease the bloodshed. Regrettably, his pleas fell on deaf ears as the Revolutionary Guards paid no heed. In an attempt to stop the atrocities, he approached the guards with a Quran, appealing to their mercy as fellow Muslims. Shockingly, one of the guards seized the Quran from his hand and callously discarded it in a corner. Subsequently, they forcibly removed him from the village, subjecting him to a brutal execution. His lifeless, headless body was discovered on the outskirts of the village four days later. On that fateful afternoon, following the ruthless killing of more than 50 individuals, the attacking forces loaded the victims’ remains onto some pickup trucks and transported them to Naghadeh town and nearby villages, where they were put on display. Later, the bodies were left in the hills near the village, further amplifying the horrifying nature of these acts. (Cheshmandaz, 2018; Social Affairs Commission of PDKI, 1990: 2–3)

QaraGol massacre

On January 26, 1983, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched an offensive on the village of QaraGol, situated between Mahabad and Miandoab, resulting in the tragic and brutal massacre of 18 innocent civilians. (Social Affairs Commission of PDKI, 1990: 29) Ms Afsar Salek (d. 2023) provided a harrowing account in a recorded program, narrating the distressing details of this atrocity: (Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 2023)

… a significant number of forces from the Islamic Republic launched an attack on [the villages of] Sarchinar and QaraGol… Mullah Ali had an idea: “Perhaps if a group of us approach the Islamic Republic forces while holding the Quran, they might refrain from harming us due to the sanctity of the holy book. After all, they profess to be Muslims and follow the teachings of Islam.” When the village was surrounded, my uncle, who was also a clergyman, accompanied Mullah Ali as they approached the forces. They [the soldiers] took the Quran from Mullah Ali’s hands, tore it apart, and discarded it onto the freshly fallen snow. The sight of the Quran being burned brought tears from the women and children, but their cries fell on deaf ears. The forces showed no mercy as they brutally and shamefully attacked the seventeen to eighteen individuals present.

The village, left in a state of devastation, became a somber testament to the cruelty that unfolded that day. With the loss of all the men, the community was plunged into a deeper sense of despair as they faced the grim task of retrieving and burying the bodies. Ms. Salek continued, describing the devastation that followed. With all the men killed, the village was plunged into despair. “There wasn’t a single man left to collect and bring back the bodies using a tractor from the Guards Corps in Sarchinar village,” she recounted. It fell to a young girl, who had learned basic driving skills, to take the initiative. Along with an elderly village councilor, she made three trips to retrieve the bodies, each time bringing back three or four, as the state of the remains was far from normal.

The psychological toll on the women was overwhelming. “After a week of enduring this pressure, the women, instead of shedding tears, found themselves dancing in front of the lifeless bodies—a reaction to the immense grief and trauma we all felt,” Ms. Salek reflected. The bodies were then transported to the QaraGol Mosque, where they lay for a week. “None of the wives and children of the martyrs could bring themselves to leave their loved ones’ sides,” she said, describing how they stayed with the bodies, unable to return home. Finally, after a week, “Kak Mowlud, an elderly man who could barely see, showed us where to dig the graves. We, the women, came together to prepare the graves, carefully removing the bullets from the bodies before giving them a proper burial.” Ms. Salek concluded with a somber note, emphasizing that all eighteen men from the village had been martyred, leaving behind a community forever marked by the cruelty they had endured.

The perpetration of these brutal acts of violence by the guards of the Islamic regime, many of whom were under the age of 30, can be comprehended only through the lens of ideological justification and the stark polarization between Islam and infidelity. The imperative nature of quelling the Kurdistan uprising was underscored by the upper echelons of the Islamic regime. Notably, Abolhassan Banisadr (the president of Iran at the time) who also served as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, orderd to the troops to “not to remove their boots until the complete restoration of control over Kurdistan.” (Shamsaddini, 2007: 203) Moreover, Khomeini, through another fatwa, granted authorization to Banisadr to employ napalm bombs for the suppression of the Kurdish forces on January 1, 1980, notwithstanding the awareness of the potentially adverse public relations ramifications for the regime. (Khomeini, 2018b)

Erdoğan’s religious rhetoric: a tool for delegitimizing Kurdish opposition in Turkey

In his public addresses delivered during the general elections in Turkey on June 7, 2015, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan levied allegations against the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), insinuating an affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) within the cities of Batman and Diyarbakıir [Amed]. Holding a Quran in hand, Erdoğan endeavored to address the citizenry of Batman, asserting that the HDP harbored intentions to displace the leadership of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. He further emphasized that this administrative body had facilitated the publication of the Quran in the Kurdish language, while simultaneously alleging that the HDP advocated for a claim asserting the city of al-Quds (Jerusalem) as the rightful possession of the Jewish community. Erdoğan also contended that the HDP was subservient to the directives of the PKK, who, he asserted, engaged in the propagation of the Zoroastrian faith in the remote mountainous regions. Concurrently, Erdoğan accused the PKK of acts involving the destruction of libraries and mosques, juxtaposed with an appeal to the citizens of Diyarbakir as his brethren in the Islamic faith. (Özel and Balikiç, 2015)

In the realm of political discourse within Turkish Islamism, the practice of labeling the PKK or individuals affiliated with the HDP as Zoroastrians is construed as a manifestation of opposition to Islamic principles, and in some cases, even an assertion of their atheistic leanings. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself has iterated on multiple occasions that both the HDP and the PKK are devoid of religious belief, categorizing them as adherents of Zoroastrianism. (Ahval, 2018; Khalidi, 2017; Rudaw, 2016) The assertion that Kurds are characterized as Zoroastrians or atheists has recurred frequently within the discourse of pro-Erdoğan media. (Akyol, 2016) During a large-scale rally held in Diyarbakir in 2018, Erdoğan went so far as to equate the HDP with the PKK, posing questions that challenged their compatibility with the values and tenets of Islam. In his rhetorical inquiry, he queried, “Do they share any affinities with our core Islamic principles? Do they maintain any semblance of connection with Islam? They are avowedly atheistic and irreligious.” (Bianet, 2018)

In this manner, President Erdoğan consistently endeavors to address the dichotomy between Muslims and non-believers in the Bakur region. He positions himself and the pro-AK party as Muslim brethren on our side, defending the principles of Islam. Conversely, he regards HDP and PKK supporters as members of the traitor faction, describing them as infidels. The process of branding the Kurds as infidels has resulted in dire consequences for Kurdish activists and fighters. Erdogan, without hesitation, has resorted to lethal measures against pro-Kurdish individuals advocating for Kurdish rights. He unabashedly propagates a climate conducive to Kurdishphobia within Turkish society. Simultaneously, as he consistently bolsters the Turkish military to quell the PKK, he asserts, “These are atheists, people who abuse religion. We must kill death, scare fear. If we don’t do this, they [PKK] will run wild around here.” (TRT Haber, 2018)

The intense animosity directed towards Kurdish fighters extends beyond targeting just PKK members, sadly ensnaring unarmed civilians and leading to what can only be described as genocidal massacres. These brutal acts, indicative of a larger systemic issue, tragically victimize civilians caught in the crossfire. Notably, the Kuşkonar and Roboski massacres serve as chilling examples of these appalling crimes against humanity, underscoring the gravity of the situation. Both instances epitomize the harrowing reality wherein innocent lives were mercilessly taken under the pretense of mistakenly identifying them as PKK members.

Kuşkonar massacre

The Kuşkonar and Koçağılı massacre, occurring on March 26, 1994, marked a tragic event in which Kurdish villagers lost their lives and the villages of Koçağılı and Kuşkonar in Şırnak Province were obliterated due to an intense bombardment by the Turkish Armed Forces. The aftermath revealed a devastating toll: 38 fatalities, comprising primarily children, women, and the elderly, with 13 people wounded. Shockingly, despite survivors’ pleas and complaints from villagers and their families, both the government and the military refused to initiate investigations, attributing blame to the PKK and exploiting the incident for propaganda purposes. (The European Court, 2013)

This harrowing massacre received acknowledgment from the European Court of Human Rights on November 13, 2013, placing responsibility on Turkey for the deaths of 33 individuals, including women and children, during the air force bombing of Kuşkonar and Koçağılı villages. This ruling is part of a series of incidents in the early 1990s during the heightened conflict between Turkish government forces and the PKK, where the army forcibly evacuated and destroyed numerous Kurdish villages, often resulting in civilian casualties through shelling or aerial attacks. (Sinclair-Webb, 2013)

Roboski massacre

On the tragic day of December 28, 2011, Turkish F-16 fighter jets carried out an airstrike that resulted in the deaths of 34 individuals from the village of Roboski in Bakur. This devastating incident claimed the lives of 19 children, with the youngest victim being merely 12 years old. The unfolding of events began with a drone detecting the villagers as they were returning from Iraq, transporting goods like cigarettes and petrol using donkeys. Regrettably, Turkish authorities, misidentifying the civilian group as members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), issued orders to bomb the target. The unfortunate result was a fatal airstrike on the villagers, conducted under the mistaken belief that they were militants. (Green and Karakas, 2014)

During this distressing episode, Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), issued a statement correctly identifying the incident as a massacre of civilians, emphasizing that among the victims, the eldest was only 20 years old. Despite this tragic loss of innocent lives, Demirtaş urged the Kurdish community to respond through peaceful and democratic means in the face of this grave injustice. (France 24, 2011)

De-kurdification of the Afrin region in Rojava

Operation Olive Branch, initiated by the Turkish Armed Forces in early 2018, had significant consequences for the Kurds, particularly in the Kurdish-majority region of Afrin in northwestern Syria. The operation targeted the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), Kurdish groups considered by Turkey as affiliates of PKK. The Turkish government viewed these Kurdish groups’ presence near its border as a security threat and sought to eliminate their control over the Afrin District. As a result, Turkish military forces, accompanied by Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA) (Al-Khalidi, 2018), launched airstrikes, artillery barrages, and ground offensives, leading to the eventual seizure of Afrin city in March 2018.

The occupation of Afrin had profound repercussions for the Kurdish population in the region. It resulted in significant civilian displacement and casualties, causing widespread human suffering and humanitarian concerns. Reports emerged detailing violations of human rights, including civilian deaths, forced displacement, property seizures, abductions, torture, sexual and gender-based violence. (Turan, 2021) The Kurdish inhabitants faced displacement from their homes, with many forced to seek refuge in neighboring areas. Additionally, the occupation altered the demographic composition of Afrin, triggering demographic changes and the resettlement of non-Kurdish populations in the region. Furthermore, the occupation disrupted local governance and autonomy structures that had been established by Kurdish groups, further exacerbating tensions and fracturing the social fabric of the region.

Moreover, during the offensive on Afrin, Turkey allegedly had a contingent of former ISIS fighters integrated within its allied military forces. Within the ranks of the Turkish-backed forces, numerous Jihadist fighters were recorded in a video making explicit threats to behead Kurds, labeling them as “infidels.” (Mutlu Civiroglu [@mutludc], 2018) Disturbing video footage surfaced online, showcasing members of the TFSA Jihadist militia actively participating in the assault on Afrin in northern Syria. These individuals menacingly threatened the massacre of the Kurdish populace unless they adhered to the particular Islamic beliefs advocated by ISIS and al-Qaeda. One video clip depicted a militia fighter, flanked by others, denouncing the Kurds as “infidels” and issuing a dire ultimatum: “By Allah, if you repent and come back to Allah, then know that you are our brothers. But if you refuse, then we see that your heads are ripe, and that it’s time for us to pluck them.” (Cockburn, 2018)

The degree of brutality exhibited by extremist combatants likely stems from an underlying ideological framework compelling them to behead Kurdish individuals, deemed “infidels,” without hesitation. Simultaneously, the architects behind Operation Olive Branch, such as Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, portrayed the Kurdish guerrillas as proponents of Marxist, communist, and atheist ideologies. (Khalidi, 2018) Furthermore, at the outset of the offensive operation in Afrin, Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), under the leadership of Ali Erbaş, called upon mosques nationwide to recite Surah al-Fath (the Conquest) and encouraged communities to pray for Turkish soldiers during the military operation in Rojava. Reportedly, more than 90,000 mosques complied with this directive, delivering sermons on conquest and rallying prayers for the troops during the ongoing Turkish military intervention. Erbaş, in his statement, emphasized the importance of reciting al-Fath for the success of the Afrin cross-border operation against threatening terrorist organizations. (Tarihi, 2018) The practice of reciting Surah al-Fatah during the Turkish army’s multiple incursions into Rojava became an officially endorsed phenomenon not only within Turkey but also extended to mosques in England and the United States, supported by the Diyanet institution. (Kurt, 2022)

Offering prayers for the Turkish army engaged in conflict with the Kurds and reciting Surah al-Fatah, which conveys the theme of God assuring victory to Muslims over non-believers, implied that the Turkish soldiers, being Muslims, were battling the infidel Kurds in defense of Islamic principles. According to Kurt, throughout the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in the 1990s and beyond, the Diyanet assumed a pivotal function in spreading state propaganda, presenting it in a religious context. This involved glorifying and sanctifying the Turkish state’s campaign labeled as the “war on terror” against the Kurdish insurgency. Additionally, the institution engaged in discrediting the rebels, portraying them as individuals lacking faith, atheists, Armenians, and morally compromised. (Kurt, 2022: 29)

Anfal campaign: Kurdish ethnic cleansing and religious validation in baathist Iraq

The Anfal campaign stands as a devastating and tragic chapter in Kurdish history, marked by the ruthless attempt to exterminate the Kurdish nation in Iraq during the late 1980s. Conducted as part of a counterinsurgency operation by Baathist Iraq, the Anfal operations targeted rural Kurds in an effort to eliminate Kurdish rebel groups and forcibly Arabize strategic areas, primarily within the Kirkuk Governorate. During this horrific campaign, hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children fell victim to unimaginable brutality. They were systematically executed, with individuals often tied together and shot, their bodies left to fill mass graves. (Hiltermann, 2008; Sadiq, 2021) Villages and towns were mercilessly attacked using chemical weapons, leading to widespread devastation and suffering. Many women and children endured appalling conditions in camps, while men and boys deemed of ‘battle age’ were specifically targeted and mass-executed.

The orchestrator of this inhumane campaign was Saddam Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid (1941–2010), infamously known as “Chemical Ali.” His ruthless command during the Iran–Iraq War included employing aggressive gas warfare against Iranians, and later, turning Iraq’s military might against the Kurds to, as he stated, (A Middle East Watch Report, 1993) “solve the Kurdish Problem and slaughter the saboteurs.”² The devastating consequences of the Anfal campaign were catastrophic. An estimated 50,000 to 100,000 Kurdish lives were lost during eight military strikes, while 1.5 million Kurds were forcibly relocated. Approximately 60,000 Kurds fled to southeastern Turkey seeking refuge. The campaign aimed not only to eliminate Kurdish lives but also to erase Kurdistan itself from existence. (A Middle East Watch Report, 1993)

One of the most harrowing events within the Anfal campaign was the Halabja genocide of March 16, 1988. This atrocity resulted in the deaths of 5,000 Kurds and the displacement of 50,000 people, many of whom sought refuge in Iran. (Hiltermann, 2007; Montgomery, 2001: 77) It not only claimed human lives but also caused extensive ecocide, devastating the region’s entire ecosystem—soil, water, animals, and vegetation. The chemicals used in the attacks contaminated the land to such an extent that even today, the soil in Halabja remains less fertile. (Salih, 2022: 200)

However, what prompted this brutal genocide, and how did the Baath regime rationalize it? Insights into the motives behind the Anfal Genocide can be gleaned from the statements of its architect, Ali Hassan al-Majid. He articulates, “With God’s help, we have managed to eliminate from our beloved North the saboteur factions and collaborators with the enemy.” (Human Rights Watch, 1993a) The Baathist regime viewed the Kurds as traitors aiming to partition Kurdistan (northern Iraq). They levied accusations against the Kurds, alleging their support for Iran during the Iraq-Iran conflict, a war characterized by Baathists as a religious confrontation between Islam and disbelief. Saddam Hussein labeled the conflict between these nations as “the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah,”³ drawing parallels to historical Arab-Muslim conquests. (Sadiq, 2021: 126) He portrayed himself as the representative of Muslim Arabs seeking to conquer the territories of Zoroastrian Iranians, whom he deemed as non-believers. Consequently, Baathist media consistently framed the conflict with both Iranians and Kurds as a sacred war against infidels. (Salih, 2023: 11)

In the Anfal operation, the Kurds were targeted and killed simply because of their Kurdish identity. (Kelly, 2007: 236) However, according to Ali Hassan al-Majid, how did the Baath regime manage to convince Iraqi officers and the public regarding the justification for this genocide? (Human Rights Watch, 1993b) The Baath regime in Iraq sought a religious justification to legitimize the horrific acts perpetrated against the Kurds. To achieve this, they resorted to an apparent religious alignment by naming the campaign “Anfal,” derived from the eighth chapter of the Quran. Anfal, which translates to ‘spoils of war’ in Arabic, represents the name of the eighth sura of the Quran. This chapter supposedly was revealed to Prophet Muhammad following the Battle of Badr in AD 624. However, the concept of Anfal, associated with spoils of war, was manipulated to justify the slaughter of non-believers—an attempt at Islamizing the persecution. The relevant verse from the Anfal chapter in the Quran emphasizes the allocation of spoils of war to Allah and the Messenger, Muhammad, urging believers to resolve disputes and obey Allah and the Prophet. (Sadiq, 2021: 11; Salih, 2023: 10–11)

Yazidi genocide and enslavement of women by ISIS

In recent history, the world bore witness to the atrocities committed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),⁴ a ruthless extremist organization that emerged as a menacing force in the early 21st century. During its reign of terror, ISIS perpetrated numerous acts of violence, but one of the most chilling chapters in its dark history unfolded in the Şhingal region of Bashur in August 2014. This area, home to the Yazidi Kurds, witnessed a genocide marked by extreme brutality, mass killings, and the displacement of countless innocent civilians. Yazidi people are an ethno-religious minority with a distinctive faith known as Yazidism. The Yezidi genocide stands as a harrowing testament to the depths of brutality that extremist ideologies, including those rooted in political Islam, can reach. It left indelible scars on survivors and underscored the pressing demand for international recognition and action. The Yazidi community, in the aftermath of a genocide, faced expulsion, forced migration, and a state of effective exile. In this grim setting, numerous Yazidi women and girls experienced the harrowing ordeal of becoming victims of sexual slavery at the hands of ISIS, while a significant number of Yazidi men met tragic fates. It’s crucial to emphasize that approximately 5000 Yazidi civilians lost their lives during what has been described as a “forced conversion campaign” carried out by ISIS in Bashur.

The plight of Yazidi women, who have been captured and forced into the harrowing world of sexual slavery, stands as a tragic testament to the brutality of war and extremist ideologies. These women, often taken against their will, are subjected to unimaginable suffering as they are sold in slave markets by ISIS. (Nicolaus and Yuce, 2017) The group’s use of rape as a deliberate weapon of war further compounds the horrors faced by these innocent victims. Their captors, demonstrating a disturbing level of organization, even employ gynecologists to examine the women, conducting invasive physical inspections to determine their virginity and pregnancy status. (Shubert, 2015) It is a heartbreaking reality that some of these women, upon being found pregnant, are forced into having abortions, amplifying the depths of their distress in the face of this ruthless exploitation.

According to Haleh Esfandiari the older women were often taken to improvised slave markets with the aim of selling them. Simultaneously, younger girls frequently faced sexual assault or were compelled into marriages with the fighters. She further noted that “it’s based on temporary marriages, and once these fighters have had sex with these young girls, they just pass them on to other fighters.” (Brekke, 2014) In October 2014, as she discussed Yazidi women who had been seized by ISIS, Nazand Begikhani remarked that “these women have been treated like cattle… They have been subjected to physical and sexual violence, including systematic rape and sex slavery. They’ve been exposed in markets in Mosul and in Raqqa, Syria, carrying price tags.” (Watson, 2014) The harrowing aftermath of sexual slavery inflicted upon Yazidi women— “including physical trauma, mental anguish, and social isolation for female victims and children born of rape” (Newey, 2022: 14)—continues to haunt women and children even after the defeat of ISIS.

The Yazidis were not a threat to the Iraqi authorities; they didn’t collaborate with foreign powers or endanger national unity. They suffered extreme atrocities due to the distorted beliefs of ISIS, the degeneration of Islamic political ideology, particularly the Salafi-jihadi ideology, into a fascist ideology. (Cheterian, 2021: 12) To comprehend the extensive brutality exhibited by ISIS, it is imperative to examine their ideological framework, specifically how they seek religious justification for acts such as genocide and the enslavement of women by categorizing Yazidis as polytheists. An article published in the official ISIS publication, Dabiq, shortly after their assault on the Yazidi community, provides insight into their official stance. This publication openly acknowledges their commitment to genocide, highlighting the premeditated nature of their actions, which are intended to obliterate the Yazidi community due to its religious identity. (Dabiq, 2014)

The opening of this article asserts that Muslims will be called to answer on Judgment Day for their coexistence with the Yazidis, whom they consider as pagan. The article suggests that Muslims have not adhered to the directive of the “verse of the sword,” which prescribes: “And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the mushrikīn (‘polytheists’) wherever you find them, and capture them, and besiege them, and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush.” (Quran, 9:5) It contends that, in accordance with Islamic laws, Yazidis are not considered apostates or followers of recognized religions like Christianity and Judaism, which would allow them to live under Islamic rule and be subject to taxation. This distinction arises from the Yazidis being viewed as polytheists who worship Iblis, and their faith was historically referred to as Magianism before the advent of Islam. In addition to the genocide of Yazidis, Islamic militants could justify their aggression towards women in the following way:

Also, their women could be enslaved unlike female apostates who the majority of the fuqahā’ say cannot be enslaved and can only be given an ultimatum to repent or face the sword. After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the Sharī’ah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the Islamic State’s authority... The enslaved Yazidi families are now sold by the Islamic State soldiers as the mushrikīn were sold by the Companions. (Dabiq, 2014: 15)

These fanatical justifications are while the Yazidis are monotheistic, believing in one God who is the creator of all. They also hold faith in the Divine Heptad, consisting of the Seven Great Angels of God, believed to be emanations of His light. After the initial act of creation, God delegates His work to these Seven Angels, with Tawsi Melek, the Peacock Angel, being the foremost and the Yazidis’ protector. According to traditional beliefs, these Seven Angels occasionally appear on Earth in human form to provide religious guidance, with historical Yezidi leaders considered earthly manifestations of the Peacock Angel and others representing the remaining angels on Earth. (Spät, 2005: 32)

Religious suppression of the so-called devil-worshipers: The Kaka’i and Yarsan experience

Among the Kurds, the persecution by ISIS extended beyond the Yazidis, targeting another Kurdish religious minority known as the Kaka’i in the south of Kurdistan. Like the Yazidis, the Kaka’is were deemed infidels by ISIS (Asi, 2016), which led to the justification of their killings and displacement. The Kaka’is are part of a broader religious community, primarily known as Yarsan or Ahl-e Haqq (People of the Truth), particularly in eastern Kurdistan. (Kreyenbroek, 2020) The Yarsans have long faced systematic repression in Iran due to their religious beliefs, which starkly differ from the Islam that dominates the region. (Hamzeh’ee, 1990) Their unique socio-cultural practices, rituals, commemoration or veneration (of deities or saints), and festivals set them apart from Islam and the other religions officially recognized by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (Moradi, 2022)

In Iran, the Yarsans have consistently clashed with the prevailing Shiite Islamic ideology. Lacking basic human rights unless they conform to Shia Islam, Yarsans are marginalized and demonized by Shia authorities. Leading religious figures like Mohammad-Taqi Bahjat have explicitly labeled them as infidels and uncleans (Bahjat, 2017), while Ayatollah Khamenei’s stance is conditional, acknowledging their faith only if they accept the essentials of Islam, such as the prophecy of Muhammad. (Khamenei, 2015) However, when they deny these fundamentals, prominent religious authorities like Ayatollah Shubairi Zanjani (Shubairi Zanjani, 2020) and Ayatollah Mohammad-Reza Golpaygani (Golpaygani, 1988) issue fatwas declaring them as infidels.

These fatwas are emblematic of the broader state policy in Iran, which systematically suppresses and dehumanizes Yarsans. The portrayal of Yarsans as “devil-worshipers” and “unclean” leads to their exclusion from social interactions, such as eating or dealing with other communities, thereby stripping them of their humanity and further entrenching their marginalization. This systemic discrimination underscores the precarious existence of the Yarsans and Kaka’is in both Iran and Iraq, where their religious identity subjects them to existential threats and social ostracism.

Conclusion

In concluding this exploration, we return to the fundamental arguments that have shaped the tragic and enduring plight of the Kurdish nation. The systematic oppression, marginalization, and dehumanization of Kurds by various Middle Eastern nation-states and non-state actors are not isolated or random acts of violence. Rather, they are deeply rooted in a historical continuum of colonial sovereignty and religious necropolitics, where power is wielded through the control of life and death, legitimized by religious and nationalist ideologies.

Throughout this article, we have traced how the Kurds, historically portrayed as “infidels,” have been subjected to a relentless campaign of violence, cultural erasure, and genocide. This portrayal, deeply embedded in the nationalist narratives of states like Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, has provided the ideological justification for the systematic persecution of the Kurdish nation. Whether through the fatwas of religious leaders, the nationalist rhetoric of political regimes, or the brutal campaigns of extremist groups like ISIS, the Kurds have been framed as an existential threat that must be eradicated to preserve the sanctity of the state and the purity of its religious identity.

The concept of necropolitics, as articulated by Achille Mbembe, has been central to understanding this dynamic. Necropolitics highlights the dark side of sovereignty, where the power to govern is inseparable from the power to kill. In the Kurdish context, this has manifested in a continuous state of war, where peace is merely an extension of conflict, and the Kurdish regions are treated as spaces of exception—zones where the rule of law is suspended, and violence is normalized.

The historical analysis provided in this article reveals the continuity of this violence, from the colonial era to the present day. The division of Kurdistan among four Muslim-majority nation-states, a consequence of post-World War I geopolitics, has only deepened the Kurdish struggle for self-determination and cultural survival. Each of these states has employed religious necropolitics to justify their oppressive policies, framing the Kurds as heretics whose very existence threatens the integrity of the state.

The article has examined specific instances of this violence, such as Khomeini’s fatwa against the Kurds in Iran, which sanctioned mass killings under the guise of fighting infidelity. These events, including the massacres at Qarna and QaraGol, demonstrate how religious rhetoric has been used to dehumanize the Kurds, reducing them to mere obstacles in the pursuit of a homogenous, Islamic nation-state.

In Turkey, the rhetoric of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has similarly framed Kurdish opposition as a threat to Islam, branding the PKK and HDP as atheists and infidels. This framing has not only de-legitimized Kurdish political movements but has also justified widespread state violence against Kurdish civilians, as seen in the Kuşkonar and Roboski massacres. Erdoğan’s use of religious symbolism and language has been instrumental in galvanizing public support for these repressive measures, further entrenching the Kurdish nation’s marginalization.

The Anfal campaign in Iraq, orchestrated by the Baathist regime under Saddam Hussein, represents one of the most devastating examples of religious necropolitics in action. By invoking the Quranic concept of “Anfal” to justify the mass extermination of Kurds, the regime sought to cloak its genocidal actions in religious legitimacy. The campaign’s brutal impact, particularly the Halabja genocide, underscores the lethal consequences of conflating religious doctrine with state sovereignty.

Furthermore, the article addresses the Yazidi genocide perpetrated by ISIS, where the Yazidis, a Kurdish-speaking ethno-religious minority, were targeted for their distinct beliefs. The systematic enslavement and mass killings of Yazidis were justified through a distorted interpretation of Islamic teachings, further illustrating how religious necropolitics has been weaponized to inflict unimaginable suffering on the Kurdish nation.

Finally, the persecution of the Kaka’i and Yarsan communities, Kurdish religious minorities branded as “devil-worshipers” and “unclean” by both ISIS and Iranian Shia authorities, has led to their systematic dehumanization, social exclusion, and existential threats. The use of religious fatwas to justify their marginalization underscores the weaponization of religious necropolitics against these groups, further entrenching their suffering and erasure in both Iran and Iraq.

In drawing these threads together, this article underscores the urgent need for a global reckoning with the narratives that have justified the oppression and victimization of the Kurds. The interplay between colonial sovereignty and religious necropolitics has had devastating consequences for the Kurds, resulting in mass killings, cultural erasure, and the denial of their basic human rights. To move towards a more just and peaceful future, it is imperative to challenge these narratives and recognize the Kurdish nation’s right to self-determination, cultural preservation, and political representation.

As this article has demonstrated, the Kurdish struggle is not merely a regional or ethnic issue but a profound challenge to the ways in which sovereignty, religion, and violence are intertwined in the modern world. By acknowledging the historical and contemporary realities of Kurdish victimization, we can begin to address the broader ethical and political questions that this struggle raises, and work towards a future where all peoples are free to live in dignity and peace.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Fateh Saeidi

Davoud Osmanzadeh

Data Availability Statement

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.

Notes

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