In order to cope with the economic fall-out from the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU countries hit hardest by the virus requested fiscal support from the other EU member states. Likewise, the Eurozone arguably depends on some form of a fiscal union. This international redistribution critically depends on citizens’ support. Do politically knowledgeable citizens develop preferences for fiscal redistribution that are different from those of ignorant citizens? Based on the 2014 European Election Study, this article argues that knowledge plays a limited and conditional role. It hardly exerts a systematic independent effect. Rather, it helps crystallize party cues and basic European integration values. My findings are consistent with a theory, according to which knowledge eases the process of rationalizing preferences that originate in previous basic orientations.
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