Abstract
Merton's early analysis of the ethos of science has gained increased relevance because recent developments — such as commercialization of research — have undermined basic norms, like impartiality. It is desirable to uphold the institutional realism in Merton's sociology of science in order to grasp contemporary challenges. But central elements in his analytical approach have also to be revised or rejected, especially his nomological conception of explanations, non-cognitivism in normative issues, and failure adequately to conceptualize Homo sociologicus as a reasoner. Reasoners present and discuss cognitive claims, related both to descriptive and normative validity. Merton's analysis of an ethos of science should be evaluated as a reconstructive type of empirical analysis where the goal is insight and adequate identification of phenomena. Several critics denying the existence of Mertonian norms tacitly presuppose the validity of the norms, thereby entangling themselves in self-defeating contradictions. As an unintended consequence, these critics confirm the existence of a fundamental ethos of science.
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