What Durkheimian thought shares with pragmatism: How the two can work together for the greater relevance of sociological practice

Abstract

Durkheimian thought and pragmatism are often considered inconsistent with each other. Nevertheless, beyond their most obvious differences, they share some fundamental postulates – like immanentism, pluralism, and relative indeterminacy. Realizing these common points seems particularly crucial in the current situation of the social sciences. Firstly, it allows us to overcome the structural-functionalist and structuralist versions of Durkheim’s work that prevent the understanding that at its core is his theory of practice. Secondly, it forces us to distance ourselves from the aspects of pragmatism that are most hostile to sociological thought (that is, that are the most oriented towards individualism). Finally, and above all, it provides social scientists with the means to escape their difficulties in assessing their own practices, and it aids in defining their political role in society. Indeed, taking into account what pragmatism shares with the Durkheimian tradition leads to a better understanding that what the social sciences are founded on, both historically and in terms of scientific practice, is a political undertaking of emancipation. Such an undertaking aims to implement an approach involving the ideas of truth and historical progress in human thinking that is neither objectivist nor relativist. In order to describe this undertaking and its limits, this article explores the famous text published by Durkheim and Mauss in 1903 under the title ‘On Some Primitive Forms of Classification’.