ETA ceasefire: Armed struggle vs. political practice in Basque nationalism

Abstract

In October 2011, the Basque armed organization ETA announced an end to its activities. This article aims at studying the reasons leading up to this unilateral decision which had been taken without prior negotiations or agreements. To this end, a large part of existing bibliography on the subject was consulted and most of the documents released by ETA in recent years, including those for internal use, were also reviewed. In our opinion, ETA reached this decision on the basis of two conclusions and an overall view of the state of affairs. The first of these conclusions found that the two main channels opened up in 1975 to reach its tactical goals, namely, negotiation with Spain and a national front, had been fully exploited. The second concerns the great difficulty in continuing to defend armed struggle on the grounds that it helps reinforce these two channels. Moreover, the belief that it is possible to make greater advances without, rather than with, armed activity, was widespread, paradoxical as that might seem. Forty years after its political positioning with respect to post-Franco Spain, convinced that both channels had been exhausted, and of its limited legitimacy to explore new ones in its capacity as a political movement, ETA reassessed the situation, and once again changed its discourse and practice, with an aim to attaining its strategic goals.