Abstract
This article addresses practices of collective self-reflexivity by discussing feedbacks related to an Article on basic human needs. As more people came in to provide feedback, it became more interdisciplinary and moved from a purely academic towards a more policy-oriented view. The article illustrates how scholars with different backgrounds approach an issue (basic needs) that is highly relevant for Global Social Policy. Three aspects of collective reflexivity are addressed: discussions related to internal or external boundaries of GSP; reflections on disciplinary resources, such as theories and methods; and discussions that performatively establish, preserve or undermine collectivity. Collective reflexivity of these three aspects ranged from critical and concise discussions of fundamental conceptual issues to indifference to creative application of the basic needs concept. The basic needs concept was controversial, yet at the same time the process of collectivity was productive. The article concludes by asking how collective reflexivity can be carried out so as to be progressive.
Keywords
Introduction
In their introduction to this special issue, Berten and Wolkenhauer argue that self-reflexivity is commonly thought of as relating to personal characteristics and individual experiences. However, they suggest, it could be more important to engage in ‘collective self-reflexivity’, by which they mean reflect Global Social Policy (GSP) as a whole. They depict GSP as a larger community that commands diverse resources, such as shared vocabularies, methods, theories and insights. The community is also marked by professional habits and, more implicitly, by not necessarily beneficial structures, such as hierarchies and exclusions. Moreover, the GSP community encompasses both researchers and practitioners.
This article addresses practices of collective self-reflexivity by discussing feedbacks related to an Article on basic human needs. That Article has been written by the author of the present article and has been published in the Journal for European Development Research (Mahlert, 2021). 1 The earliest feedbacks date back to many years before the Article’s publication. They were part of conversations related to the author’s research on global inequality, and they alerted her to the basic needs concept in the first place. Later feedbacks relate to preliminary versions of the Article as well as to its published version. The anonymous feedback to the submitted Article will be discussed, as well as comments received in informal conversations and at conferences.
Resonating with Berten and Wolkenhauer’s proposal, the feedback to the Article revolved around substantive issues of broader interest within GSP, such as the nature and conceptualization of needs, theoretical approaches and policies. By focussing on these substantive issues rather than on the more specific arguments developed in the Article, the following discussion highlights how peers engaged in practices of collective reflexivity when giving feedback. Specific attention will be paid to the ways in which peers from different (sub-)disciplines approached the subject. Overall, the article illustrates how scholars with different backgrounds approach an issue (basic needs) that is highly relevant for GSP.
The basic needs concept refers to elementary aspects of human well-being and/or survival. Much GSP research and practice deals with these elementary bases, such as health, education or food, and how these are addressed by governance, policies and politics at transnational and global levels. Yet, as an explicit concept, the notion of basic needs is not so widespread in GSP. Moreover, it is controversial. ‘Basic human needs’ means different things in different strands of literature, and opinions on the added-value of the basic-needs concept differ widely, as will be discussed below.
The feedback to the Article tended towards increasing interdisciplinarity in the participating audiences, and, more specifically, moved from a purely academic towards a more policy-oriented view. Coming from sociological theory, the author attempted in the Article to address for the first time an audience interested or engaged in policy analysis. The first series of feedbacks were by colleagues with a strong interest in sociological theory. These were followed by feedback from scholars in different strands of GSP (broadly understood): applied policy researchers, post-development scholars and academics who explicitly refer to themselves as GSP researchers. 2 Moreover, a preliminary version of the Article was presented to post- and decolonial scholars from diverse disciplines. The published Article received feedback from a mixed audience, including one GSP scholar and sociologists with diverse specializations.
Based on Berten and Wolkenhauer’s introductory remarks, three aspects of collective reflexivity will be addressed:
Discussions addressing the internal or external boundaries of GSP and the other disciplines involved, such as between sociological theory, applied policy research and post-development.
Discussions related to disciplinary resources – ‘endowments’ of GSP that can be used for producing knowledge, such as data, theories or insights.
Discussions that performatively establish, preserve or undermine collectivity – some form of togetherness, for example, in the form of commitment to a shared goal.
The next section introduces basic needs literatures. The sections thereafter roughly trace the sequence of received feedbacks. Perspectives from sociological theory and development research will be discussed, followed by ‘critical’ and ‘functionalist’ perspectives. Next, views expressed by sociologists from the so-called Global South and Global North are compared, while the last series of feedbacks came from scholars with diverse backgrounds.
The story of the Article is unavoidably a personal one, as it is based on the author’s own memories and reflections. Moreover, the opinions expressed in the feedbacks cannot be considered representative. Other members of the same groups, for example, other applied policy researchers, other critical scholars and other sociologists from the ‘Global South’ could have put forward different views. These alternatives will not be explored. This article does not aim at generalization. Rather, the goal is to reveal a spectrum of substantive arguments. These arguments elicit opportunities for mutual learning across (sub)disciplinary boundaries, some of which might not be obvious.
Introduction to basic needs
In the context of GSP, basic needs are commonly associated with international development debates of the 1970s. At that time, several national and international agencies put forward new strategies that should centre development efforts on the satisfaction of basic needs (e.g. International Labour Organization (ILO), 1976; Streeten et al., 1981). They did this in reaction to the insights revealed by social data which UN agencies had collected as part of the Development Decade in the 1960s. Data on employment, income distribution and various aspects of social welfare such as nutrition and education demonstrated that most citizens remained extremely poor even in countries with considerable growth rates (Finnemore, 1996: 102). In principle, the underlying idea was widely accepted, namely, that ‘the basic needs of all should be satisfied before the less essential needs of a few are met’ (Streeten et al., 1981: 8). Nevertheless, the concept of basic needs was a political issue from the very outset. Basic needs strategies implied an active role of the state in the provision of basic goods and, therefore, required redistributive measures. However, addressing distributive issues questioned the dominant orthodoxy in economics, according to which economists should stay away from political and ethical questions. Adding to this, in the context of the Cold War some Westerners perceived redistributive measures as a move towards the establishment of socialism. In the opposite view, basic needs strategies appeared to be used by Northern capitalists to keep developing countries dependent on the developed world. Confining development to basic needs only served to withhold the full prosperity that their citizens enjoyed from people in the ‘Global South’ (e.g. Gauhar, 1982). Besides the basic-needs strategies of World Bank, International Labour Organization and other larger agencies several other approaches to basic needs have been proposed in the development field from the 1970s on. Most well-known, the notion of basic needs has inspired Amartya Sen’s theory of capabilities, as well as the United Nations Development Programme’s human development approach, which builds on Sen’s framework (Sen, 1995, 2001).
In these literatures as well as in everyday language and other fields of practice and research, notions of ‘needs’ and ‘basic needs’ are used in different ways and with different goals. To offer a background understanding for the subsequent discussion, three sets of meanings and corresponding areas of work on needs as identified by Gasper (1996) will be introduced. The three approaches are explanatory, instrumental, and normative and can be found across disciplines. Subsequently, it will be highlighted how sociologists typically approach basic needs. This should offer background information relevant to the sociologists’ feedbacks discussed further below.
Explanatory
The first approach identified by Gasper (1996), of which Maslow’s famous theory could be read as an example, covers ‘positive theories for explaining behaviour which posit forces called “needs” which drive our actions’ (p. 9). Maslow (1954) refers to these forces as motivations, which he considers to be a state of the whole person. If a motivation – such as to have something to eat – is strong, the thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and behaviour of the person are oriented on this goal (p. 66). Maslow (1954) identified four groups of needs – physiological needs, security needs, needs of belonging, of esteem (e.g. recognition, adequacy, self-confidence) and needs of self-actualization. The latter is the desire to realize one’s potential self, which can be ‘in many roles including in serving ones’ (p. 13).
According to Maslow (1943), motivation theory cannot by itself explain behaviour, which is typically also determined biologically, culturally and situationally. He distinguishes between conscious and deeper, more elementary desires – the needs. If a person goes for an ice cream, s/he might satisfy a deeper need for comfort, social interaction or stimulation. These rather than the ice cream are what is ultimately important. Conscious desires vary culturally and individually, but the deeper desires are general to the human species. Gasper argues that this kind of interpretation can be illuminating, yet there is the danger that ‘purported needs could be invoked ad hoc and ad infinitum to rationalize observed behaviour’ (Gasper, 1996: 15). More generally, he argues, explanatory ‘needs’ analyses ‘sometimes downplay the quintessential human activity of cultural construction of identities, meanings, values, and societies’ (Gasper, 1996).
Instrumental
According to Gasper, Maslow’s theory performs better as a contribution to the second area, which comprehends positive analyses of requirements for certain types of functioning, well-being or satisfaction. The understanding of needs as a requirement factors in the fact that people might choose actions that are damaging to their well-being. Not all requirements of well-functioning or well-being are supported by motivations. Gasper (1996: 15f.) mentions an example presented by Scitcovsky (1992), namely, urges to obtain comfort. Seeking relaxation from hardship or direct satisfaction through consumption can go at the cost of needs for activity or meaningfulness. Their satisfaction might require to endure temporary ‘discomfort’, for example, through hard work or determined learning.
Survival needs – the requirements for survival – typically manifest on a motivational level. They do not only comprise Maslow’s physiological and security needs but also a minimum of so-called enhancement needs, such as stimulation, esteem, exercise of curiosity, belonging and self-determination. ‘Humans can die or go mad from total isolation, monotony or restriction, and can risk death to avoid them’ (Gasper, 1996: 13). Enhancement needs might be felt as ‘vague urges’; ‘advice and training may be necessary to raise [these]to the level of directed consciousness and to learn how to use potentials’ (Gasper, 1996, addition in brackets mine).
In a synthesis of needs approaches from different disciplines, Galtung (1979) depicts needs as requirements for avoiding fundamental disintegration. 3 He extensively reflects on their nature, including how they might become manifest as motivations (or not). At a general level, he emphasizes that human beings are ‘difficult, complex, ever changing, very often dissatisfied, contradictory’ (Galtung, 1979: 3), which makes ‘basic needs’ an intricate issue. Not all that is consciously wanted is ‘basic’, that is, necessary to avoid fundamental disintegration. Conversely, some needs might not be conscious. However, Galtung suggests, a deeper motivational base or potential seems to exist (Galtung speaks of ‘latent’ needs). We should try to identify groups of basic needs ‘and postulate that in one way or the other human beings everywhere and at all times have tried and will try to come to grips with something of that kind, in very different ways’ (Galtung, 1979: 6). Talking with others about what is engaging them in their life is a method for discovering these latent needs. When listening to a friend recounting how he launched a dancing ensemble, an individual might become aware that s/he misses making music or that s/he would also love to bring together different people. Galtung moreover indicates that human beings ‘process’ needs differently from other goals when they internalize them. Needs are malleable (although not infinitely so). But ‘once they are sufficiently internalized in a human being that individual is no longer malleable without considerable risk. Inside him or her, more or less consciously, some sort of reckoning takes place; satisfaction/dissatisfaction is the term used for that’ (Galtung, 1979: 21). Thus, what distinguishes needs from many conscious goals is the experience of satisfaction. The prospect of satisfaction alone can be a strong motivational force. Satisfaction is not linear but rather a dialectical process in which states of ‘needing’ and ‘experiencing satisfaction’ alternate repeatedly. ‘For the well-sated, there may be a need to be hungry again so as to have the need for food and (if it is available) the satisfier of that need and with it the enjoyment of need-satisfaction’. There should be ‘with each need a need to feel that need again, a looking forward to next time’ (Galtung, 1979: 31).
Overall, Gasper concludes that both the explanatory and instrumental approach have weaknesses, but, even if they simplify matters, their proposed lists of needs have proved useful. They are progressive compared with the conventional ‘economic man’ model with its focus on ‘material interests’. They are also more realistic than a view of human beings as infinitely culturally malleable. The two positive approaches cannot grasp all human behaviour and functioning, but they provide instruments to improve their understanding: They ‘arm us with a set of pointers – “remember X”, “watch out for Y” – that at least give a starting-point in analysis superior to “economic man”’ (Gasper, 1996: 17).
Normative
According to Gasper, normative needs theories pursue a more modest goal than positive explanatory analyses, namely, to provide a ‘frame-for-work in arguing intelligently about priorities’. They contain arguments about which prerequisites should be prioritized by a given political community. These theories have a ‘distinctive structure and rationale’ (Gasper, 1996: 20f.). They determine a criterion of normative importance and analyse its implications in the sense of requirements that must be met to create the overall value. A basic analytical tool is the distinction between ‘needs’ and ‘satisfiers’, which is also used in positive analyses. Satisfiers are means for fulfilling needs. Relations between needs and satisfiers are complex and variable. For example, a given need can typically be met by different satisfiers. A given satisfier will typically contribute to meeting various needs but could also impair the fulfilment of particular needs. Normative needs analysis often includes more analytical levels, going beyond the distinction of needs and satisfiers (e.g. Doyal and Gough, 1991). The more specific the implications, the more variable they will be culturally or otherwise.
Sociology
Sociology approaches human agency in a distinct way that in important respects differs from economics and philosophy, which are prevalent in development research. As a result, basic needs is not a central concept in sociology. An example might help illustrate the kind of knowledge sociologists aim to produce and how this shapes their attitude towards basic needs. Imagine there is hunger in a region. By nature, human needs, such as the need for food, are experienced individually, but sociology is interested in collective aspects. A relevant sociological question would be to ask how the famine came about. If people did not build up supplies of food, why did they not choose to do so? A sociological explanation would typically look at features of social organization, for example, norms. Perhaps those who had harvested food surpluses earlier were expected to share these surpluses. Sharing could be motivated by a need for esteem, or status. Yet what is significant from the sociological point of view is that the local norms demand that surpluses be shared. In many other societies, status criteria could be different, including, for example, individual success, which would have manifested in different ways of disposing surpluses (e.g. investment). Therefore, norms are the better explanatory variable here than a need for esteem.
In general terms, sociology is an empirical discipline that offers diverse theories for explaining human action. Only few of them 4 integrate basic needs as a key explanatory variable. Instead, sociologists emphasize plasticity of human beings, their lack of behaviour-controlling instincts and their ability to learn. These anthropological constants require to explain human action by analysing the social context in which it takes place rather than by pointing to innate drives or motivations (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 47ff.). Still, needs literature might help to enhance sociological explanations further. Like economists, it could arm sociologists with ‘a set of pointers’, as Gasper proposes, making them aware of motivations that might be overlooked if focussing on social context alone. Thus, in the above example, a felt need for survival could have prevented people from building up food supplies, for hunger situations mostly occur in regions where food is scarce anyway.
Perspectives from sociological theory and development research
An expert in family and gender policies first turned my attention to the basic needs concept at a time when I was doing research on global inequality. Like in any inequality analysis, the study had to answer the question ‘inequality of what?’: relevant values, resources or opportunities had to be identified to which the members of the reference group had unequal access. As my reference group was the world population, socio-cultural variability became a challenge. What constitutes valuable resources should vary highly between contexts. To get some orientation, the expert and I picked out the upper groups of a yet-to-be-defined spectrum of global inequality and discussed what ‘rich’ could mean in a global context: Can we identify something that everybody wants to have no matter where and when s/he lives? We found that energy could be the ultimate resource of universal value (cf. Mahlert, 2020). Trying to fill this abstract definition with more concrete information, the expert pointed to the notion of basic needs. The globally rich then would be those who command plentiful resources for satisfying their basic needs. An absolutely poor person would be someone who lacks the means to survive.
I thought that the expert’s idea could be valuable for sociology exactly because it is provocative: In a somewhat ironical turn, cultural diversity seems to force us to resort to anthropological constants instead of turning away from them. Moreover, I thought, the needs-concept could be of more general use in the sociology of inequality, including within countries. Inequality research typically claims to analyse inequalities of ‘life chances’, however, mostly without explicitly discussing which life chances are valuable for those compared. There is a working assumption that relevant goods are those that are considered valuable within the overall society, such as income or school education. Inequality research therefore often relies on common-sense evaluations rather than on systematic analyses of requirements for well-being (the second bulk of work on needs identified by Gasper). However, common-sense evaluations can be ideological or otherwise misled, which is why relying on needs analyses could be helpful.
When presenting these considerations to sociological theorists, most expressed a critical or even hostile attitude towards the needs concept. Many pointed to cultural diversity, which they saw was an argument against the existence of general human needs. One colleague put forward counter-examples, saying that members of warrior classes in ancient Sparta voluntarily went to their death and therefore obviously had no needs for security. S/he obviously assumed that all basic needs are motivations. At that time I was not yet aware that needs can become manifest on subjective levels in familiar with the different ways, including not at all, as described above. Therefore, I had no spontaneous response to his or her argument. One colleague argued that we should consciously base theories of inequality on common-sense evaluations as long as people lived in the same context. Thus, for all who live in the same city or even country, it is obvious who is better and who is worse off. Inequalities of class would be visible, for example, in people’s clothing or relative quality of accommodation. This evidence from the life world would make it unnecessary to resort to human needs literatures. However, in a global context people do not perceive each other on a daily base like in a city; global inequality lacks visibility. Moreover, the rich of one country could be middle class or even poor in another country. Therefore, s/he said, we cannot speak of global classes or even of global inequality in a strong sociological sense of the word.
S/he added an anthropological argument: Common-sense notions of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ are certainly simplifying, but for this very reason they offer orientation. This argument builds on Arnold Gehlen’s anthropology, which sees human beings as potentially overwhelmed by a hyper-complex world. Humans realize that the world is more complex than they can imagine – but which decisions then to take? Categories like ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ relieve people from these complexities and enable them to go on in their daily life. By using such categories, people produce and reproduce social structures. For example, by choosing an occupation that is ‘for people like us’ rather than considering all occupational opportunities, school leavers simplify their decision situation and thus preserve their agency. At the same time, if taken in vast numbers, such decisions produce enduring structures of inequality. According to my colleague, the sociological category of ‘class’ was analytically fruitful for sociology’s explanatory efforts exactly because read from fundamental common-sense understandings, rather than from sophisticated literatures on the foundations of human well-being. Against this background, s/he asked me what I wanted to explain by drawing on the needs concept.
While this argument is compelling, it is important to consider that societal evaluations and real-life chances do not necessarily coincide. In 19th-century China, polished rice was prestigious. Yet members of the royal dynasty died from beriberi because they lacked the vitamins contained in the husk (Osterhammel, 2014: 168). Therefore, if interested in the distribution of human life chances (as distinguished from explaining human action), sociologists must deal with the specific characteristics of human beings in addition to societal evaluations (i.e. instrumental analyses of requirements for functioning or well-being, the second bulk of work on needs identified by Gasper). However, according to another colleague, detailed discussions of human needs were not of interest to sociologists. Moreover, by drawing on the needs concept, my approach would become normative.
Overall, the sociological theorists with whom I talked did not problematize the close understanding of basic needs. They, and also myself at that time, just did not consider it necessary. Rather, we discussed whether the basic needs concept was relevant for generating qualified sociological knowledge at all. We thus addressed the conceptual boundaries of our discipline. In doing so, my colleagues insisted on basic premises shared by sociologists for good reasons. Thus, one colleague said that, while he sympathized with my considerations, they would attack the ‘last consensus’ that existed among sociologists, that is, distance from problems relevant for practitioners and dispensation with anthropological assumptions except plasticity and the like. These premises were the disciplinary resources ultimately at stake in our discussions. Collectivity was established by re-affirming them. This was not only a defensive manoeuvre, serving to distance sociology from other disciplines. It also served to focus on and thereby bolster the specific strength of sociological research.
Reflecting my colleague’s indication of normativity in my approach, I realized that I did want to contribute to basic needs satisfaction with my research. Therefore, I decided to write an article for a development journal, as its audience would be more practically oriented and interested in basic needs. Perhaps I could make a contribution here based on my expertise in sociological theory. When submitting the Article to the European Journal of Development several years later, three anonymous reviewers commented on three versions of the Article. They alerted me to the complexity of the needs literature and to many subtleties arising thereof which I had not been aware before. This offered replies to several issues raised by my sociological collocutors.
Specifically, one reviewer replied to my colleague’s above-mentioned argument about the warrior classes going voluntarily to death and therefore not having needs for security: Needs are only considered to be motivations in some usages but not all. Not all human motivations are directed towards behavior that supports well-being; people might even act in self-endangering ways. Moreover, they might not always experience harm as such. This clarification also made me reconsider what actually renders an analytical approach normative. Gasper (1996) refers to instrumental needs analysis as positive because it is ‘factual, actual, relating to description and explanation’ (p. 3). However, analyses of requirements for wellbeing might be considered normative in sociology. When does applying a valuative criterion render an analysis normative? Is all inequality research normative as soon as it addresses the distribution of life chances – even in an explanatory effort? And what follows from our answer to these questions? Regarding the explanatory value of the needs concept, the reviewer’s commentary indicated that it alone would not be sufficient for explaining human action, but could contribute to it. Here, Galtung’s (1979) elaborations on (conscious) wants and (often latent) needs might add value. Being aware of the ‘rhythms’ of needs and satisfactions – the ‘looking forward to the next time’ (p. 31) – might be illuminating, particularly if social processes are at stake. If it is true that needs exist but are not infinitely malleable; and that they motivate human actors once they have been socialized into these needs, it will not be sufficient to look at social structures such as norms to explain action.
Through the Article’s submission at a development journal, a research community was included in the process of collective reflexivity that is different from sociological theory, not only due to its thematic focus. Contrary to sociological theory, development resarch is multi-disciplinary and close to policy and practice. With this came a change in the way in which the collective was being reflected. The reviewers never questioned the relevance of needs (concepts) for readers of the European Journal of Development Research. Rather, they advised me how to make the Article understandable across the boundaries between different communities within this broader audience, and which of the many different analytical choices should be taken up to best make a contribution here. The reviewers established collectivity by helping to render the Article accessible in a thematic field that is marked by a multiplicity of understandings and approaches. They achieved this through sharing their knowledge of diverse disciplinary resources with me. The diversity of needs discourses raises the risk of unknowingly choosing the wrong terms for certain audiences. Misunderstandings can strengthen fruitless distinctions and impede mutual learning. Such effects will be addressed in the next section.
Critical and functionalist perspectives
While the previous section addressed the concept of basic needs, this section turns to the question which kind of knowledge it can help produce. The Article proposes to use the distinction between (universal) needs and (variable) satisfiers to produce a reflexive form of knowledge: knowledge of potential narrowings in the cognitive and evaluative frameworks that underlie development policies, as well as of features of contextual realities that might be overlooked because of such narrowings. Taking into account the variable relations between needs and satisfiers can help avoid detect and avoid these narrowings. 5 Specifically, it can help avoid the following errors when proposing a particular development strategy: (a) to consider it the only possible one, thus overlooking possibly better ways of achieving the desired goal; (b) to assume that the strategy of choice will work the same in any context; (c) to consider the strategy as only good, while in reality, virtually all strategies will have both positive and negative effects. One reviewer warned that if I do not express myself very precisely, readers will not receive the overall message. S/he recommended in particular to speak of potential or candidate satisfiers instead of just satisfiers at certain points. This would better convey the message about the satisfiers’ variability.
The Article was inspired by two (seemingly) opposed approaches: First, by the post-development approach, which criticizes established development knowledge for its Eurocentric bias. This bias produces those kinds of potentially damaging narrowings. Second, by sociological functionalism, which proposes to use the variable relations between ‘functions’ and social structures as analytical tools. This should animate researchers to think out of the box (cf. Kangas, 2012; Luhmann, 2005; Merton, 1968). However, post-developmental literatures typically depict functionalism, including especially the work of Talcott Parsons, as a cornerstone of Eurocentric social theory and modernization theories. These theories provide an important foundation of Western-biased development knowledge with its damaging narrowings.
The Article’s original version used Max-Neef (1991) to introduce the idea of variable satisfiers and then drew on the functionalistic framework to explain those three features of satisfiers. One reviewer indicated that the linkage between functionalism and human needs approaches was not clearly explained. The linkage, s/he said, might be evident, as both functionalists and human needs theories focus on interdependence. This view surprised me. Max-Neef and sociological functionalists put forward different images of contemporary society. The former adheres to a radical criticism of Western capitalism, the latter emphasizes ambivalences, that is, positive and negative aspects of Western modern societies. The needs concept thus establishes links and potentials for mutual learning, not only between post-development and sociological functionalism, but also between the latter and approaches critical of capitalism more generally.
Later I presented the not yet published Article at conferences on post-development and decolonial research and practice, arguing that the needs concept could support these audiences in realizing their progressive agendas. I tried to heed the reviewers’ advice to express myself very carefully. The presentation at a conference on post-development first quoted Ivan Illich, saying that the notion of ‘basic needs’ had been used to make people dependent on state services, consumer goods, and experts who are telling them what they ‘need’. 6 This criticism seemed justified but it applied only to the hegemonic understanding of basic needs in international development discourses. The less well-known literature on so-called basic human needs had developed the needs vocabulary as a source for empowering people. This vocabulary could contribute to bringing about a more humane, equitable and ecologically wise world, which is the central goal of the post-development community. Hardly anyone responded to this message. Rather, participants asked how the proposed approach considered power.
At a workshop on decolonial research and practice, participants discussed blind spots of the political economy perspective (i.e. culture) and how to remedy them. Following up on their observations, I proposed that Talcott Parsons could make a contribution and tried to explain. At this point, the until then very harmonious interaction became conflict-ridden and hostile. One participant suggested that I was obviously not informed about basic readings in the decolonial literature. Because I was stressed, I do not remember the specific arguments s/he put forward. The chair made some calming and pacifying statements. S/he concluded the session by this summary: The two presented papers start from post-colonial critiques of narrowings and distortions in our theories and methods and reflect how these can be improved.
With post-development and decolonial scholars the composition of audiences participating in the process of collective reflexivity changed again. It now included communities that shared with the reviewers an interest in specific proposals for more progressive trajectories of policy, research and/or practice (e.g. Kothari et al., 2019). However, they put these proposals forward from a radical criticism of dominant forms of knowledge and practice and strongly emphasize power hierarchies, both within the overall society and academia. With this shift came a change in the way the collective was being reflected (or not). Instead of trying to clarify potential misunderstandings, boundaries between different communities of research and practice were emphasized implicitly or explicitly. Their disciplinary resources, such as their vocabularies, goals, and methods, were depicted as opposite and irreconcilable – if at all: what was most striking is that indifference prevailed in the audience’s reactions to the Article. The reviewers’ communicative behaviour had corresponded to that of post-development practitioners as portrayed by Alberto Acosta at that conference. These practitioners, he said, were not being interested in ideological camps but rather in how equity can be achieved. 7 While the participants of the conference fundamentally shared this progressive orientation, we did not succeed in overcoming ideological camps when discussing basic needs. Therefore collectivity was not established.
In a preparatory workshop to this special issue, GSP scholars offered an explanation. Critical researchers and practitioners repeatedly found that their proposals were being ‘captured’ by those whom they criticized, that is, international development agencies and the epistemic communities surrounding them. They were concerned that ultimately their proposals could be used in a way that causes damage instead of improving human well-being. The basic needs concept figures as an outstanding example of such hostile appropriation. It now became manifest that ‘basic needs’ is not only a complex thematic field, but a mined area as well. In reality there are commonalities between ‘camps’ depicted as opposite, such as between sociological functionalism and Max-Neef, or between modernization theories and their critiques. Yet the respective audiences might be unaware of these interconnections or consider them irrelevant compared with the damage that has been caused in the name of basic needs. Thus, when Bob Deacon once innocently proposed to use the needs concept in GSP, he sparked an outcry in the community. 8
Against this background, the chair at the workshop on decolonial research and practice concluded with a notable remark. It addressed all three aspects of collective reflexivity in a forward-looking manner: First, s/he made clear that several theories and methods were needed rather than just one to overcome the narrowings and distortions identified by postcolonial critiques. Thereby, s/he encouraged the attendees to cooperate across (sub-)disciplinary boundaries. Second, disciplinary resources: S/he explicitly acknowledged the kind of contribution the Article wanted to make. This is an important step: In a contested field with a mixed audience like that present at the workshop, underlying intentions are difficult to perceive. Third, the chair established a unifying element and, thereby, collectivity: All attendees shared the postcolonial critique; all saw a need to work on ways to remedy the perceived deficits; and all felt that this could turn out to be a difficult task.
Sociologists from ‘Global South’ and ‘Global North’
The two previous sections considered one aspect of positionality, namely, positionality within academia. This section turns to positions within global society at large. One widespread set of categories for positioning people in global society are those of ‘Global South’ and ‘Global North’. These binary categories have for justified reasons been problematized, yet are used widely, including in critical, decolonial discourses, where the term ‘Southern approaches’ is widespread. In the author’s personal network, some significant differences between Southern and Northern sociologists’ views on basic needs have become visible. These are not representative for Southern nor for Northern scholars. Yet, my colleagues’ arguments seem relevant in the context of this article, and for this reason should be included.
Contrasting with the decolonial scholars referred to in the previous section, some African colleagues expressed an affirmative attitude towards both the decolonial critique and the basic needs concept. When discussing our views on decolonization, development and sociology in a group composed of sociologists from Ethiopia, Nigeria and Austria, we agreed on the following understanding: 9 Sociology aims at development, by which we understand the amelioration of the human condition. This requires examining and understanding people, their cultures, socio-economic and political systems in their own contexts within the exigencies of the larger global system. However, in Africa, knowledge generation and production are guided predominantly by Western epistemology and pedagogies. Decolonizing sociology therefore means contextualization and indigenization of ontology, epistemology and pedagogy. For African researchers, it means to produce homegrown research and teaching oriented towards the welfare and basic needs satisfaction of African people, 10 rather than towards Northern audiences. In contrast to these views, the authors’ ‘Northern’ peers from sociological theory showed disinterest or resistance towards the basic needs concept, as discussed above. 11
These differences resonate with Raewynn Connell’s (2018) decolonial critique. She argues that Northern sociology mostly deals with themes that are ‘marginal to the biggest issues. It’s hard to get worked up about reflexive modernity or shifting subjectivies when you are facing starvation in a drought, rampant pollution in a mega-city [. . .] and other such inconveniences of modern life’ (Connell, 2018: 403). In Connell’s view, land is a rare category in Northern social theory, however was a key issue for Western empires and still is one for ‘postcolonial indigenous life’ (Connell, 2018). Connell’s depiction of typical Northern sociological themes reminds of Pierre Bourdieu’s (2000) interpretation of upper-class people’s lifestyles and evaluations. Members of the upper classes surround themselves with ‘distinguished’ cultural objects (‘high’ arts) while taking a distance from the ‘necessities’ in less well-off people’s lives.
Assumed that Connell’s diagnosis of a prosperity bias in Northern sociologists’ thematic interests is justified, one might wonder whether this will change in the long term. There is a widespread perception of cumulating crises in contemporary Northern sociology, and interest in socio-ecological transformation is growing. Both might lead to an enhanced engagement with elementary foundations of survival and well-being, which might open up new opportunities for collaboration across (sub)disciplinary boundaries. Collectivity between Southern and Northern sociologists, but also between sociological theory and GSP could be strengthened and existing boundaries be overcome through a shared interest in basic needs. Such an interest could eventually even lead to the mainstreaming of basic needs provision in research and practice, analogous to the now widely established mainstreaming of gender. This would stimulate the production of new disciplinary resources.
Diverse backgrounds
The preceding section argued that new forms of collectivity and new perspectives might emerge through an enhanced interest in basic needs. This section takes up this thread by addressing a final series of feedbacks. According to the chair’s concluding remark at the decolonial workshop, the Article reflects ‘how narrowings and distortions in our theories and methods can be improved’. In this reading, the Article does not propose a specific theory but rather a tool for improving existing ones. New theories would only become visible once the tool had been applied. When discussing the published Article in a sociological colloquium, the colleagues traced the path sketched by the chair. Spontaneously adopting the needs-satisfier distinction, they contributed observations from their respective fields.
A sociologist of religion argued that actors were often not talking about basic needs from a neutral point of view, as the Article seemed to suggest. At a UN meeting, conservative activists presented the family as a means of poverty eradication and thus a satisfier. However, their true aim was to preserve the traditional family against a perceived threat from progressive gender policies. All participants understood that the conservatives’ intervention was ideological. They ended up debating on how family should be defined, whereas poverty was no longer an issue.
Applying the issue of values to another example, the participants discussed housing as a potential satisfier for many needs: People themselves define which of their needs to prioritize and which kind of housing they therefore ‘need’. However, like the conservatives, Austrian housing policy-makers propagate one specific model that all people allegedly need. Even if this kind of housing does not fulfil needs, it is seen as good in itself. Satisfiers are thus turned into values that cannot be debated. A scholar from rural sociology added to this by reporting from his fieldwork in a Zambian village. Here dwellings were oriented on religious needs. When their inhabitants died, the hut would be burnt to free their souls. However, when they saw the stone-made houses of Whites, the villagers wanted these dwellings for themselves. As part of a development project, they created a mixture of both, made of bricks, but this did not work. Then the bricks producer said that production would be stopped and the houses remain as they are. By telling this story, the colleague pointed to a social dynamic in which one category of satisfiers (housing) became relevant for different needs. The ‘traditional’ and ‘Western-bourgeois’ dwellings each satisfied either religious needs or needs for comfort. A fully ‘synergic’ satisfier (Max-Neef, 1991), which would fulfil both needs simultaneously, could not be found.
Some months earlier, a GSP scholar contributed observations which could offer a direction for solving this dilemma. Boone’s (2014) arguments concerning land rights, as discussed in the Article, he said, would resonate with his view on inclusive social policy. Inclusive social policy must be designed so as to be complex rather than monistic. To meet the needs of all target groups, it must consist of different but well-matched elements. Applied to the example of housing, there must be wood and stones; their specific qualities cannot be provided by bricks. My colleague’s reading of Boone also shed a new light on the functionalistic framework. Luhmann’s so-called equivalence functionalism invites researchers to search for functional equivalents, by which he means different satisfiers for a need (cf. Kangas, 2012: 63ff.). Luhmann presented these as alternatives. We can try to meet a given need either by Satisfier A or by Satisfier B, and each would have different implications. By thinking about combining different satisfiers for a given need or groups of need, sociological functionalism could be developed further.
In these discussions, reflexivity again took a different form. The participants, who came from all hitherto involved (sub-)disciplines, established collectivity by together exploring possible uses, limits and potentials of the needs-satisfier distinction. (Intra-)disciplinary boundaries were not addressed. Rather, they were crossed without further ado by picking up disciplinary resources such as examples from other fields, and following up on them with additional new ideas and observations. The participants showed subject-related expertise, openness and an ability to relate to others across (sub-)disciplinary boundaries in a precise manner. Perhaps it was due to this combination that the discussion led to a wealth of relevant perspectives.
Conclusion
Berten and Wolkenhauer suggest reflecting on GSP as a whole rather than focussing on individual experiences. In fact, the feedback to the Article addressed the goals, vocabularies, boundaries and real-world effects of GSP and other disciplines. Both the sociological theorists and the reviewers at a development journal emphasized the necessity of becoming clear about conceptual aspects. They challenged me to respond to fundamental criticisms of the needs concept, thus helping to advance the quality of the Article. Post-development and decolonial scholars were indifferent. They seemed to perceive the Article, and the basic needs concept more generally, to be just another expression of hegemonic Western development and social theory. Conversely, my African colleagues emphasized emancipatory potentials of the basic needs idea: For African researchers, to engage in decolonized research requires to prioritize basic needs of people living in Africa. Participants in a sociological local colloquium spontaneously applied the distinction between needs and satisfiers to interpret social processes in different societal fields, thereby generating new perspectives. Because none of these contributions was without alternatives, the reflexive process could have taken a different direction. Reflecting about how and with what consequences we engage in reflexivity can therefore enhance academic research and policymaking in GSP.
When the basic needs idea gained prominence in international development debates in the 1970s, it turned out to be a political issue. Similarly, in the feedbacks to the Article, the idea was controversial, and sometimes provoked emotional reactions. At the same time, the process of collective reflexivity was productive. Audiences from different (sub-)disciplines contributed in-depth and concise reflections. Although they did not meet in person, their arguments interlinked in meaningful ways. Obviously, the idea of basic needs functions as a bridging concept – a boundary object that enables communication across disciplines by combining identity and plasticity (Star and Griesemer, 1989). The term ‘(basic) needs’ has different meanings – a strong motivation, a requirement, a value. Yet it retains a common identity across different fields of practice and research. Depending on discipline, the (potential) uses of the basic needs concept will differ. In the process of collective reflexivity recounted here, basic needs were discussed as a variable in the explanation of human behaviour; as a value for comparing life chances; as a reflective tool to discern narrowings in policy frameworks; as an instrument of power; as a value to which sociological research should orient; and as a tool for comparing social processes.
Given these different uses and interests, how can collective reflexivity be progressive, as envisioned by Berten and Wolkenhauer in their introduction to this special issue? The concluding remark of the chair in the decolonial workshop is important here because it enabled integration – not in the sense of an all-encompassing theory or framework, but rather in the form of a temporarily shared focus or goal. The chair acknowledged that the participants of the workshop were committed to different and possibly conflicting theoretical and methodological approaches. Yet s/he reminded us that we were bound together by a shared goal (i.e. to improve distortions in our theories and methods that have been identified by post-colonial critiques). Likewise, the engagements and projects of GSP researchers and practitioners will differ widely. Still, when entering in a process of collective reflexivity, it will be conducive to recognize some shared focus. Even if at a very general level such as to enhance knowledge, this will improve the quality of our reflections and enable us to advance in our shared as well as in our differing endeavours.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
