If Goffman Had Read Levinas

Abstract

The article attempts to explore fundamental assumptions underlying Goffman’s theory of interaction. Goffman’s work has long been criticized for certain pervasive weaknesses such as the idea of a self as ‘inside’ and therefore inaccessible, an indifference to any distinction between appearance and reality, and a lack of concern for morality. It is argued that combating these and related problems necessitates uncovering the philosophical roots of Goffman’s way of conceptualizing the self. The article identifies these roots in some assumptions that Goffman shares with and may well have adapted from Sartre. Sartre’s theory of the self is outlined and clear affinities between these two authors’ main assumptions are revealed. The import of this linkage is to point to inevitable obstacles standing in the way of developing the self as a truly social being if one begins with the understanding of what a self is common to both Goffman and Sartre. Next the article puts forward, as an alternative, the ideas of Levinas who has produced an almost point by point rebuttal of Sartre’s version of the self. The key point is that, unlike Sartre and Goffman, Levinas locates the self’s being or consciousness as taking a positive rather than negative form. This differing starting point has demonstrable repercussions for the way the self can relate to both material things and other people. In particular, such a self can be available to, rather than (as in Sartre and Goffman) hidden from, others and is therefore susceptible to others’ influence. Instead of being threatened by the other, there is scope for what Levinas calls non-possessiveness towards and hospitality to others. Finally, the article points out how such a conception of self can be utilized to resolve some specific problems with Goffman’s depiction of social interaction such as his amorality, his views on the role of language and his claims to the omnipresence of concealment.